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Abstract
This thesis examines the processing of quantificational semantics 
during reading. It is motivated by some formal observations made by 
Barwise and Cooper (1981), and a psychological theory proposed by 
Moxey and Sanford (1987,1993a). Barwise and Cooper classify 
quantifiers in terms of the directional scalar inference they license. 
Quantifiers like a few and many are described as monotone-increasing 
which means that what is true about a subset is also true of the 
superset. For instance, if a few student passed the exam with ease, this 
entails that a few students passed the exam. Other quantifiers like few  and 
not many are monotone-decreasing, and license inferences in the 
opposite direction. If it is true thalfezv students passed the exam, this 
entails that/ezu students passed the exam zuith ease.
Moxey and Sanford found that these categories of quantifier produce 
contrasting patterns of focus. They used an off-line production task to 
demonstrate the monotone-increasing quantifiers, like a few  and many 
focus processing attention on that subset of the quantified NP which is 
true of the sentence predicate (called the 'refset'), and that subsequent 
pronouns are interpreted as referring to this set. This means that given 
a fragment like (1), the plural pronoun will be interpreted as referring 
to the set of students who passed the exam.
(1) A few of the students passed the exam. T hey . . .
In contrast, monotone-decreasing quantifiers like few  and not many 
exhibit a more diffuse pattern of focus, and permit subsequent 
reference to either the refset, or the complement of this set (called the 
compset), which is false of the sentence predicate. This means that the 
plural pronoun in (2) can be interpreted as either referring to the set of 
student who passed the exam, or those who failed it.
(2) A few of the students passed the exam. They . . .
However, the off-line nature of the Moxey and Sanford studies limit 
them as descriptions of reading processes, so this thesis reports a series
of experimental investigations of pronominal reference during reading. 
The first two studies used materials like (3) in a self-paced reading 
experiment to demonstrate that reference is easier when the anaphor 
describes a property of the refset (their presence) following monotone- 
increasing quantification, but that reference to either a property of the 
refset (their presence) or compset (their absence) is possible following 
monotone-decreasing quantification, although there is a preference for 
compset reference.
(3) [A few | Few] of the MPs attended the meeting.
Their [presence | absence] helped the meeting run more 
smoothly.
A second two experiments monitored subjects' eye movements as the 
read passages like (3) in order to determine the locus and time course of 
referential processes. In line with other studies (eg. Garrod,
Freudenthal and Boyle, 1993), it was predicted that the anaphor would 
be immediately interpreted as anomalous when it describes the 
unfocused antecedent. However the studies failed to find any evidence 
of punctuate effects. A further eye movement study was conducted 
with a revised set of materials but still failed to find evidence of 
punctuate anomaly detection in the two quantificational conditions. It 
was concluded that pronominal reference to a quantified noun-phrase 
is not processed on-line, i.e. it is not processed as the anaphor is read.
Chapter eight presents two experiments on the interpretation of the 
non-monotonic quantifier only a fezv. It was suggested that this has the 
simple function of marking a set relative to expectations, and that focus 
is pragmatically determined. Focus is maintained on the refset when 
the quantified sentence describes a situation which is consistent with 
expectations, but the compset is placed in focus when these 
expectations are violated. Experiment six uses a sentence-continuation 
task to demonstrate these preferences, and an interaction with sentence 
connectives. Experiment seven monitored subjects' eye movements are 
they read sentences which referred to either the refset or compset of a 
sentence quantified by only a few. There was no evidence that the 
processing of pronominal reference is contingent on the focusing 
properties of this quantifier.
Chapters nine and ten make a digression to consider the interpretation 
of sentences with more than one quantifier. The resulting scope 
ambiguity has been the subject of considerable theoretical interest, but 
limited empirical research. The existing literature is reviewed in 
Chapter nine, and a preliminary off-line sentence-continuation study is 
reported in Chapter ten which examines the interaction of quantifier 
and pragmatic constraints on a doubly-quantified sentence. The 
experimental findings are summarised in Chapter eleven, where an 
effort is made to accommodate the quantifier focus and scope 
ambiguity strands of this thesis within a common representational 
framework.
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1Chapter one: 
Processing consequences of a model-theoretic approach 
to natural language quantification 
Introduction
The experiments reported in later chapters investigate the interpretation of 
natural language quantifiers during text comprehension, and take as their 
starting point a theory of quantifier function proposed by Moxey and Sanford 
(1987,1993a). This theory is partly motivated by observations from model- 
theoretic semantics, and particularly the work of researchers applying 
developments in Generalised Quantifier Theory (Mostowski, 1957) to 
linguistics (cf. Barwise and Cooper, 1981; Keenan and Stavi, 1986; Westerstahl, 
1989). However, while Moxey and Sanford note some parallels between 
model-theoretic and psychological approaches to semantics, others have 
argued for a closer correspondence (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1982,1983). This chapter 
assesses the contribution of model-theoretic semantics and generalised 
quantifier theory to a psychological account of quantificational semantics.
The chapter has two main sections. The first section provides an overview of 
the model-theoretic approach to natural language semantics, and particularly 
the approach to natural language quantification. It then concentrates on some 
attempts to produce a detailed categorisation of natural language quantifiers in 
terms of semantic properties. This includes the properties of conservativity and 
extensionality, which define the context-dependency or independency of 
quantifiers, and the properties of monotonicity and persistence, which are used 
to describe directional inferences associated with those quantifiers. The most 
important of these is the property of monotonicity, which is shown to be 
related to a syntactic phenomena called negativity (Klima, 1964).
The second section of the chapter describes three processing accounts of natural 
language quantification. The first of these proposes that the processing 
complexity of quantifiers is explained by the properties of monotonicity and 
persistence. The second account proposes that processing complexity can be 
described in terms of the complexity of the automaton that would be required 
to determine the truth of a quantified sentence. The third account is a 
psychological account, but is consistent with a categorisation of quantifiers in 
term of monotonicity. The next chapter will consider the correlation
2between the semantic property of monotonicity and the psychologically- 
motivated sub-division of quantifiers described by Moxey and Sanford (1987). 
In order to set the scene for this comparison, we begin with a brief overview of 
Moxey and Sanford's account of quantification.
Moxey and Sanford (1987) describe how some quantifiers (eg. a few  and few) are 
used in partitive constructions of the form Q uantifier of the N  VP to focus 
processing attention onto contrasting subsets of the quantified noun. They 
argue that the noun is divided into two subsets, called the refset and compset; 
where the refset is that part of the quantified NP of which the VP predicate is 
true, while the compset is that part of the quantified NP which is false of the 
predicate. One sub-category of quantifiers (including a few) is thought to 
exclusively focus processing attention on the refset, and another sub-category 
(including few) preferentially focuses on the compset. Figure 1 illustrates the 
partition of a noun-phrase by a few.
Set of all MPs
Subset of MPs 
who attended the 
meetingREFSET
COMPSET Subset of MPs 
who did not 
attend the 
meeting.
Given Ihe sentence A  fezv of the MPs went to the meeting, the refset is the subset of 
MPs w ho did attend the meeting, and the com pset is the com plem ent subset who 
did not attend the m eeting. ________________________________________________
Figure 1:
Refset and compset partitions of a plural noun-phrase.
Some experimental evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that quantifier 
focus guides coherence processes like anaphoric reference, and can influence 
the content of inferences. For example, Moxey and Sanford (1987) report 
sentence-continuation studies where subjects read sentence fragments like (1)
3or (2), and interpreted the plural pronoun as referring to the focal subset of the 
quantified NP. This meant that the pronoun was interpreted as reference to the 
refset of MPs who did not attend the meeting following quantification by a few, 
but tended to be interpreted as reference to the compset following 
quantification b y  few.
(1) A few of the MPs went to the meeting.
(2) Few MPs went to the meeting,
The content of the sentence continuations also appeared to be determined by 
the form of quantification. Quantification by a fezv tended to result in sentences 
which simply continued the narrative from the perspective of the refset, but 
quantification by few  resulted in reasons for, or consequences of, the small 
refset.
Unfortunately, because Moxey and Sanford tested language production, their 
experimental studies cannot be interpreted in terms of comprehension 
processes. It may be that the observed focus effects are a part of language 
production processes involved in generating sentence continuations. Or more 
plausibly, they may have been due to strategic processing performed in 
response to the specific task demands, and not representative of normal 
language processing. The present experiments address questions about the 
comprehension of anaphora in quantificational contexts, and use 
methodologies (e.g. self-paced reading and measures of eye movements during 
reading) which do not draw conscious attention to the experimental 
manipulation, and are not so prone to strategic processing.
Model-theoretic semantics
The above account, and particularly the model illustrated in Figure 1, depends 
on the interpretation of NPs, VPs and quantifiers as descriptions of set 
representations. A similar approach is formalised in model-theoretic semantics 
(Montague, 1974; see Dowty, Wall and Peters, 1981), where linguistic 
expressions are translated into set descriptions. This is a complex and non- 
intuitive account, but one which is fundamental to the semantic properties 
described later in this chapter, and deserves a detailed introduction.
According to the theory, two intermediary sets of functions called intensions 
and extensions are required to translate linguistic expressions into set 
descriptions. These are the modern equivalents of Frege's (1892) distinction 
between the sense and reference of an expression. The reference (or extension)
4describes the objects picked out by the expression in a given state of affairs; 
while the sense (intension) of an expression is the criteria used to make this 
selection, whatever the state of affairs. Linguistic expressions are first mapped 
onto their intension using a general interpreting function (see Figure 2). After 
this, intensions perform a more complex function of mapping possible worlds 
(all the conceivable states of affairs) onto the appropriate extension for each of 
those possible worlds. Finally, extensions pick out the set description of a 
linguistic expression in a given possible world.
The power of this approach can be demonstrated by a simple example. 
Consider the expression the Prime Minister. Five years ago this would have had 
the person Margaret Thatcher as its extension. The same expression evaluated 
today has as its extension another individual with the name John Major. 
Between these two times the intension of the expression has not changed, the 
individual who is the Prune Minister has been selected using the same criteria, 
but with different extensional results. Moreover, the two points in time used to 
evaluate the expression are but two possible worlds, and there are clearly 
others that could have been used to produce different extensions. For instance, 
the Prime Minister would refer to James Callaghan or Edward Heath at different 
periods of the 1970's, and it is even possible to think of an imaginary situation 
where Mickey Mouse is the appropriate extension. In fact, there are an infinite 
num ber of possible worlds which can be used by intensions to generate 
extensions.
LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS
General
interpreting
function
POSSIBLE 
WO R IDS
Intensions of linguistic 
expressions APPROPRIATE 
EXTENSIONS IN 
DIFFERENT POSSIBLE 
WORLDS
Figure 2: The interpretation of a linguistic expression in model-theoretic 
semantics. From All wood, Andersson and Dahl (1977)
While a straightforward extensional semantics is sufficient for most purposes, 
adding intensions and possible worlds avoids some pitfall originally observed
5by Frege (1892). The worst of these is the inability of extensional semantics to 
distinguish between expressions which pick out the same set, even though 
these expressions are intuitively different. A classic demonstration uses the 
expressions morning star and everting star. Although these are both descriptions 
of the planet Venus, one describes its presence in the morning, and the other 
describes its presence at night. Because they share the same extension they are 
treated as semantically equivalent. However, the difference between the two 
can be captured using intensions and possible worlds. These allow for the 
existence of an alternative world where the expressions do not share the same 
extension, but actually describe two separate stars: one that appears in the 
morning and another which appears at dusk. Since intensions provide the 
criteria for determining the extension of an expression for each possible world 
the intensions of morning star and evening star necessarily differ.
A similar problem occurs when different expressions have the empty set as 
their extension. Examples of these would be the set of female Presidents of the 
United States, or dogs who can play Beethoven (Allwood, Andersson and Dahl, 
1977). Again, without possible worlds and intensions these descriptions are 
semantically indistinguishable. With possible worlds the expressions have 
conceivable non-empty extensions in some alternative world, and therefore 
must have different intensions.
The introduction of two further principles allow the model-theoretic approach 
to provide intensions and extensions for complete sentences. The first of these 
is the principle of compositionality (following Frege, 1892), which asserts that 
the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings of its parts. Montague 
argues that a functional composition of the intensions of the sentence parts will 
determine the sentence intension, which can be evaluated against a model to 
return a truth-value. To achieve compositionality, Montague introduces 
isomorphic syntax and semantics as a second principle. This is achieved by 
specifying semantic types which correspond to syntactic categories, and 
semantic composition rules which parallel the rules of grammar. Johnson- 
Laird (1983) neatly describes the relationship as semantic ingredients mixed 
according to a syntactic recipe.
The semantic type assigned to an expression also defines its set description in a 
given model. For example, the Montagovian equivalent of intransitive verb 
describes, in a particular model, the set of individuals for whom the verb 
predicate is true. So a verb like smiles will pick out that set of individuals for 
whom it is true. Similarly, transitive verbs describe a set of ordered pairs,
6where the predicate is true of each pair. The verb-phrase is married to will pick 
out a set of paired individuals in the model. The treatment of noun-phrases, 
like the boys, is less intuitive. They describe a set of sets, where each of the 
subsets is the extension of one of the properties of the noun-phrase. So the 
extension of the boys is the set of extensions for all of the predicates which are 
properties of the noun-phrase. These might include the properties are male, are 
young and play football Proper names like Tom also pick out a set of sets, but 
can be interpreted as the intersection of the set of predicates which form the 
properties of the proper noun. This will be a single individual in the model 
(unless it contains more than one person called Tom).
The composition rule for noun-phrases and verb-phrases states that the 
resulting sentence is true if the set described by the extension of the verb- 
phrase is a subset of the set described by the extension of the noun-phrase. In 
other words, the sentence is true if the verb-phrase describes one of the 
properties of the noun-phrase.
Formal and psychological approaches to semantics 
Formal and psychological theories of semantics have different objectives. A 
formal approach like model-theoretic semantics is concerned with the means of 
determining the truth of a sentence with respect to a fixed and known model of 
the world; or to put it another way, it is concerned with specifying the 
necessary conditions for the truth of a sentence. A psychological theory, in 
contrast, must explain what model of the world is consistent with the meaning 
of a sentence, and explain the process of arriving at this interpretation. It must 
also explain how this interpretative process interacts with other factors. For 
instance, it must describe how the interpretation assigned to a sentence is 
further constrained by knowledge about the prior context, the plausibility of 
alternative interpretations, and the pragmatics of the described situation.
The relationship which holds between formal and psychological accounts may 
be similar to that which holds between theories of syntax and parsing.
Syntactic theory attempts to specify the rules which govern the structure of 
grammatical sentences, while a theory of parsing describes the computation of 
that sentence structure. Some theories of parsing (e.g. Frazier and Fodor, 1978) 
adopt a particular syntactic theory as the description of the output structures, 
then propose a set of procedures to compute these structures. The parsing 
theory must be able to explain why one syntactic structure is preferred over 
another when the sentence is ambiguous, and account for the difficulty
7experienced when reading particular sentences. This means that a parsing 
theory will be correct to the extent that the adopted syntactic theory describes 
the mental representation of syntax, and that the parser is a description of 
sentence processing.
Some researchers (e.g. Hall-Partee, 1979; Johnson-Laird, 1982,1983) have 
argued for a similar approach to semantics. According to this approach, formal 
semantics is a theory of linguistic competence, which provides an idealised 
account of the relationship between sentences and models of the world, 
whereas a psychological theory is an account of linguistic performance. It must 
describe the extent to which the idealised account can be accommodated within 
the limitations of the sentence processing system.
Both Hall-Partee and Johnson-Laird acknowledge that the impossibility of 
cramming the infinite number of possible worlds into the finite capacity of a 
brain is a major performance restriction. They propose two ways around this 
problem: either there is a limit on the number of possible worlds that can be 
mentally represented, or there is a set of procedures to generate possible worlds 
as they are needed. Hall-Partee and Johnson-Laird favour the latter solution. 
This introduces a secondary problem of whether a language user with limited 
access to possible worlds can be aware of the intensions of words. Intensions 
were defined in the previous section as a function from the set of all possible 
worlds to extensions in a given world. However, these intensional functions 
cannot work if there is restricted access to the possible worlds. Hall-Partee 
suggests that the problem is avoided by allowing partial functions as 
intensions. This implies a language user who is not unaware, but has an 
imperfect awareness of the intensions of words, which concords with informal 
observations by Johnson-Laird (1982). He notes that while a language user 
might claim to fully understand a particular sentence, she will have greater 
difficulty in defining many of the component words.
Other performance restrictions are appropriate for the representation of a 
single model. We have already seen the complexity of the formal semantic 
treatment of noun-phrases, where they are represented as a set of all the 
properties which are true of the noun-phrase. It is unlikely that this degree of 
detail is mentally represented, if only because it requires more than the 
available partial intensions. Hall-Partee (1979) suggests that only partial 
mental representations are constructed and that "communication is possible as 
long as there is sufficient similarity in our partial models and our imperfect 
semantics" (Hall-Partee (1979, p39).
8The degraded nature of mental representations is easy to demonstrate. 
Johnson-Laird (1982) distinguishes between the logical completeness of a 
formal semantics model, where there is a determinate truth-value for any 
sentence evaluated against it, and what he refers to as the 'radical 
incompleteness' of mental representations. Often the truth of a sentence is 
indeterminate with respect to a mental model because of the relative poverty of 
the representation. Johnson-Laird argues that quantified sentences like (4) have 
an indeterminate truth-value relative to the model described by (3), because (3) 
can describe a situation where the difference between the set of smokers and set 
of vegetarians is the empty set, or one where the difference is a set of smokers 
who are not vegetarian.
(3) All of the vegetarians are smokers.
(4) Some of the smokers are not vegetarians.
Sentence (3), he suggests, is represented either by a number of separate models, 
or by a simultaneous representation of the sets of possible states or affairs, and 
a model of the determinate aspects of the discourse. Spatial descriptions offer 
further evidence of indeterminacy that require multiple or vague 
representations (cf. Mani and Johnson-Laird, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1983), as 
does multiple quantification. For example, a sentence like (5) is ambiguous 
between at least two interpretations, one where every man loves the same woman, 
or one where every man loves some or other woman. Multiply-quantified 
sentences are further discussed in Chapters nine and ten.
(5) Every man loves a woman.
These examples describe the indeterminacy of some quantified sentences. 
However, a separate hypothesis will be pursued in this thesis; it will explore 
the claim that quantifiers are used to direct the construction of mental 
representations, in order to achieve the shared partial representations which 
Hall-Partee believes to be necessary for successful communication. Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne (1991) report an experiment on syllogistic reasoning which 
illustrates what this means. Their subjects read syllogisms where the first 
premise was either quantified by all (6) or only (7). These two sentences have 
the same truth conditions, but Johnson-Laird and Byrne predicted that the 
mental representation of (7) included the explicit information that anyone who 
is not a baker is also not an athlete, whereas this remains indeterminate in the 
mental representation of (6).
9(6) All of the bakers are athletes.
(7) Only the bakers are athletes.
This prediction was supported by the finding that subjects who then read a 
second premise like (8) were more likely to conclude that Mark was not an 
athlete when this premise followed (7) than when it followed (6).
(8) Mark is not a baker.
It m aybe that the mental representations for sentences quantified by afezu and 
few  differ from each other in a similar way. A quantified sentence like (9) might 
produce a mental representation of the refset of MPs who attended the 
meeting, but remain indeterminate about the compset of MPs who were absent. 
This would explain the difficulty in making pronominal reference to the 
compset. However, the mental representation of a sentence (10) might include 
both the refset and compset, and so enable reference to either subset.
(9) A few of the MPs went to the meeting.
(10) Few MPs went to the meeting,
The rem ainder of this chapter will focus on formal approaches to natural 
language quantification, then consider three attempts to translate these into 
processing accounts.
Model-theoretic quantification
Montague (1974) extends the model-theoretic approach to include a radical 
treatment of quantification which preserves the syntactic and semantic 
uniformity apparent in natural language. The more traditional logic of 
predicate calculus1 describes two quantificational operators which express the 
mathematical properties of existence and universality. These correspond only 
loosely to the natural language descriptions at least one and all The quantifiers 
prefix logical formulae and are used as a means of introducing variables. For 
instance, in (11) the universal quantifier (V) binds the variable 'x ' which 
appears in the formula as the operand of the function 'R', to assert that for all 
substitutions of the variable 'x', the application of function 'R' is true. Longer 
formulae might include multiple occurrences of the variable which are all 
interpreted as bound by the quantifier.
1 cf. A ndersson el al, (1977), M cCawley (1981).
10
(11) Vx(Rx)
Translating a quantified sentence into predicate logic disrupts the syntactic 
form of the original. For example, (12) has (13) as its logical interpretation.
Here the quantifier some is interpreted (imprecisely) as the existential quantifier
(3), and the noun and verb-predicate order is reversed. The quantifier is placed 
outside the formula as a means of introducing the variable boy.
(12) Some boy runs.
(13) 3 boy (RUN(boy))
In contrast, Montague attends to the structure of natural language to treat 
quantifier syntactic operators on nouns like boys to produce noun-phrases like 
some boys. Semantically, they no longer prefix formulae as a means of 
introducing and binding variables, but enter into the formulae as functions on 
nouns. We have already discussed the extensional semantics of verb-phrases 
and noun-phrases as properties and sets of properties respectively. A 
combination of an NP and VP produces a sentence, which is true if the property 
which is the extension of the VP is a member of the set of properties which are 
the extension of the NP. Quantified NP's have as their extension a superset of 
the properties that are true of the unquantified noun. For example, it might be 
true of the plural noun men that they run and jump; but some man might only 
run and not jump. As with unquantified NPs, the combination of quantified NP 
and VP is true if the property described by the VP is a member of the set of 
properties denoted by the quantified NP.
The uniformity of this approach is attractive, but there are some problem cases 
(Westerst&hl, 1984, 1989). The most immediate of these are examples of 
quantifiers which do not operate on nouns, but instead appear to act 
anaphorically. Westerst&hl argues that sentences like (14), (15) and (16) are 
instances where the quantifiers take a "dummy7 argument whose content is 
derived from context.
(14) Some like it hot.
(15) Few come to visit anymore.
(16) All cheered.
Further examples are complex quantifiers like something and everything which 
resemble quantifiers but do not fill the same syntactic role unless they are
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treated as complex expressions which decompose to some + thing and every + 
thing.
Generalised quantifier theory
Barwise and Cooper (1981; also Keenan and Stavi, 1986) use this general model- 
theoretic framework as the basis of a more detailed classification of quantifiers. 
Not all of the classifications are relevant to the present issue, and attention will 
be restricted to those which characterise the function of quantifiers relative to 
context, and others which describe their inferential properties. At the same 
time, it must be remembered that while researchers broadly agree about the 
classification of quantifiers, there are some disputed cases. For instance, 
Barwise and Cooper differ over judgements about the quantifiers few and many, 
which Keenan and Stavi exclude from their analysis. Keenan and Stavi also 
have problems with a few. Westerst&hl (1989) proposes different interpretations 
for many in an effort to resolve the difficulties it raises.
These quantifiers are of interest precisely because of the problems they present 
for semantic theories. Often their interpretation appears to be context- 
dependent. They are also quantifiers investigated by the present experiments, 
so are used as examples throughout the discussion of semantic categorisation 
schemes. Another quantifier, only a fezu, is also included, and is the subject of 
some experiments reported in Chapter 8.
Conservativity and extensionality
We begin with the related properties of conservativity and extensionality. 
Conservativity states that a quantifier functions over a limited domain, and that 
the truth of a quantified sentence depends only on that part of the VP extension 
which is common to the noun of the quantified NP (Westerst&hl, 1989). This 
means that no other NP sets of which the VP is true share any responsibility for 
the truth of the sentence. For example, the truth of a sentence like every sailor 
survived is only dependent on the set of sailors who survived, and no other sets 
of surviving entities. Extensionality requires that a quantified sentence 
maintains its truth-value under expansion of the model. This means that the 
truth of the sentence depends only on those aspects of the model describes by 
the sentence, and that changes to other aspects of the model will not affect the 
truth of the sentence. The precise implications of these constraints will become 
clearer in a moment, but it is sufficient to note that they require that the truth of 
a quantified sentence is independent of any other aspects of the model, which 
means that its interpretation is context-independent.
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A quantifier is judged to be conservative or extensional from intuitions about 
its performance in linguistic tests (Barwise and Cooper, 1981). The same 
method can be used to show that some of the presently considered quantifiers 
are borderline cases for the conservativity constraint (particularly only a few) 
and most of them are non-extensional. The test sentences are based on a 
scenario where a ferry carrying a crew of sailors and some passengers has sunk.
If conservativity is a property of the quantifiers used in sentences (17) to (22) 
then the truth of these sentences must depend only on the set of surviving 
sailors, and no other sets of survivors. This is clearly the case for (17) and 
probably (18), but (19) to (22) are more contentious. On one reading, the 
quantifiers in these examples describe the set of surviving sailors alone, but on 
another reading they describe a quantified amount of surviving sailors relative 
to the total number of survivors. This second reading is particularly strong for 
only a few  (sentence 22). It seems to assert that either only a few sailors survived 
relative to a much larger number of passengers, or no passengers survived. 
More will be said about this comparative function when I discuss 
extensionality.
(17) Every sailor survived.
(18) A few sailors survived.
(19) Few sailors survived.
(20) Many sailors survived.
(21) Not m any sailors survived.
(22) Only a few sailors survived.
Westerstcihl (1984) argues that the conservativity restriction should be 
broadened from quantification over the noun set of the sentence to 
quantification over "context sets' in the discourse. These are contextually 
selected sets which act as extensions for quantified NPs. In most cases the 
context set equals the noun set (Westerst&hl calls this context set the NP- 
universe), but there are exceptions, perhaps including some of the examples 
discussed above, and certainly including instances of pronominal quantifiers.
If we imagine a courtroom scenario where a wrongly-convicted person has just 
been sentenced, then the following are possible fragments of discourse about 
the event:
(23) The judge hammered his gavel. All stood up.
(24) A crowd of people jeered. All wanted justice.
In (23) all refers to all of the people in the courtroom (excluding the judge), 
which Westerst&hl calls the discourse universe. With (24) it refers only to the 
crowd of people who jeered, not the full discourse universe.
The reference of quantified NPs can also be contextually constrained. 
Westerst&hl suggests the following example (25), where most children must refer 
to the set of English children, even though the quantified NP implies an NP 
universe of all children, and the passage has a discourse universe which 
includes the children from many countries. Finally, he argues that the definite 
article selects the context set for partitive constructions like Quantifier of the N.
(25) The English love to write letters. Most children have several penpals 
in many countries.
The quantifiers in sentences (17) to (22) have two possible contexts. Either they 
operate on the NP-universe, the set of sailors, or else they operate on a broader 
context set containing all of the individuals in the discourse. This set contains 
both the sailors and the passengers on the ferry.
A similar pattern of results are observed on tests of extensionality. These 
require that the truth of a sentence is dependent only on those aspects of the 
model which are explicit in the sentence. A quantifier is demonstrably non- 
extensional if sentences like (17) to (22) are possibly false, despite the truth of 
sentences (26) to (31). By this criteria every is clearly extensional, as (17) and
(26) are synonymous; but the truth of the other quantifiers depends on what the 
set of surviving sailors is compared against. In sentences (27) to (31) this is 
clearly the full set of sailors, but the comparison set is not so obvious for 
sentences (18) to (22). For example, on some readings of (20) there might be 
many surviving sailors relative to the total number of survivors, or relative to 
the total num ber of those originally on board the ferry. Neither of these 
readings are synonymous with (29), and imply the non-extensionality of many. 
Similar alternative readings are possible for not many, few  and only a fezv. 
According to my interpretation afezo is extensional, although Keenan and Stavi 
(1986) claim that others find it non-extensional.
(26) Every sailor was a surviving sailor.
(27) A few sailors were surviving sailors.
(28) Few sailors were surviving sailors.
(29) Many sailors were surviving sailors.
(30) Not m any sailors were surviving sailors.
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(31) Only a few sailors were surviving sailors.
Westerst&hl (1989) formalises the observation that many can have several 
readings, some of which are non-extensional. He proposes three alternative 
interpretations. In one many compares the set it quantifies (the many of the NP 
under VP predication) to the size of the overall universe. In another, the 
comparison is a 'normal', or expected, frequency for the noun quantified by it.
A third interpretation compares the quantified NP to the overall frequency of 
the predicate in the universe, although Westerst&hl rejects this option because it 
also implies non-conservativity.
Further evidence of the non-extensionality of many is given by Keenan and 
Stavi (1986). Their argument depends on the reader following a lengthy story 
about a rather complicated scenario, but has the advantage of not relying on the 
reader to agree with their intuitions about sentence interpretation. Readers are 
asked to imagine an annual meeting of some society which is normally 
attended by a large number (say ten thousand) people who are qualified as 
doctors, and another one or two who are lawyers. In the year prior to one of 
these meetings all of the doctors become qualified lawyers, and the lawyers 
simultaneously become qualified as doctors, with the result that everyone is 
both a lawyer and a doctor. Now Keenan and Stavi imagine that the overall 
attendance at this year's meeting is much lower than usual: only about 500 of 
the doctor/lawyers turn up. Keenan and Stavi suggest that, although the sets 
picked out by the two expressions the doctors and the lawyers are semantically 
equivalent - they have the same extensions - sentence (32) will be true and 
sentence (33) false. This is because the attendance is judged relative to a norm 
attendance, and while this year there are many more lawyer than normal, there 
are also m any less doctors. Because of this the quantifier is necessarily non- 
extensional. Keenan and Stavi argue that a variant of this example will work as 
well for few  and, by implication, not many. Substitution of only a few  for few  
suggests that these are similarly non-extensional.
(32) Many lawyers came to the meeting this year.
(33) Many doctors came to the meeting this year.
It was noted earlier that conservativity and extensionality imply context- 
independency. The converse argument claims that quantifiers which fail to 
observe these properties will have a context-dependent function. This is the 
conclusion drawn by Westerst&hl (1989), who observes that his two non- 
extensional meanings of many require a comparison against some norm
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frequency which is not represented in the model. He also notes that the 
standard of comparison varies across contexts. For example, the sets of boys 
for (34) and (35) are many with respect to different criteria. In (36) the criteria 
vary within the one sentence. Here the many boys are compared against the 
universe of boys (which is an extensional interpretation), but many girls is 
compared against the expected frequency of girls dated by boys.
(34) Many boys in the class are right-handed.
(35) Lisa is dating many boys in the class.
(36) Many boys date many girls. (Partee, cited in Westerst&hl, 1989)
However, Keenan and Stavi contradict the assumption that non-extensionality 
necessitates context-dependency. They argue that sentences quantified by 
many or few  have the narrower function of expressing the speaker's belief that 
an amount is significant. Such sentences have indeterminate truth-values 
because the reader cannot know the standard of comparison intended by the 
writer. They use sentence (37) as an example.
(37) Many tourists visited the zoo today.
If we imagine that (37) is uttered in the context of a rainy bank holiday during 
the summer, then Keenan and Stavi observe that the sentence might be true if 
the number of tourists is compared against the number who would normally 
visit the zoo on a rainy day, but plausibly false if compared against the number 
who would normally visit on a summer bank holiday with better weather. 
Because the listener cannot establish which of these comparisons is intended, 
she cannot know the truth of the sentence, only something about the speaker's 
beliefs. From a more psychological perspective this objection is less 
problematic. I earlier agreed with Hall-Partee (1979) that the purpose of 
language comprehension is to construct partial representations of a model by 
interpreting the descriptions given by the writer, and that the closer this 
approximates the model held in the writer's mind, then the more effective the 
communication. Successful communication will mean the intended standard of 
comparison of quantifiers like many and fezv is easily recovered from the 
context.
16
Monotonicily and persistence
The second two properties of monotonicity and persistence2 label patterns of 
inference associated with a quantifier within a single model. Barwise and 
Cooper (1981) highlight some processing implications of these two properties, 
while Moxey and Sanford (1987, 1993a) suggest that the focus effects they 
describe are processing correlates of monotonicity.
Monotonicity describes the direction of inferences about the truth of quantified 
sentences under the expansion or contraction of the VP predicate. Quantifiers 
which are monotone-increasing permit scalar inferences about the truth of a 
superset description given the truth of a subset description. Those which are 
monotone-decreasing permit inferences in the opposite direction. A third 
category of quantifiers are non-monotonic and fail to preserve the truth of 
inferences in either direction. Persistence is an equivalent description of 
inference patterns for quantified NPs under expansion or contraction of the 
noun-phrase set under constant VP predication. Quantifiers are either 
persistent and permit scalar inferences from NP subset to NP superset, anti- 
persistent and permit inferences in the opposite direction, or non-persistent and 
block both sets of directional inferences.
I will begin with a classification of the monotone properties of quantifiers. This 
depends on intuitive judgements about the truth of sentences like (38) to (41). 
These illustrate tests of upwards monotonicity (38 and 39) and downwards 
monotonicity (40 and 41) for the quantifiers some and no. The acceptability of 
(38) and unacceptability of (39) demonstrate the classic monotone-increasing 
property of some, while the reversed pattern of acceptability for (40) and (41) 
describe no's downwards monotonicity. The directional inferences entailed by 
these tests are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.
(38) If some student passed the exam with ease, then some student passed 
the exam.
(39) x If some students passed the exam, then some students passed the exam
with ease.
(40) x If no students passed the exam with ease, then no students passed the
exam.
(41) If no students passed the exam, then no students passed the exam with 
ease.
2 M onotonicily and persistence are also know n as left and right m onotonicily (cf. van Eijk, 
1986) w hich captures the closeness of the two properties but can be confusing. We retain 
Barwise and Cooper's terminology for the sake of som e clarity.
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set o f students w ho  
p a ssed  the exam  
w ith  ease.
se t o f students w h o  
p assed  the exam .
Figure 3: Illustration of monotone-increasing inference.
A quantifier is monotone-increasing if it permits inferences about the truth of 
the VP superset given the truth of the VP subset.
Substitution of the quantifiers a fezv and many produce acceptable sentences on 
tests of upwards monotonicity. In contrast, substitution of few  and not many 
result in acceptable sentences for tests of downwards monotonicity. My 
intuitions about fezv and many are supported by observations by Barwise and 
Cooper (1981) and Moxey and Sanford (1987, 1993a), while Moxey and Sanford 
agree that a fezv is monotone-increasing. Barwise and Cooper argue that a few 
can be both monotone and non-monotonic, depending on its interpretation. If 
it is understood to mean some but not many then a fezv is non-monotonic, but if it 
means at least a fezv then it is monotone-increasing.
Judgements over the monotonicity of only a fezv are also divided (see 42 and 43). 
Moxey and Sanford describe only a few  as monotone-decreasing, but my 
intuitions are that only a fezv is non-monotonic and does not produce acceptable 
sentences on tests of either upwards or downwards monotonicity. Other non­
monotonic quantifiers are exactly tzvo and exactly half
(42) x If only a fezv students passed the exam with ease, then only a fezv
students passed the exam.
(43) x If only a fezv students passed the exam, then only a fezv students passed
the exam with ease.
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set o f stu d en ts w h o  
p a ssed  the exam  
w ith  ease.
se t o f stu d en ts w h o  
p a ssed  the exam .
Figure 4: Illustration of monotone-decreasing inference.
A quantifier is monotone-increasing if it permits inferences about the truth of 
the VP subset given the truth of the VP superset.
The same sort of tests are used to categorise quantifiers in terms of their 
persistence. Sentences (44) and (46) are tests of persistence for the quantifiers 
some and no respectively, and sentences (45) and (47) are the corresponding 
tests of anti-persistence. The acceptability of (44) and unacceptability of (45) 
demonstrates the persistence of some. The anti-persistence of no is clear from 
the unacceptability of (46) and acceptability of (47). As before, the inferences 
evaluated by these sentence pairs are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6.
(44) If some short students passed the exam, then some students passed the 
exam.
(45) x If some students passed the exam, then some short students passed the
exam.
(46) x If no short students passed the exam, then no students passed the
exam.
(47) If no students passed the exam, then no short students passed the 
exam.
Substituting the quantifiers jew, and many into these tests does not yield the 
same clear results as tests of monotonicity, while the behaviour of a few  and 
only a fezv is not considered by other researchers. Barwise and Cooper (1981) 
tentatively class few  as anti-persistent and, with even more doubts, class many 
as persistent. My own intuitions are that/eu; is clearly not persistent but
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"v. set of short
/  students who
/  passed the exam.
i N------s  I set of students who
\  passed the exam.
Figure 5: Illustration of persistence inference.
A quantifier is persistent if it permits inferences about the truth of an NP
superset given the truth of the NP subset.
difficult to classify under tests of anti-persistence unless it is understood to 
mean x or less including zero. For many, it depends on the standard of 
comparison. If many is understood extensionally then it is persistent, but if a 
non-extensional interpretation is used then it fails both tests. Not many seems 
to behave similarly to few, and again requires an x or less interpretation to be 
classed as anti-persistent. A  few  appears persistent, and only a few  is again 
difficult to classify. It fails tests of persistence (48) but is questionable on tests 
of anti-persistence (49). Moxey and Sanford suggest that only a few  is best 
interpreted as x and no more, which is both non-persistent and non-monotonic.
set of short
students who
passed the exam.
set of students who
passed the exam.
Figure 6: Illustration of anti-persistence inference.
A quantifier is persistent if it permits inferences about the truth of an NP subset
given the truth of the NP superset.
(48) x If only a few short students passed the exam, then only a fezv students 
passed the exam.
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(49) ??If only a few  students passed the exam, then only a few  short students
passed the exam.
Monotonicity and negativity
The observations of monotone inference patterns derive from a more general 
attempt to characterise negativity (cf. Klima, 1964; Fauconnier, 1978; Ladusaw, 
1979). Both Fauconnier and J. D. Fodor (reported in Ladusaw, 1979) discovered 
that constructions previously labelled as negative or affective have the ability to 
reverse directional scales of implicature and inference associated with the 
positive versions of those constructions.
The starting point for these observations was given by Klima (1964), who 
provided a set of formal tools for categorising lexical items which are 
commonly recognised as negative, but do not have an explicit negative 
component. He noted, for example, that native speakers of English are aware 
that never is equivalent to the explicitly negative not ever, and that/m7 is the 
negative pole of the lexical pair fail and succeed. Other examples of positive and 
negative components are found across a range of syntactic classes including 
quantifiers, quantificational adverbs, prepositions, adverbial constructions, 
verbs and adjectives. According to Klima, the negativity of an item is 
demonstrable by substituting them into declarative sentences with tag 
questions or negative polarity items (see Zwarts, to appear, for a treatment of 
negative polarity items).
Klima uses tags of the form " . . .  don't they?" and " . . .  do they?" to 
distinguish positive and negative declarative sentences respectively, but 
without any clear theoretical motivation. He observes that those sentences 
which are intuitively positive (e.g. 50) accept the negative tag "don't they" and 
not the positive tag "do they"; and the converse is true for sentences which are 
explicitly marked as negative (e.g. 51).
(50) All of the students study logic, don't they?
(51) None of the students study logic, do they?
The same sentence frames can be used to test the polarity of other quantifiers. 
For instance, monotone-increasing quantifiers like a few  and many produce 
acceptable sentences when the tag question is a test of positive polarity (e.g. 52), 
and unacceptable sentences when it is a test of negation (e.g. 53).
(52) A few /  Many of the students study logic, don't they?
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(53)* A few /  Many of the students study logic, do they?
Conversely, the monotone-decreasing quantifiers/eu; and not many produce 
acceptable sentences when the tag question is a test of negativity (e.g. 54) and 
unacceptable sentences when it is a test of positive polarity (e.g. 55).
(54)* Few /  Not many of the students study logic, don't they?
(55) Few /  Not many of the students study logic, do they?
It should be noted that these judgements are not so easy to make as for test 
frames containing the logical quantifiers all or none, but the intuitions reported 
here are in agreement with both Klima, and Moxey and Sanford (1993a). It is 
even more difficult to make judgements about the polarity of only a few  using 
tag questions. It appears most acceptable within sentence frames where the tag 
question is a test of negative polarity (56), and of borderline acceptability on 
tests of negativity (57). Moxey and Sanford (1987) argue that sentences which 
test for positive polarity appear odd when they contain the quantifier only a few; 
but that the corresponding negative test frame is entirely unacceptable.
(56) Only a few of the students study logic, don't they?
(57)? Only a few of the students study logic, do they?
Negativity is also demonstrated by the acceptability of lexical items within 
declarative items containing negative polarity items like ever, any or anymore. 
Klima observed that these sentences appear acceptable when they contain 
negative lexical items and unacceptable when they contain positive lexical 
items. Ladusaw gives an extreme example of a sentence containing negative 
polarity items (58) which can be used to test the polarity of quantifiers.
(58) QUANTIFIER of the Chrysler dealers ever sell any cars anymore.
The substitution of an explicitly negative quantifier like none is produces an 
acceptable sentence, as does few  and not many. However, neither all, a few  or 
many produce acceptable sentences, while only a few  appears to be a borderline 
case.
Fodor (also Ladusaw) observed that those quantifiers classed as negative by tag 
tests and their compatibility with negative polarity items exhibit the 
downwards direction of entailment which Barwise and Cooper call 
downwards-monotonicity. Fauconnier argues that the semantic entailments
22
associated with negative lexical items are but one example of scalar 
expressions. He states: "negation plays no special role . . .  it is simply one of 
the many scale-reversing environments (perhaps a statistically dominant one)" 
(Fauconnier, 1978, pp295).
Fauconnier's own examples of scale reversal are pragmatic. He argues that 
grammatical superlatives of the form the most Adj N or the Adj+est N licence 
directional pragmatic implicatures. For example, (59) licences the implicature 
that Max can solve problems ranging downwards across mediumly difficult 
problems to the easiest one, which is captured by (60). Sentence (61) permits 
implicatures in the opposite direction: if Max cannot solve the easiest problem, 
then neither can he solve mediumly difficult or hard ones, or any problem (e.g. 
62). Because these scalar patterns are pragmatic in origin they are defeasible, 
meaning that their implicatures are cancellable, unlike the semantic entailments 
describe by Fodor.
(59) Max can solve the most difficult problem.
(60) Max can solve any problem.
(61) Max cannot solve the simplest problem.
(62) Max cannot solve any problem.
Moxey and Sanford (1993a) observe that positive and negative quantifiers can 
be ordered in pragmatic scales which resemble those described by Fauconnier, 
and believe that these scales reflect the strength of claim associated with a 
quantifier. For example, they use (63) and (64) to demonstrate a negative scale 
running downwards from not many through hardly any to none. This means that 
not many implies that hardly any may be the case, and both imply that none may 
be the case, but hardly any is a closer approximation to none than not many. This 
is clear in the unacceptability of the implicature described in (66).
(63) Hardly any of the students study logic, in fact none do.
(64) Not many of the students study logic, in fact hardly any do.
(66)* Hardly any of the students study logic, in fact not many do.
This can be re-stated in terms of focus. None is used to focus on the compset, 
and requires that the refset takes an empty set interpretation. The other 
quantifiers, hardly any and not many also focus on the compset but do not 
require that the refset is empty. Instead they imply that this may be 
the case, but differ in the strength of this claim. Hardly any strongly asserts the 
empty refset compared to not many.
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The directional inferences observed by Fodor, and the directional implicatures 
described by Fauconnier are both examples of perspective control, which 
contribute to the maintenance of shared representations between language- 
users. Moxey and Sanford show how these patterns of inference and 
implicature can be interpreted in terms of focus for quantifiers, while an 
empirical study by Jarvella and Lundquist (1994; described in the next chapter) 
demonstrates focusing effects for pragmatic scales. Other syntactic classes 
which have negative members may also exhibit focusing properties. This is not 
entirely hypothetical since Moxey, Sanford and Barton (1990) report focus 
effects for quantificational adverbs.
The processing complexity of quantifiers
In the previous section, a distinction was drawn between the comprehension of 
a sentence, and the verification of its truth. It was argued that only the former 
is an automatic part of the reading process. However, most research into 
natural language quantification has concentrated on truth verification, and 
asked questions such as whether the semantic complexity of a sentence 
correlates with the time taken to determine its truth. This section describes 
three accounts of the processing of sentence truth. A final section considers the 
relevance of these accounts to a theory of comprehension.
Witness sets and monotonicity
Barwise and Cooper (1981) predict that monotonicity has processing 
consequences for the verification of sentence truth. They first note that 
M ontague's approach to NP representation and the verification of simple 
sentences is psychologically unrealistic. According to Montague, an NP is 
denoted as the family of sets to which that NP belongs, and a simple sentence is 
true if its VP denotes one of these sets. This means that an NP such as the meyi 
has as its extension all those sets to which it belongs, including the set of things 
which are male, and the set of things which are people. If interpreted as a 
processing theory, it predicts that a reader verifies the truth of a simple 
sentence like the men run by first of all calculating the denotation of the men, 
then determining if the set of runner belongs to this denotation.
Barwise and Cooper propose a more parsimonious account, where a sentence is 
true if it is possible to find a 'witness set' for which the verb-phrase predicate is 
true. A witness set is defined as a subset of the noun-phrase denotation such 
that the noun-phrase is true. For example, a witness set for some men is any
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subset of some men. Similarly, a witness set for a fezv men, is any subset 
composed of a few men, and a witness set for few men is any set of men who are 
few in number. In any given model there may be may subsets which constitute 
a witness set, and the truth of a sentence like some men run is established by 
finding a witness set of some men such that those men run. If such as set 
cannot be found, then the sentence is false.
Witness sets specify the minimal conditions for the truth of a quantified 
sentence. For instance, it might be the case that all of the men run in the model 
used to verify that some men run, but it is sufficient to identify a witness set 
composed of some men. This is complicated by the fact that different minimal 
conditions hold for the truth of monotone-increasing and monotone-decreasing 
quantified sentences. The minimal conditions for the truth of a sentence like 
(67) is that no less than a few men run. The sentence is still true in models 
where more than a few, or even all of the men run. It follows that to evaluate 
the truth of a monotone-increasing quantified sentence, it is sufficient to find a 
witness set for which the VP is true.
(67) A few men run.
However, the minimal conditions for the truth of a sentence like (68) is that no 
more than few men run. To calculate this it is necessary to find a witness set of 
few men who run, then check that no other men run. If any are found, the 
sentence is falsified.
(68) Few men run.
If these procedures are psychologically real, then the added complexity of the 
procedure used to verify the truth of monotone-decreasing quantified sentences 
implies a greater processing complexity, which will be evident as a longer 
decision latency in experiments where subjects are asked to verify the truth of 
quantified sentences.
Barwise and Cooper extend this account by arguing that non-monotonic 
quantified sentences like (69) require more complex verification procedure, and 
longer decision latencies, than either monotone-increasing or monotone- 
decreasing quantified sentences.
(69) Exactly two men run.
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This is because non-monotonic quantifiers are a conjunction of monotone ones. 
For example, exactly two is a conjunction of the monotone-increasing at least two 
and the monotone-decreasing at most two. According to Barwise and Cooper, 
this means that two separate procedures are required to verify the truth of a 
non-monotonic quantified sentence: one to evaluate the monotone-increasing 
component, and a second procedure to evaluate the monotone-decreasing 
component.
However, this is unnecessary because the monotone-increasing procedure is 
included within the monotone-decreasing one, so only the latter is required to 
verify the truth of a non-monotonic quantified sentence. For example, to verify 
the truth of (69), the reader must identify a witness set of two men, which 
satisfies the requirement that at least two men run, then check that no more 
than two men run.
There are more general problems with the claim that these procedures predict 
the processing complexity of quantifiers. For instance, the above account
predicts that a monotone-increasing quantifier like all will have a shorter
verification time than a monotone-decreasing quantifier like no, but this is 
demonstrably wrong. To verify the truth of either (70) or (71) requires that the 
entire set of men is inspected.
(70) All men run.
(71) No men run.
Instead of claiming a direct correlate with processing complexity, it may be 
sufficient to suggest that the verification of monotone-increasing and 
monotone-decreasing quantified sentences draws on separate procedures. A 
monotone-increasing sentence is most efficiently verified by searching for 
supporting evidence, but the verification of a monotone-decreasing one 
depends on a search for counter-evidence.
This is most easily demonstrated by considering a more detailed example. 
Imagine a situation where a carpark attendant is asked to check, as quickly as 
possible, whether a certain amount of cars in the carpark have their hand­
brakes in the off-position. To establish that a monotone-increasing number of 
quantifiers have their hand-brake off, the most efficient strategy is to 
successfully identify such cars until the quantifier is satisfied. So if told that 
there are some cars with their handbrake off, the attendant would search until 
some such cars were found. However, if told that a monotone-decreasing
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amount of cars had their hand-brake off, then the attendant should search until 
either the sentence was falsified or every car has been checked. For example, if 
told that there were no cars with their hand-brake off, the attendant should 
check all of the cars until one is found with its hand-brake off. Similarly, if 
asked to check if exactly two cars have their hand-brake off, the attendant must 
search until two such cars are found, then continue to check that there are no 
others. We can therefore conclude that the procedure neeed to verify the truth 
of a monotone-increasing quantified statement is less complex that that needed 
to verify the truth of a monotone-decreasing quantified statement. However, 
for the present example at least, there is no difference in complexity for 
procedures needed to verify the truth of monotone-decreasing and non­
monotonic decreasing quantified sentences.
Semantic automata and processing complexity
An alternative account of processing complexity (van Bentham, 1987) considers 
what procedures are necessary to calculate the truth of a quantified sentence of 
the form Q A B. Van Bentham categorises quantifiers by the type of abstract 
mathematical machines (called automata) which could carry out these 
procedures.
The best-known type of automaton is described by Turing (1944) to express the 
universality of computation, where any operation which can be expressed as a 
series of procedures can be carried out by an abstract computing device. This 
account is a theoretical forerunner of present-day computers and programming 
languages. A Turing machine reads from a list of symbols (imagine a ticker 
tape stream of symbols fed into a computer) where the current symbol 
produces a change in the internal state of the machine. The machine then 
moves onto the next symbol to produce another change in its internal state. At 
each point the internal state change is a function of the current state of the 
machine and the symbol read from the tape.
Van Bentham uses two types of automata to describe the procedures entailed 
by different quantifiers. Finite-state automata are the simplest form of Turing 
machine, and can read only the current symbol, change their internal state, and 
move on to the next symbol. Laport (1994) suggests an elevator control as an 
exemplar finite state automaton. It keeps record of the current position of the 
elevator (the machine state) and the nature of the current request. From this 
knowledge it can choose between two types of possible response, and send the 
lift either up or down.
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The second type of automaton described by van Bentham are push-down 
automata, and work in the same way as finite-state ones, but with the addition 
of a stack as an internal memory structure. A stack is a device where responses 
to the current input can be recorded and stored for later use, or previously 
recorded responses can be erased, depending on the nature of the current 
input. Its major constraint is that items on the stack can only be removed from 
the top, following a last in, last out protocol; but there m aybe other constraints 
on the readable depth of the stack. For instance, the automaton may only be 
able to read the top item, or perhaps the top two items on the stack, at any 
point in time.
Both types of automata operate in the same way as a Turing machine. They are 
presented with a string of symbols which describe whether a member of the 
noun set A in a given model is also a member of B. Membership of B is 
symbolised by '1', and non-membership is symbolised by "O'. The automaton 
for each quantifier reads this string of V s and 0's, alters its internal state 
accordingly. The final state of the automaton represents the truth value given 
the quantifier and model description of sets A and B.
Van Bentham argues that the denotations of all first order quantifiers (defined 
in van Bentham, 1987) which satisfy the extensionality and conservativity 
constraints described above (and a third one, the quantity constraint3) can be 
computed using finite state automata with two internal states. These include 
the quantifiers all, some, no, and not all. For example, an automaton to evaluate 
the truth of all of the squares are red, reads in a string of symbols where T  stands 
for those squares which are red, and 'O' stands for those squares which are not 
red. The automaton accepts all occurrences of '1' and remains in a 'true' state, 
but on encountering a '0' it switches into a 'false' state which cannot be altered 
by further symbols. This captures the fact that only one non-red instance of a 
square is sufficient to falsify the sentence. Similarly, the automaton for some 
enters and remains in a 'true' state on encountering a '1' in its input.
Higher order quantifiers, such as most, almost all, many, few  and hardly any 
cannot be computed by finite-state automata, but require the more complex 
push-down automata. As an example, consider van Bentham's description of 
most as a push-down automaton. As the input list of l 's  and 0's is read, they
3 The quantity constraint slates that the truth of the quantified relationship only depends on the 
number of members of the model, noun set, predicate set and intersection between the noun set 
and predicate set, and not the identity of those members. So, given the statement that some of 
squares are red, then it does not matter which of the full set of squares are red, only that there is 
enough to determine that some is true.
are stored on the stack, which can only be read to a depth of one item. When a 
1 is read off the input tape, it is compared with the top item on the stack. If this 
is a 0, then it is erased from the stack and the automaton reads the next input 
from the tape. Also, when the current input is 0 and the top item on the stack is 
1, that top item is erased. Inputs are only added to the stack when they are the 
same as the current top stack item. The sentence is true if, at the end of 
processing, there are only l 's  in the stack (this can be checked by reading and 
erasing them one at a time).
Van Bentham claims that the other higher-order quantifiers can be modelled by 
different permutations of push-down automata, but also argues that quantifiers 
like many, few  and almost all are under-determined and must be given 
approximate values which retain the spirit of their meaning. He suggests, for 
example, that many can be interpreted as at least one third, and almost all is 
paraphrased as at least two thirds. However, despite the mathematical elegance 
of this approach, the inadequacy of such approximations should be obvious as 
an attempt to bypass the context-dependency of these quantifiers.
Psychological theories of processing complexity
While existing psychological theories provide a less detailed processing 
account than that suggested by either Barwise and Cooper or van Bentham, 
they do describe differences in verification time for sentences of positive and 
negative affect. Researchers have employed two general techniques to 
investigate the verification of negated or quantified sentences. Subjects are 
required to either evaluate the sentential description against an external model, 
generally a pictorial representation (Clark and Chase, 1972; Clark, 1976; Just 
and Carpenter, 1971; Carpenter and Just, 1975), or against commonly known 
semantic knowledge (eg. Greene, 1970; Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos and 
Perry, 1983). Just (1974) reports that cross-modal verification and the 
comparison of sentences with semantic knowledge produce the same pattern of 
results, and argues that common processes are used in the two tasks (but see 
Tanenhaus, Caroll and Bever, 1976, for a criticism of the sentence-picture 
verification task).
Both Just and Carpenter, and Clark and his colleagues developed componential 
models of sentence and picture representation and comparison to explain 
results on the first of these tasks. Although there are some differences between 
the two accounts, there is general agreement on the core components. They 
argue for a four-stage process, where the sentence is first of all represented as a 
set of propositions, and then the picture is encoded as a similar set of
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propositions. Negatives, whether sentential negatives of the form it isn't true 
that the dots are red or predicate negatives like it's true that the dots aren't red, are 
treated as denials of a positive proposition that the dots are red. However, Just 
and Carpenter differ from Clark over the precise representational form for this, 
while Tanenhaus et al are critical of inconsistency in both theories. In general, 
the negated sentence is represented as an embedded affirmative proposition 
(what Clark and Clark, 1977, call the supposition) and an external negative, 
with the form NEG (DOTS, RED). Once the sentence and picture have been 
encoded as sets of propositions they are compared.
The comparison process starts from the assumption that the sentence is true, 
then attempts to match propositions from the sentence with others from the 
picture. Embedded propositions (or suppositions) are compared first. If these 
do not match, then the truth index of the sentence is changed from true to false. 
The embedding propositions are compared next and, again if these do not 
match the truth index is changed. So the index is changed if the sentence is 
prefixed with a negative marker, and the picture is affirmative. Each of these 
steps is assumed to add a constant increment to the verification latency, so a 
change in truth index following a comparison of both the embedded and 
embedding propositions will produce the longest verification latency. Also, 
because the representation of a negative takes an extra step - adding the 
embedding proposition, it is assumed to add more time to the verification 
latency.
Clark (1976) tested this theory by comparing negative and affirmative 
sentences. He recorded the time taken by subjects to verify the truth of 
sentences like those illustrated in (72) against a picture of a square, and reports 
response latencies with the order given in (72), where true affirmative sentences 
took the least time to verify, and true negative sentences took the most time.
This pattern of results matches the model predictions. True affirmatives should 
take the least time because they require a simple unembedded propositional 
representation, and find a straightforward match with the picture 
representation. False affirmatives have an extra stage where 
where no match is established and the truth index is changed. Both of the 
negative stages imply more complex representational stages which add the 
embedding negative marker, and an additional comparison stage to evaluate 
that embedding proposition. The true negative has the longest verification 
latency because the truth index must be changed twice, once because the 
embedded proposition is false, and a second time because of the embedding 
proposition.
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(72) True affirmative: The square is present
False affirmative: The circle is present
False negative: The square isn't present
True negative: The circle isn't present
Another study by Just and Carpenter (1971) established that the implicit 
negative components of quantifiers likefeiv  imply a similar increase in 
verification latency as explicit negative markers. They compared explicit 
negative quantification like (73) with comparable affirmatives like (74), implicit 
negative quantification (75) with quantified affirmatives (76), and what they 
called 'semantic negatives' (77) and the corresponding affirmatives (78).
(73) None of the dots are red.
(74) All of the dots are red
(75) Few of the dots are red.
(76) Many of the dots are red.
(77) A minority of the dots are red.
(78) A majority of the dots are red.
A longer processing latency for negatives was observed across all three 
categories. Explicit negatives were evaluated fastest, then the implicit 
negatives, with the 'semantic negatives' slowest. There was also evidence of 
the same pattern of results found by Clark, where true affirmatives were 
evaluated faster than false affirmatives, which in turn were faster than false 
negatives, and true negatives had the longest verification latency.
It is interesting to note that Just and Carpenter's so-called 'semantic negative' a 
minority shares m any of the semantic properties of only a few. By my intuitions, 
it fails tests of upwards monotonicity, and is questionable on tests of 
downwards monotonicity. It is also unacceptable when tested for persistence, 
and borderline on tests of anti-persistence. Also, like only a few  it is more 
acceptable with positive tags tests than those for negatives, however it licenses 
the use of negative polarity items. Compare (79) with (80).
(79) A minority of Chrysler dealers ever sell cars.
(80) A majority of Chrysler dealers ever sell cars.
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In a subsequent study of eye fixations during a sentence-picture verification 
task, Carpenter and Just (1972) observed different strategies in the verification 
of quantifiers likefew, and other quantifiers like a minority of. After reading a 
sentence like (75), subjects fixated on the set of non-red dots when comparing 
the sentence against a picture representation, but fixated on the set of red dots 
when verifying (77). Carpenter and Just interpret these results as evidence of 
the implicit negativity of few, but they also accord with the hypothesis-testing 
strategy earlier associated with the verification of monotone-decreasing 
quantified sentences. It was suggested that subjects attempt to disprove 
monotone-decreasing quantified sentences, but look for supporting evidence 
when verifying monotone-increasing ones.
More recently, Laport (1994) carried out a sentence-picture verification study 
on quantified sentences where she manipulated the monotonicity type.
Subjects read a series of sentences relating geometric shapes to colours under 
monotone-increasing, monotone-decreasing and non-monotonic forms of 
quantification. Sentence (78) is an example of the monotone-increasing 
condition, while (79) is a monotone-decreasing example, and (80) describes 
non-monotonic quantification4.
(78) All triangles are blue.
(79) No triangle is blue.
(80) Four triangles are blue.
Laport measured the reading time for these sentences, and the time for their 
verification against a picture of coloured geometric shapes. She observed 
increased reading time for both monotone-decreasing and non-monotonic 
quantification relative to the monotone-increasing condition. She also observed 
a substantial increase in verification time following monotone-decreasing 
quantification compared to monotone-increasing quantification. However, the 
difference was less marked for monotone-increasing compared to non­
monotonic quantification, although the error rate was four times as great 
following non-monotonic quantification. In general the results confirm Barwise 
and Cooper's prediction, but without finding any added complexity for the 
processing of non-monotonic quantifiers beyond that of monotone-decreasing 
ones. However, the error rates do suggest greater difficulty in evaluating non­
monotonic quantified sentences, which might explain the surprising low 
verification time. It may be that subjects adopted a different strategy in 
response to the added difficulty.
4 The sentences w ere presented in Dutch. The translation is Laport's own.
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It is worth noting the similarity between these theories and the 'Derivational 
theory of complexity' (c.f. Miller and Isard, 1963), which argued that the 
transformational complexity of a sentence is directly related to processing 
complexity. More specifically, the theory claimed that the more 
transformations needed to map the surface syntactic structure of a sentence 
onto its underlying structure (where both of these are defined in Chomsky, 
1957), then the greater the difficulty in processing this sentence. Both Clark, 
and Just and Carpenter, suppose that the processing complexity of a negative 
sentence is directly related to the number of steps needed However, the 
'Derivational theory of complexity' was largely abandoned because it was not 
clear that the evidence of increased processing times for particular sentences 
was actually due to transformational complexity, and at the same time there 
was counter-evidence that transformational complexity did influence 
processing (c.f. Fodor, Bever and Garrett, 1974).
The first of these two criticisms can also be levelled at theories of linguistic 
processing based on the sentence-picture verification methodologies. In 
particular, it is not clear if the latency differences reported by both Clark, and 
Just and Carpenter, are due to processing differences during sentence 
comprehension, or when comparing the sentence against the picture. This is a 
major criticism, which implies that this is not an appropriate methodology for 
investigating the early stages of sentence comprehension.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed some model-theoretic and psychological approaches 
to natural language quantification. It provided an overview of model-theoretic 
semantics, and argued for a correspondence between this and psychological 
approaches to semantics. More specifically, it was argued that model-theoretic 
semantics provides an account of linguistic competence, while psychological 
approaches must specify linguistic performance.
Given this parallel between model-theoretic and psychological semantics, the 
chapter went on to consider model-theoretic accounts of natural language 
quantification, particularly those accounts proposed by Montague (1974), and 
researchers influenced by generalised quantifier theory (Barwise and Cooper, 
1981; Keenan and Stavi, 1986; Westerst&hl, 1989). This concentrated on 
attempts to categorise quantifiers in terms of semantic properties. It was 
observed that failure to observe the semantic constraints of conservativity and
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extensionality implied that the interpretation of a quantifier is context- 
dependent. Other semantic properties, i.e. monotonicity and persistence, 
describe patterns of directional inference associated with quantifiers. Those 
quantifiers which are monotone-increasing according to linguistic tests, are also 
negative. That is, they are either explicitly marked as negative (e.g. not many), 
or are implicitly negative (e.g. few).
The chapter then described three accounts of the processing of natural language 
quantifiers. The first of these accounts (Barwise and Cooper, 1981) claimed that 
the semantic properties of monotonicity and persistence have consequences for 
the processing of quantifiers. They argue that monotone-decreasing quantifiers 
like few  and not many have a greater processing complexity than monotone- 
increasing ones like a few  and many, while non-monotonic quantifiers like only a 
few  are more complex yet. Moreover, quantifiers of the same monotone 
processing complexity can be separated in terms of the property of persistence. 
Anti-persistent quantifiers are more complex than persistent quantifiers which 
have the same monotone complexity. It was shown that although the account 
of processing complexity is not entirely satisfactory, it does produce evidence 
that monotone-increasing and -decreasing quantified sentences are processed 
in different ways. The second account (van Bentham, 1986) proposed that the 
processing of quantifiers could be described for in terms of the complexity of 
the semantic automaton required to evaluate the truth of a quantified sentence. 
The third account (Just and Carpenter, 1971; Clark and Chase, 1972) was a 
psychological model of decision latencies to evaluate the truth of quantified 
sentences relative to pictures. While the theories and methodology are flawed, 
there was some evidence that negative, and therefore monotone-decreasing, 
quantifiers are more complex than positive (monotone-decreasing) ones. This 
was further evidence that there are processing consequences of monotonicity.
The next chapter argues that the monotonicity of quantifiers correlates a 
psychological property of focus that is described by Moxey and Sanford. It will 
be shown that monotone-increasing and -decreasing quantifiers exhibit 
different patterns of focus, and that this has consequences for the interpretation 
of subsequent pronominal reference.
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Chapter two: 
The interpretation of quantifiers 
Introduction
The previous chapter described some formal approaches to semantics, 
particularly the semantics of quantification, and suggested that there may be a 
parallel between the formal classification of quantifiers on the basis of either 
negativity or monotone inference patterns, and the psychological account of 
quantifiers proposed by Moxey and Sanford (1987; 1993a). This chapter will 
detail Moxey and Sanford's theory and experimental findings, alongside some 
related research on the interpretation of quantifiers and quantificational 
adverbs.
Moxey and Sanford argue that there are two classes of quantifier which are 
used to divide noun-phrases (NPs) into refset and compset partitions, that 
these quantifiers exhibit differential patterns of focus, and that this is indexed 
by the ease of pronominal reference to each of the NP partitions. Those 
quantifiers like a few  and many which appear to be positive and monotone- 
increasing according to formal tests, focus on and enable reference to the refset 
partition, the NP subset of which the VP predicate is true. This means that 
plural pronominal reference to a sentence like (1) should be interpreted as 
reference to those MPs who attended the meeting.
(1) A few of the MPs went to the meeting.
In contrast, those quantifiers which appear to be negative and monotone- 
decreasing, such as few  or not many, also focus processing attention onto the 
compset partition, or the NP subset of which the VP predicate is false, and 
permit reference to either partition. For example, plural pronominal reference 
to a sentence like (2) can refer to either those MPs who were present, or those 
who were absent from the meeting.
(2) Few of the children went to the park.
It seems then that the two classes of quantifier are used to control discourse 
focus in different ways. Monotone-increasing ones place the refset in discourse
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focus, but monotone-decreasing ones are used to place both subsets in 
discourse focus.
Discourse focus and quantification
Before presenting the evidence that quantifiers are used to differentially focus 
on and enable reference to subsets of the quantified NP, I will clarify what is 
meant by focus, and one consequence of this account of quantification.
The notion of discourse focus has become common in theories of discourse 
processing and representation (cf. Garnham et al, 1989; Greene, McKoon and 
Ratcliff, 1992; Garrod, Freudenthal and Boyle, 1994), but is most clearly 
formulated in Sanford and Garrod's (1981; Garrod and Sanford, 1982, 1991) 
scenario theory of text comprehension. They describe a two component mental 
representation of text. The main part, called explicit focus, is a representation 
of the objects and relations described by the text. A second partition (called 
im plicit focus) maps this explicit focus representation onto an underlying 
description of the situation (called a scenario) and the appropriate discourse 
roles of entities in explicit focus. This allows situation-specific knowledge to 
flesh out the details of the impoverished text input.
Following Chafe (1972,1976), the objects and relationships in explicit focus are 
focal (or foregrounded, to use Chafe's terminology), and only these elements 
are accessible to pronominal reference. For example, Garrod and Sanford 
(1982) used discourse fragments like (3) and (4) to demonstrate the incapability 
of pronominal reference to objects in implicit focus. They argue that although a 
car forms part of the scenario description of both sentences, as demonstrated by 
successful definite noun-phrase reference in (4), pronominal reference fails in 
(3) because the car is an implicit entity which has been cued by the verb to drive, 
and resides in implicit focus.
(3) Keith was driving to London.
It had recently been overhauled.
(4) Keith was driving to London.
The car had recently been overhauled.
The account presupposes that there are just two discrete levels of focus, while 
Chafe also resists the suggestion that foregrounding might be a continuous 
phenomenon where potential antecedents exhibit degrees of accessibility (see 
discussion section in Chafe, 1972).
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The claim that monotone-decreasing quantification focuses on and enables 
reference to the compset is problematic to Sanford and Garrod's theory, 
because it violates the requirement that only those entities which are described 
in the text can be represented in explicit focus. By its very definition, the 
compset is not an explicitly described entity, but the complement set of that 
described by the quantified sentence. Yet it is accessible to pronominal 
reference, which implies that it must reside in explicit focus. The solution to 
this problem (Garrod and Sanford, 1991) is to allow explicit focus to include 
those entities which are introduced by semantic operators like monotone- 
decreasing quantifiers, and maintain implicit focus as a representation of the 
relevant situation-specific knowledge which has been retrieved from long-term 
memory.
This solution also means that focus cannot be discrete, since I have claimed that 
both the refset and compset are plausible antecedents of pronominal reference 
following monotone-decreasing quantification, although the compset is the 
preferred antecedent. There must instead be at least two levels to the explicit 
focus partition, one which holds the more focal compset, and another for the 
refset. This can be generalised to claim that entities in explicit focus (and 
presumably also those in implicit focus) exhibit degrees of accessibility. This 
might be represented as an ordered list using a symbolic processing paradigm, 
or as a range of activation values in a connectionist framework. The latter 
account supposes that these are represented in parallel, but that the compset is 
generally more accessible than the refset. However, only the refset may be 
represented and open to reference following monotone-increasing 
quantification.
Focus can also be thought of as a form of perspective control where the 
currently focal element takes charge of the narrative direction. Other instances 
of perspective controllers are contrasting bipolar descriptions, and perhaps also 
the scalar expressions investigated by Fodor (1975), Ladusaw (1979), and 
Fauconnier (1978). One pair of contrasting bi-polar descriptions are the 
quantificational adjectives half-full and half-empty. If a river at 50% capacity is 
described as half-full or half-empty then, although the two descriptions are 
semantically equivalent, they hold different implications. Describing the river 
as half-full directs attention towards the amount of water which is present, but
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to describe it as half-empti/ focuses on the missing water5. This may also 
constrain the type of inferences which are made.
Experimental evidence of quantifier focus
Moxey and Sanford (1987) used an off-line sentence-continuation task to 
investigate their claim that quantifiers focus on and enable reference to 
different NP subsets, and to show that there is a systematic variance in the 
content of inferences. Subjects were asked to provide a one or two sentence 
continuations to discourse fragments like (5), where the quantifier was one of a 
few, few, many, not many or only a few. It was predicted that the plural pronoun 
they would be interpreted as referring to the focal NP subset, and that it would 
be possible to determine which subset was referred to from the content of the 
continuations. Figure 1 summarises for each of the quantifiers the percentage 
of continuations which described the compset.
(5) QUANTIFIER of the MPs attended the meeting. T hey. . .
QUANTIFIERS REFSET COMPSET OTHER
CONTINUATIONS CONTINUATIONS CONTINUATIONS
(%) (%) (%)
A few 95 0 5
Only a few 95 5 0
Few 35 62.5 2.5
Table 1: Percentage frequency of refset, compset and other intended referents of plural pronoun 
continuations in different quantificational renditions (from Mbxev and Sanford 1987).
Moxey and Sanford found that the plural pronoun was aljmost always 
interpreted as reference to the refset partition of the quantified NP following 
quantification by a few, and interpreted this as evidence that the quantifier 
focuses processing attention onto this set. Similarly, the continuations almost 
always referred to the refset following quantification by only a few  6, with a 
small incidence of compset reference. Again this was interpreted as evidence 
for refset focus. However, there was a more diffuse pattern of results following 
quantification by few, which suggested that the pronoun could be interpreted as 
reference to either the refset or compset partition of the quantified NP, 
although the results also suggested that there was a preference for compset
5 This has an interesting folk psychology interpretation as an indicator of character type, and 
features in a Gary Larsen cartoon. An optim ist is believed to see things from a positive 
perspective, so the glass is always half-full, w hile the pessim ist takes a negative view  and the 
glass is disappointingly half-empti/.
" A more detailed account of the experimental results for only a feru is presented in Chapter 8.
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reference. Moxey and Sanford concluded that quantification by fezu is used to 
place the compset in focus, but that the refset remains a plausible referent.
A second study directly compared the frequency of continuations which 
focused on the compset following quantification by either fezu (61%) or not many 
(79%). Moxey and Sanford concluded that quantification by not many also 
results in compset focus, but more reliably than fezu, perhaps because of its 
explicit negativity.
Moxey and Sanford also found differences in the content of subject's 
continuations which correlated with the focusing properties of the quantifiers. 
They found that continuations to sentences quantified by a fezu or only a fezu 
generally extended the narrative from the perspective of the refset (eg 6) - 
Moxey and Sanford refer to these as "what happens next" continuations - and 
to a lesser extent gave reasons why the refset is true of the predicate (eg 7).
(6) Many of the MPs attended the meeting. They discussed NHS funding 
levels.
(7) A few of the MPs attended the meeting. They were obliged to go by 
the party whips.
However, continuations to sentences quantified by fezu or not many tended to 
explain why the compset is not true of the predicate (eg 8).
(8) Few of the MPs went to the meeting. They thought that it would be 
boring.
The data supports the claims that there are two classes of quantifier which 
differentially focus on and enable reference to the refset and compset subsets of 
the quantified NP. Moreover, the results suggest that only the refset may be 
available as an antecedent following quantification by a fezu, but that both the 
refset and compset are possible antecedents following quantification b y  fezu and 
not many. Finally, a more detailed analysis of the sentence continuations 
suggests that the quantifiers are used to direct inferential processes. This 
results in simple narrative continuations following quantification by a fezu, but 
continuations which attempt to explain the state of events following 
quantification by fezu or iwt many.
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Experimental evidence of context-dependent quantifier function
Given the experimental evidence that quantifiers a few, few, and not many are 
used to direct discourse focus, it remains to be seen whether they also exhibit 
the context-dependency claimed for them in Chapter one. We saw there that 
the non-extensionality and possible non-conservativity of these quantifiers 
implied that the truth of a sentence quantified by them depends on properties 
of the model other than those explicitly described in that sentence. For 
instance, researchers agree (Keenan and Stavi, 1986; Westerst&hl, 1989) that the 
truth of a sentence quantified by either fezu or many requires a comparison of 
the actual sentence extension against the size of an expected set extension, 
although Keenan and Stavi argue that the expected set may be unknowable.
However, there are no empirical studies of these semantic observations, and 
experiment research has instead concentrated on the context-dependent 
m apping of vague expressions (generally frequency adverbs) to numbers (cf. 
Pepper and Prytulak 1974, Newstead and Collis, 1987). Newstead and Collis, 
for example, asked subjects to translate the frequency of events described by 
frequency adverbs like never, rarely, often or always. Such studies generally 
agree that there are contextual constraints on the mapping to numerical values 
for expressions which denote large amounts or frequencies, but no effect for 
expressions which denote a small amount or frequency. For instance, 
Newstead and Collis demonstrated that the higher the base-rate expectation, 
then the higher the value attributed to high-frequency denoting terms like often 
and alzvays, while the numerical value for low-frequency denoting expressions 
like never and rarely remained stable under a contextual manipulation.
Other studies by Hormann (1983) have investigated the mapping of quantifiers 
onto numbers. She asked subjects to assign numerical values to a number of 
quantified noun-phrases across a range of contexts, and identified several 
important variables. For instance, she found that certain types of objects, and 
those which were small, were rated as more numerous than others. One 
example of this was the finding that subjects produced larger numerical values 
to describe many crumbs than to describe many mountains. The spatial location 
of the objects also proved to be important, and subjects rated a few  people 
standing in front of a building as more numerous than a fezu people in front of a 
hut. Hormann interpreted this to mean that the size of the building affected the 
numerical interpretation of the quantifier. However, Newstead (1988) suggests 
that it might instead reflect the expected frequencies of occurrence, where 
subjects try to imagine how many is likely for the described situation.
40
To test this, Moxey, Tuffield and Temple (reported in Moxey and Sanford, 
1993a) carried out a similar experiment where subjects were asked to assign 
numerical values to noun-phrases quantified by a few  and many in sentences 
like (9) and (10). They established that it was not just the size of the building 
which determined the numerical mapping for many, but the expected frequency 
of people outside the building, which supports Newstead (1988). Because a 
chip shop would be busy with customers, a large number of people might be 
expected outside it, but people are not expected to crowd around a fire station 
to the same extent. As with previous studies no effect was observed for the 
small amount denoting quantifier a few.
(9) QUANTIFIER people standing in front of the fish and chip shop.
(10) QUANTIFIER people standing in front of the fire station.
A further experiment (Moxey and Sanford, 1993b) used a fully independent 
design to investigate the contextual constraints on numerical mapping for the 
quantifiers fezu, very fezu, only a fezu, quite a fezu, not many, many, very many, quite a 
lot and a lot; and again found that numerical values assigned to the high- 
amount denoting quantifiers varied with context, but no effects were observed 
for the other low-amount denoting quantifiers. Moxey and Sanford also 
observed a poor differentiation between the values assigned to quantifiers like 
fezu and those like very fezu which include intensifies. However, there are 
strong focusing differences between these same quantifiers (Moxey and 
Sanford, 1987) which suggests that the intensifies might have a discourse 
function rather than an influence on expression to number mapping.
The lack of a context-dependent effect for the low-amount denoting quantifiers 
is more troublesome, but may be due to floor effects. For example, if a 
contextual manipulation doubles the reported values across all of the 
quantifiers, then the difference for old and new values will not be so marked 
for a small quantifier like a fezu compared to a large quantifier like many. It 
might be the difference between 5% and 10% compared to a difference between 
40% and 80%. Some support for this explanation is given by a study conducted 
by Moxey, Sanford and Grant (reported in Moxey and Sanford, 1993a), which 
did find a small but reliable context effect for small quantifiers when a broader 
range of contexts was used.
All of these experiments describe the mapping of vague expressions onto 
numerical values, yet Moxey and Sanford's sentence-continuation studies 
demonstrate that quantifiers have a discourse function where this mapping is a
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secondary process, if one that occurs at all. For present purposes, it may be 
more pertinent to look for context-dependency in the discourse function of 
quantifiers. For example, we noted earlier that compset focus is evident in both 
the type of reference and content of continuations produced by subjects. 
Continuations following quantification by few  and not many tend to explain the 
smallness of the refset. Clearly, such inferences depend on knowledge about 
the described situation, and it is possible that compset focus is mediated by the 
availability of inferences in a given context, and explanations may be 
unw arranted under some conditions.
Moxey and Sanford (1987) manipulated the VP predicate of a sentence 
quantified by few  to test this hypothesis. They asked subjects to provide 
continuations to the discourse fragments in (11) and (12). Fragment (11) 
matches the expectation that children are fond of Santa Claus, and only a very 
small refset would normally be expected. It seems likely that there will be few, 
if any, inferences which explain the small refset for this situation. Fragment 
(12) describes the contrasting situation where there is a small refset who do like 
Santa Claus, which violates expectations and will license a number of 
explanatory inferences.
(11) Few of the children hated Santa Claus. They . . .
(12) Few of the children liked Santa Claus. T hey . . .
As predicted there were more continuations which explained the small refset in 
the expectation-violating condition (80% compared to 30%), but there were no 
reliable differences in the tendency towards compset reference. Seventy-five 
percent of continuations described the compset in the expectation-violating 
condition, and 90% did in the expectation-matching condition. This invites the 
conclusion that compset focus is primarily under semantic control, and 
pragmatic factors only influence the content of continuations. However, a 
subsequent experiment (Moxey and Sanford, 1993a) demonstrates that the 
availability of knowledge-based explanatory inferences determines the 
likelihood of compset focus following quantification by only a few. One of the 
experimental materials (14) violated expectations, but there were no strong 
expectations associated with the other situation (13). Moxey and Sanford found 
that while two thirds of continuations for (14) referred to the compset, there 
were hardly any for (13).
(13) Only a few of the MPs were at the meeting. They . . .
(14) Only a few of the children ate their ice-cream. They . . .
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This suggest that both semantics and pragmatics can contribute to the 
likelihood of compset focus, but that pragmatics will only predominate if the 
semantic constraints are weak. Quantification by few  is a strong semantic cue to 
compset focus, so a manipulation of the context has a negligible effect. 
However, the non-monotonic only a few  exerts much weaker semantic 
constraints, and focus is more strongly influenced by contextual manipulations.
Other evidence of perspective control by function words 
I have suggested that other syntactic classes might also exhibit focus, and there 
is some evidence for this. Moxey, Sanford and Barton (1991), for instance, 
describe how the quantificational adverbs seldom, rarely, occasionally and only 
occasionally appear to exhibit focus preferences. Given a sentence like (14), 
these adverbs divide the set of occasions when Mary eats into a refset of those 
when she eats in a restaurant, and a compset of when she eats elsewhere7. The 
adverbs seldom and rarely appear to focus on the compset partition and license a 
continuation sentence which explains why Mary does not eat in restaurants 
(15), while a sentence which refers to the refset (16) appears anomalous. In 
contrast, quantification by occasionally focuses on the refset and favours 
continuation by (16). Finally, only occasmmlly does not exhibit any strong focus 
preferences, and both continuation sentences appear equally acceptable.
(14) Mary ADVERB eats in restaurants.
(15) She enjoys eating at home.
(16) She likes to be waited on.
Moxey et al demonstrated these preferences experimentally. They asked 
subjects to complete the text fragments in (17) and (18) for each of the four 
adverbs, and classified the completed continuations by their content. They 
found that occasionally predominantly resulted in continuations which gave 
reasons for going to the cinema, while seldom and, to a lesser extent, rarely 
produced reasons for not going. Both sets of effects were made stronger when 
the connective because was used to link the quantified and anaphoric sentences
(17). Only occasionally showed no strong preferences, although conjunction by 
because enhanced the frequency of reasons for not going to the cinema.
(17) John ADVERB goes to the cinema. He . . .
7 II should be noled that there is a scope am biguity associated w ith the quantificational 
adverbs, and they could have a restricted scope where they focus on the frequency with which 
Mary eats as opposed to som e other act that m ight be performed in a restaurant. For instance 
Mary might be a waitress w ho often works, but rarely eats in reslaurant.s.
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(18) John ADVERB goes to the cinema because he . . .
Moxey and Sanford interpret the results for rarely and seldom as evidence that 
they are adverbial correlates oifew  and very fezu respectively; while the function 
of occasionally appears to parallel that of a fezu, and only occasionally behaves 
similarly to only a fezu.
Moxey and Sanford are not the only researchers to observe perspective control 
by function words. Anscombre and Ducrot (1986) present a linguistic account 
of the opposed function of the French mass quantifiers un pen and pen, which 
are equivalent to the English quantifiers a little and little. They argue that the 
quantifiers are used to 'bring out different facts' about utterances in which they 
appear. For example, (20) carries the implication that the quantity of work is 
small, while (19) simply asserts that some work has been done. Some of 
Anscombre and Ducrot's theoretical claims have been empirically tested. 
Champaud and Bassano (1987), for example, report a developmental study 
which investigates the contrasting perspectival function of adverbs like 
settlement {only) and bien (really, or at least).
(19) Peter has done a little work.
(20) Peter has done little work.
(adapted from Anscombre and Ducrot, 1986)
Another experimental study by Jarvella and Lundquist (1994) investigated the 
effect of Danish and Finnish scalar expressions on the processing of co­
reference within a discourse. They observed that the ascending scalarity of 
almost, and the descending scalarity of only interact with pragmatic knowledge 
about the described situation. For instance, they found that these quantifiers 
interact with the knowledge that 'the more votes someone gets, the more likely 
he is to win' in sentences (21) to (24). The quantifier almost is used to mark the 
fact that a large number of votes were gained relative to those needed to win 
the contest. This licenses the inference that John Smith is likely to win, and 
enables a co-referential interpretation in (21) but not (22). In contrast, the 
quantifier only is used to mark the fact that a small number of votes were 
gained relative to those needed to win, which enables a co-referential 
interpretation in (24) but not (23).
(21) John Smith got almost 500 votes in the first round. He is likely to win 
the election.
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(22)?? John Smith got almost 500 votes in the first round. He is likely to lose 
the election.
(23)?? John Smith got only 500 votes in the first round. He is likely to win 
the election.
(24) John Smith got only 500 votes in the first round. He is likely to lose the 
election.
Jarvella and Lundquist tested these claims in several experimental studies 
where subjects read experimental passages like (25), which described the 
performance of two named characters in a competitive scenario, and consisted 
of a context-setting section, followed by two sentences. The first of these 
sentences contained a statement about the performance of one of the characters 
(who was described by name) and included either an ascending or descending 
scalar expression. These were the quantifiers almost all or only a fezu 
respectively. The second sentence began with a noun-phrase (the tall blond 
Arhus-girl and the 20-year-old office girl) which referred indeterminately to one of 
the passage characters, and indicated that this person was currently either 
winning or losing the competition (behind /  ahead).
(25) The Beauty Competition
The year's big beauty competition took place in the Circus Theatre in 
Copenhagen. Eighteen models participated, chosen from various 
provincial cities. As journalists and other media people had suspected. 
Karina Madsen and Louise Femholm stood out as the big favourites.
si In the round with bathing suits, Karina Madsen received high marks
from only a fezu /  almost all the judges.
s2 The tall blond Arhus-girl was clearly behind /  ahead.
Jarvella and Lundquist predicted that the anaphoric NP would only be 
interpreted as co-referential with the previously named character when the 
scalar expressions of the quantified and anaphoric sentence ran in the same 
direction. This meant that the tall blojid Arhus-girl would only be interpreted as 
reference to Karma Madsen when she received high marks from almost all of the 
judges, and the anaphoric sentence described her as being ahead. Similarly, co­
reference would be possible when only a fezu and behind were used together.
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This prediction was supported in an off-line study where subjects indicated 
which character was in a winning and losing position. There was 95% 
agreement that the immediately preceding named character was the 
appropriate antecedent of the anaphoric NP when the scalar expressions were 
in the same direction, and 80% agreement that the other named character was 
the antecedent when the scales were in opposite directions. These preferences 
were also evident in a self-paced reading experiment where YES /  NO 
responses to questions of the form "Did N  win?" or "Did N  lose?" achieved 
more than 80% responses in the predicted directions. Jarvella and Lundquist 
also found that there was an increased reading time for sentences containing 
downwards scalar expressions, which suggests that these produced greater 
processing difficulty than upwards scalar expressions.
It seems then that there is considerable evidence of perspective control by 
function words, and several syntactic classes readily decompose into subsets of 
operators which exhibit contrasting patterns of focus. It is my contention that 
these function words are used to control the structure of mental representations 
and direct inference processing during comprehension. This requires that 
function words like quantifiers and quantificational adverbs directly 
correspond to mental procedures, which are triggered on reading the function 
word. However, this is a contentious claim because none of the studies 
described here are tests of perspective control during reading. The 
experimental chapters test a more specific version of this claim, that the success 
of anaphoric reference to a quantified NP is contingent on the focus patterns of 
the quantifier. But before presenting the results of these studies, I want to 
sketch some representational requirements, and in the next chapter I will 
consider the likely processing implications of this account.
Quantifiers and Mental Models
My starting point is Johnson-Laird's theory of Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). This was introduced in the previous 
chapter as an account of mental representations which was in the spirit of 
model-theoretic semantics, but with an awareness of the performance 
restrictions and constructive processes required by a psychological 
implementation. It is intended to subsume discourse representation within a 
general account of reasoning. However, quantifiers are only considered for 
their contribution to reasoning, particularly syllogistic reasoning (eg. Steedman 
and Johnson-Laird, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird, Byrne and 
Tabossi, 1989; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991), and are absent from the account
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of discourse comprehension. This is unfortunate because there are good 
reasons to suppose that the inferences required for complex tasks like 
syllogistic reasoning are quite different from those required for comprehension 
(cf. Fodor, 1983; Graesser, Singer and Trabasso, 1994, Kintsch, 1994), and it is at 
least conceivable that the representations will also differ. This distinction is 
central to the debate about automaticity and the time course of inferences 
reviewed in the following chapters.
The Mental Models approach to quantifiers has other failings too. Johnson- 
Laird does not venture far beyond traditional logical quantifiers like all, some 
and none (Bach, 1993). He does includes most, more than half (Johnson-Laird, 
1983, pl37-141) and only (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991), acknowledges J. D. 
Fodor's similarly model-based approach to the quantifiers each and every 
(Fodor, 1982)8, and assumes that the theory will also apply to many, several and 
a fezu (ibid., pl37), but without specifying how. Neither does he include any of 
the semantic properties reported by generalised quantifier theory, or include 
focus within his models. Other mental models theorists have added focus and 
offer a broader and more psycholinguistic account of mental models (eg 
Garnham et al, 1989), but do not discuss quantification. Despite these 
weakness, Mental Models make some assumptions about the representation of 
noun-phrases and function of quantifiers which can kick-start my own account.
According to Johnson-Laird, a Mental Model is an internalised tableau 
representation which is constructed from the semantic content of language and 
general knowledge about the described situation. Plural nouns are represented 
in these models by an arbitrary number of tokens, except in cases involving 
numerical quantifiers and other forms of number restriction (eg. four dogs, both 
donkeys), which stand for instances of the noun type; and quantified sentences 
are represented by the necessary and possible subsets of the quantified noun 
relative to its predicate.
For example, a sentence of the form All X  are Y  requires that the X terms are 
exhaustively represented in a one-to-one relation with Y. The brackets around 
the X terms in Figure 1 (adapted from Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991) assert 
that the set of X's has been fully represented, and if the model was fully 
'fleshed-out' to include all instances of X, then these would necessarily stand in 
relation to a Y term. In the original theory, other Y terms are included
8 Fodor (1982) is detailed in Chapter 9. She distinguished between all, each and every using the 
distributive properly discussed there.
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separately from the X terms to allow for the possibility of other instances of Y 
which are not X.
(X) Y
(X) Y
(X) Y
(X) Y
Figure 1: Mental models representation of 'All X are Y', 
from lohnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991.
In the same way, some X  are Y  is represented by an arbitrary number of X that 
stand in relation to Y, and the possibility that there are other instances of both X 
•and Y which do not relate to each other. No X  are Y is described by the 
necessary condition that X and Y are exhaustively represented, and no X and Y 
stand in relation to each other. Finally, some X  are not Y  is represented by an 
arbitrary set of X standing in relation to an exhaustively represented set of Y's, 
with the addendum that the set of 'not X' is exhaustively represented as 'not Y'.
Johnson-Laird argues that mental models also cope with quantifiers denoting 
relative set sizes, such as most, many several and a fezu-, and demonstrate 
inferences which are dependent on these relative sizes and an interaction with 
general knowledge. He illustrates this with the following examples (26 and 27).
(26) All fascists are authoritarian.
Most authoritarians are dogmatic.
(27) All archbishops are Tories.
Most Tories are middle-class.
The two premises in (26) invite the conclusion that Most fascists are dogmatic, but 
the same form of conclusion, that Most archbishops are middle-class, is blocked in
(27) by the knowledge that the set of archbishops is very small compared to the 
set of middle-class people.
While there is some question about whether individuals represent the 
necessary and possible conditions of quantifiers in the way Johnson-Laird 
claims (eg. Newstead, 1989), and the use of arbitrary numbers of tokens means 
that it is difficult to separate the different representations for quantifiers like a
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few , some, several from each other and from numerical quantifiers, a more basic 
problem is that this form of representation is only suitable for some types of 
plural nouns and quantifiers. Others, like mass nouns (cf. McCawley, 1981) or 
group nouns (Barker, 1994), do not readily decompose into member elements in 
the manner assumed by mental models. For example, it is not possible to 
decompose water, furniture or prose into their component elements without 
losing the defining properties of the plural NP. This mean that the elements of 
water are not themselves described as water; and while water is wet, it is not so 
clear that a molecule of water is wet.
There are other differences too. For instance, adjectives which can apply to a 
mass noun are often not applicable to the individual elements. So you can have 
a cup of dirty water, but not a molecule of dirty water. Similarly, although the 
members of a count noun can be enumerated using the indefinite article or 
numerical quantifiers (eg. three stude?rts, a house, more than four games), and 
count nouns accept quantification by a few, several, many and each, this is not 
possible with mass nouns. In fact, they reveal their mass representation 
through the acceptability of reference by the neutral pronoun i f i  (see 28 and 
29); and can be quantified by the likes of a little and much which appear 
anomalous when applied to count nouns.
(28) The furniture was broken. It was thrown out with the refuse.
(29) Some of the prose was obscene. It was removed by the editor.
Barker argues that group nouns like committee or army must be represented in 
manner such that the plural noun holds properties and licenses inferences 
independently of its underlying membership. What this means can be 
demonstrated using the group noun committee if we imagine a situation where 
the members of a committee are specified in the discourse - let's say that Tom, 
Bill and Harry are the only members of this committee. Barker argues that (30), 
(31) and (32) could all be statements about this situation.
(30) Tom, Bill and Harry discussed the best way to deal with joy-riders.
(31) The men discussed the best way to deal with joy-riders.
(32) The committee discussed the best way to deal with joy-riders.
However, while these appear to describe the same situation, that is, they share 
the same reference, they are not semantic equivalents. The truth of (32) entails
9 I Iowevcr som e forms of quantification are referred to using a plural pronoun, but this seem s 
to have more to do with the form of quantification than the mass noun.
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that (31) and (32) are also true, but neither the truth of (30) nor (31) entail the 
truth of (32). It could be that the three members of the committee are having a 
discussion outside of the situation where they constitute that committee.
Given that neither mass or group nouns cannot receive an individuated 
representation, I want to suggest that quantified count nouns do not receive it 
either. In fact, it is the form of quantification itself which is used to mark the 
granularity of the representation. This assumes that plural NPs have an 
unindividuated representation as a default, meaning that the members of the 
NP are not represented by individual tokens, and that some forms of 
quantification, say by a few ox few, are used to produce a more fine-grained 
representation. As already described, these divide the NP into refset and 
compset partitions. The subsets will also have an unindividuated 
representation.
Other quantifiers with distributive properties (cf. Fodor, 1982), such as each, 
may be used to produce an even more fine-grained representation of the 
quantified noun. This may be fully individuated in the case of each, which 
would be consonant with Vendler's (1967) characterisation of it as a procedure 
which considers the member of set one by one. It is also consonant with the 
observation that distributive quantifiers like each and several only operate on 
count nouns (McCawley, 1981), since mass nouns cannot be individuated.
This approach can fit within the Sanford and Garrod's (1981; Garrod and 
Sanford, 1991) theory of discourse representation. It requires that plural NPs 
are represented as a unindividuated entity in Explicit focus, and map onto a 
single discourse role in Implicit focus. This m aybe marked as a complex 
representation in order to allow it to accept plural pronoun reference. 
Quantification b y  a few ox few will divide the NP into refset and compset 
partitions, which are mapped into separate discourse roles, and licences 
pronominal references to one or other of the subsets, depending on the form of 
quantification10. Finally, quantification by a distributive quantifier, say each, 
will produce an even more individuated representation where a number of NP 
set members are mapped into separate roles in Implicit focus. This licenses 
singular pronoun reference to the individual members (33), and may be used to 
mark distinctions between the members of the NP set. For instance, my 
interpretation of (33) is one where the members of a group of MPs attend
10 It is also possible that m onotone-increasing quantification, say by afeio, w ill only result in a 
representation of the refset.
50
separate meetings. More will be said in Chapter 9 about the interpretation of 
this type of sentence.
(33) Each of the MPs attended a meeting, and she took careful notes.
Since plural reference to the superset is always an option following both types 
of quantification, it seems likely that the representations are hierarchically 
organised, or embedded within each other. This means that representations of 
a quantified sentence are simply more fine-grained versions of the 
representation of an unquantified sentence.
Conclusion
This chapter has described some evidence from off-line production experiments 
that those quantifiers that monotone-increasing and -decreasing quantifiers 
exhibit different patterns of focus. The data can be interpreted as evidence that 
monotone-increasing quantifiers like a few  and many are used to focus 
processing attention onto the refset of a quantified sentence, i.e. the set for 
which the sentence is true. Plural pronoun reference to this sentence is almost 
always interpreted as reference to the refset. In contrast, it appears that 
monotone-decreasing quantifiers likefew and not many are used to place the 
compset in focus, where the compset is one of those sets of which the sentence 
is false. The experimental data can be interpreted as evidence that although 
both the refset and compset are plausible referents of plural pronoun reference, 
the compset is a preferred referents.
The chapter reviewed some other experimental evidence that the interpretation 
of non-logical quantifiers, like afew,fezo, many and not many, is context- 
dependent. It also reviewed some further experimental work by Jarvella and 
Lundquist (1994) which argues that positive and negative quantifiers are used 
to direct processing attention. Finally, the chapter considered the mental 
representation of quantified information, and argued that quantification is used 
to control the granularity of mental representation of sentence meaning.
However, the main aim of the chapter was to provide experimental evidence 
for the claim that quantifiers can be differentiated in terms of focus. Yet the 
reported experiments used off-line production tasks in which subjects provided 
completions to sentence which referred to a quantified sentence. Because they 
are production tasks, and because they are not time-limited, they may not 
describe processing during comprehension. For instance, it is possible that the 
observed effects only occur when subjects have time to deliberate on the
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appropriate interpretation of the pronoun. For this reason, the following 
chapter describes an account of the processing of reference to a quantified 
sentence during comprehension, and reviews previous research on the 
processing of reference and inference during comprehension.
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Chapter three: 
Processing anaphora and quantification 
during reading 
Introduction
The previous chapter reported some sentence-continuation data in support of 
the claim that quantifiers are used to focus on and enable reference to particular 
NP subsets, and made some further claims about how these quantified NPs 
might be mentally represented. These claims will be transformed into some 
more specific processing predictions. In order to do so, I will isolate a set of 
likely component processes, then assess the compatibility of these with current 
models of text comprehension and inference processing.
The component processes of anaphoric reference 
The three predicted components of pronominal reference to quantified noun­
phrases are illustrated in Figure 1. First of all, the quantifier divides the noun 
set into refset and compset partitions, of which the sentence predicate is 
respectively true or false. However, it remains open as to whether this happens 
during the processing of the quantified sentence, or in response to the 
anaphoric reference. While this question is not addressed by the current 
studies, a proposed experimental manipulation is described in Chapter 6. Yet, 
whatever the locus of quantifier function might be, the other processes cannot 
begin before encountering the anaphor. These are both stages of anaphoric 
reference, where the anaphor is initially attached to the most focal antecedent, 
then this attachment is evaluated, and re-assigned if it proves to be anomalous.
The first stage of anaphoric reference, when the anaphor is initially attached to 
the most focal element of Explicit focus, is a heuristic which usually avoids the 
greater processing load involved in directly comparing the anaphor against all 
possible antecedents. It is based on the assumption that those entities which 
are in focus are also central to the current discourse, and the most likely 
recipients of pronominal reference. Other forms of reference, such as definite 
NPs, can be used to access less focal antecedents (eg Sanford and Garrod, 1981; 
Garrod and Sanford, 1991).
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Focusing function 
of quantifier
resolution of 
pronoun 
reference
Initial attachment 
of pronoun to 
antecedent
Figure 1: Proposed component processes of pronominal 
reference to a quantified NP
This heuristic is used when resolving pronouns that make reference to a 
quantified noun-phrase. For instance, when (2) is read as a continuation of (1), 
the experienced difficulty arises from an initial attempt to interpret the anaphor 
as referring to the reference set of the quantified noun-phrase, i.e. the set of 
MPs who attended the meeting. However, this appears anomalous, because 
the events described in (1) and those described in (2) cannot concern the same 
set of individuals. That is to say, the same set of MPs cannot both attend a 
meeting and go for lunch instead.
(1) A few of the MPs went to the meeting.
(2) They went for lunch instead.
According to my intuitions, this anomaly is unrecoverable, meaning that the 
reader cannot re-intepret the pronoun as referring to another set of individuals 
in order to reach a coherent interpretation of the pair of sentences.
Sentence pairs like (3) and (4) produce a temporary sense of anomaly when the 
antecedent sentence contains a monotone-decreasing quantified noun-phrase, 
and the second sentence describes an action or event that is congruous with the 
reference set. For example, (4) describes an event that is congruent with the 
reference set of MPs who did attend the meeting, an incongruent with the 
complement set of MPs who did not attend the meeting.
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(3) A few of the MPs went to the meeting.
(4) They discussed funding levels for the NHS.
Both the reference and complement sets will reside in Explicit focus following 
monotone-decreasing quantification. However, the complement set will be the 
more accessible (i.e. focused) of the two. Therefore readers will initially 
interpret the plural pronoun as referring to the complement set. This will 
results in an anomaly when the reader cannot integrate the events described in 
the two sentences. However, this is a temporary anomaly because the reader 
can easily re-interpret the pronoun as referring to the less accessible (i.e. 
comparatively unfocused) reference set.
This account is consistent with other observations. Sanford and Garrod 
(Sanford, Garrod, Lucas and Henderson, 1984; Sanford and Garrod, 1989) 
report what they call 'false-bonding' phenomena, where a pronoun appears to 
initially and anomalously attach to the focal antecedent before re-assignment to 
a more appropriate one. In (5) this results in an impression that the neutral 
pronoun it refers to Ireland, before it is understood to refer to the boat taken by 
Harry. This antecedent is represented in Implicit focus as the instrument of the 
verb to sail.
(5) Harry was sailing to Ireland. It sank without trace.
In this case, and my quantificational example, the anomaly is experienced 
during the second stage of processing, when the processor attempts to establish 
a match between the semantic properties of the anaphor and those of its 
potential antecedent. In both examples, it becomes clear at some point 
downstream of the pronoun that its description is incompatible with the initial 
attachment.
The co-referentiality of an anaphor and its antecedent can be evaluated in 
several ways. The most obvious of these is a comparison of gender and 
number information11. For instance, reference to a male character by the 
singular feminine pronoun she is clearly anomalous, while Garrod and Sanford 
(1985) report an unpublished study where reference to an individual by 
singular pronoun resulted in a longer reading time compared to less 
appropriate plural pronoun reference.
11 Gender and number aggreem enl are usually v iew ed as synlactic (c.f. Garnham, 1985).
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Beyond these factors, the processor looks for congruency between the discourse 
roles of the anaphor and its antecedent. The process of doing this is described 
as a pragmatic inference, because the reader must infer a relation between the 
two discourses on the basis of general or specific background knowledge about 
the described scenario. For example, in (6) the discourse role filled by the 
pronoun finds a match with the actor (John), because needing to trust someone 
is consonant with giving a confidence. However, in (7) the pronoun is 
interpreted as reference to the patient, because being trustworthy is a better 
reason for receiving a confidence that giving one.
(6) John confided in Bill because he needed someone to trust.
(7) John confided in Bill because he was trustworthy.
Such inferences clearly depend on detailed knowledge about the described 
situation - that people who confide are looking for someone to trust, and that 
being trustworthy is a desired characteristic of a confidante - but can also be 
influenced by other sentence level factors. For instance, Caramazza, Grober 
and Garvey (1977) observe that the anaphoric reference in (6) is more 
acceptable than that in (7), and attribute this asymmetry to a lexically-encoded 
verb bias. Verbs like confided in, they argue, have an 'implicit causality' where 
the subject of the verb is charged with causing the current event. Following 
conjunction by the causal connective because, the subject NP is preferred as the 
antecedent of pronominal reference from the subordinate clause. This means 
that John is the preferred antecedent in both (6) and (7). Other verbs like blame 
differ in their implicit causality and favour reference to the object NP, which 
explains the greater acceptability of (8) compared to (9). Caramazza et al found 
that subjects took longer to assign an antecedent when the pronoun referred to 
the disfavoured NP.
(8) John blamed Bill because he spilt the coffee.
(9) John blamed Bill because he had to find a scapegoat.
Yet, as Ehrlich (1980) notes, implicit causality cannot fully explain the 
referential process, because the anaphor is eventually attached to the 
appropriate antecedent even when this is opposed by the verb bias. Ehrlich 
argues that readers must use knowledge about the described situation to 
resolve the anaphor in these cases, and do so even in those cases where verb 
bias appears to aid the referential outcome (6 & 8). Instead of viewing implicit 
causality solely as a lexically-encoded property, she suggests that verbs help 
structure a model of the described events, and that other lexical items will
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interact with these constraints. For instance, Ehrlich demonstrates that 
manipulating the form of conjunction between the main and subordinate 
clauses changes the preferred pronoun antecedent. Substitution of and for 
because leads to no strong attachment preferences, while but reverses the 
preferences attributed to implicit causality, as in (10). This time John is the 
preferred referent.
(10) John blamed Bill but he spilt the coffee.
Later studies suggest a similarly complex interaction between gender and verb 
semantics. In one study Garnham and Oakhill (1985) reported a significant 
effect of gender, but no effect of verb causality. However, Vonk (1985) 
produced a contrary pattern of results where verb causality determined 
pronoun reference, and there was no effect for gender. In an effort to reconcile 
these contrary findings, Oakhill, Garnham and Cruttenden (1992) observed that 
matching the pronoun and referent role-descriptions was inferentially simpler 
for Vonk's materials than for the Garnham and Oakhill ones, and tested the 
hypothesis that gender cues predominate when complex pragmatic inferences 
are required to map the anaphor to a verb-role, and that the latter guides 
reference when the inferences are simpler. There was some evidence of this 
interaction, but stronger evidence that the two factors constrain different 
aspects of the inferential process. Verb congruity effects, it appeared, produce 
a role-to-role matching, while gender information cues a role-to-name 
matching. This is consistent with other claims for a separation of the mental 
representation of discourse roles and those entities which fill them (eg. Sanford 
and Garrod, 1981).
Given this model of reference processing, a good test of my claims about 
quantification would be to measure the ease of pronominal reference to the 
refset and compset partitions of a quantified sentence. Reference to the focal 
subset should be processed more easily, and more quickly, than reference to the 
unfocused one - because the latter case involves additional processing to revise 
an initial and anomalous attachment to the focal subset. Such an experiment 
will also be informative about the sort of inferences which are made during 
comprehension. This is a topic of current controversy. One side of it (McKoon 
and Ratcliff, 1992) claims that only a minimal number of inferences are made 
during reading, and specifically rule out instances of anaphoric reference which 
depend on situation-specific knowledge. For instance, McKoon and Ratcliff 
argue that only those inferences which are supported by well-known 
information from general knowledge, or information which is explicit in the
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text, are automatically computed. This suggests that anaphoric reference to the 
compset will not be processed during reading, because the compset is neither 
explicit in the text, nor represented as general knowledge. Instead it is 
represented as the complement of the described set, whatever that might mean 
in the given context. The following section takes some time to detail this debate 
about the extent of inference processing and type of inferences which are made 
during reading.
Text comprehension and inference processing
Early inference research (eg Dooling and Lachman, 1971; Bransford, Barclay 
and Franks, 1972; Barclay, 1973; Anderson and Pichert, 1978) argued that the 
outcome of text comprehension is a model of the described situation, which is 
cued by information in the sentence, and includes background knowledge 
about that situation, or information from other modalities (Bransford and 
Johnson, 1972). Other researchers (eg Bower, Black and Turner, 1979;
Galambos and Rips, 1982; Sanford and Garrod, 1981; Anderson, Sanford and 
Garrod, 1983) suggest that the background knowledge used to construct these 
models has a m odular organisation, and that sentential information can trigger 
the instantiation of a detailed representation for a given situation12. Sanford 
and Garrod, for instance, argued that situation-specific packets of background 
knowledge, which they call scenarios, fill the implicit focus partition described 
in their theory of text processing. Once a scenario has been triggered by 
sentential input, subsequent sentences are interpreted with respect to this 
structure, unless they include cues, such as temporal adverbial phrases, which 
instruct a change of scenario (Anderson et al, 1983; Fauconnier, 1985).
This was intended to contrast with an interpretative approach (Katz and Postal, 
1965) which assumed that meaning resided solely in the content of the 
sentence, and can be derived by assigning semantics to a deep structure 
representation following syntactic analysis of the sentence. Flowever, the 
interdependence of sentential content and situation-specific or general 
knowledge is easily demonstrated. For example, sentences (11) and (12) 
describe very different situations despite their surface and propositional 
similarity. In (12) the wicket-keeper is understood to have physically caught 
the ball, but in (11) the policeman signals the traffic to stop without any such 
physical contact.
12 Minsky, (1975), Schankand Abelson (1977) and Sanford and Garrod (1981) provide a more 
Ihcorelic treatment of modular know ledge organisalion and its application to language 
understanding.
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(11) The policeman held up his hand and stopped the traffic.
(12) The wicket-keeper held up his hand and stopped the ball.
The same argument applies to the interpretation of under-specified verbs 
(Garnham, 1979). For instance, the verb cut takes a different sense in (13) and 
(14).
(13) The gardener cut his friend's grass.
(14) The barber cut his friend's hair.
In one classic experiment, Bransford et al also showed that inferences are 
controlled by an integration of sentential content and background knowledge. 
Subjects who read sentences like either (15) or (16) were later tested on their 
recognition memory for a list of sentences including (17) and (18). Those who 
had read (15) did not recognise (17) or (18) as previously presented sentences; 
but those who read (16) falsely recognised (18), but not (15). Bransford et al 
concluded that the mental representation of (16) includes the inference that fish 
swimming underneath the turtles will also swim underneath the log. This is 
based on knowledge about the likely relationship between the objects and 
transitive properties of the spatial preposition on. However, the preposition 
beside, which is used in (15) does not produce the same model of events or 
license this inference.
(15) Three turtles rested beside a floating log and a fish swam beneath them.
(16) Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath them.
(17) Three turtles rested beside a floating log and a fish swam beneath it.
(18) Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath it.
These days it is beyond dispute that the final outcome of text comprehension is 
a mental representation which integrates sentence content and at least some 
background knowledge. Even those who favour minimal inferential activity 
(eg Kintsch, 1988; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992) concede that such a model is 
ultimately represented, although they question the validity of models which 
depend on a lot of situation-specific knowledge. The debate has since moved 
on to differentiate between those inferences which take place during reading, 
and others which are delayed, or made in response to task demands.
The above Bransford et al study illustrates the distinction. It is not clear 
whether the inference observed there was made when reading the original
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sentence, during the period between reading the sentence and the recognition 
test, or at the time of the recognition test. McKoon and Ratcliff (1991,1992; also 
Perfetti, 1994) suggest that knowledge-based inferences like these will be made 
off-line because they are computationally demanding. Perfetti claims that it is 
more efficient to make a limited number of easy inferences during reading, 
when there is competition for scarce processing resources, and wait until later 
to devote these resources to more computationally demanding ones, than to 
attempt to generate all manner of inferences during reading.
Yet the perceived complexity of inferential processes depends on how those 
inferences are defined. Some researchers, like McKoon and Ratcliff, define 
those inferences which are made during the reading of a sentence as operations 
on a propositional database13, which is the output of prior syntactic analysis 
(see also Kintsch, 1974; Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978). They suggest that other, 
knowledge-based inferences are delayed until a discourse model is constructed 
from an integration of propositions and knowledge about the described 
situation. Other researchers (eg Sanford and Garrod, 1981; Johnson-Laird,
1983; Garrod, 1985; Garnham, 1987; Oakhill, Garnham and Vonk, 1992) 
consider that the bulk of inferential activity takes place at the level of the 
discourse model, and differ over the need for propositions. Although Johnson- 
Laird, Garnham and their associates include an intermediate surface 
representation of text, they suggest that only the most limited inferential 
activity occurs at this level, such as some forms of elliptical reference (cf. Sag 
and Hankamer, 1984; Carreiras, Garnham and Oakhill, 1993). Sanford and 
Garrod (1981; Garrod, 1985; also Sanford and Moxey, 1995) eschew 
propositions for a direct mapping of text onto a model of the described 
situation. Other, less partisan definitions of inference, such as the creation of 
new semantic information from old (Rickheit and Strohner, 1985), only finesse 
the dispute between propositional and model-based theories.
According to propositional theories, the major inferential task is to produce 
connectivity between propositions, either by argument overlap, co-reference 
(including anaphoric reference), or via the explicit use of connectives. Because 
these inferential processes take place during reading and draw upon limited 
STM (Short-term memory) resources, they only connect propositions which are 
in close proximity, no more than two sentences apart, and are consequently 
described as local coherence inferences. More global inferences, such as those
13 These propositions are intended to approxim ate those of propositional calculus. However, 
research in logical semantics (cf Johnson-Laird, 1982) has established that propositional 
calculus, and even first order predicate calculus, are incapable of representing the com plexity of 
natural language.
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needed to achieve co-reference or causality between distant propositions, are 
ruled out because they operate on more propositions than can be held in STM. 
Knowledge-based inferences are also ruled out because the processor would 
need to orchestrate an even greater amount of information. McKoon and 
Ratcliff stress that only those inferences that are necessary for the reader to 
comprehend a piece of text are made during reading. McKoon and Ratcliff 
argue that these are usually inferences that produce local connectivity in the 
text and require minimal general knowledge. For example, general semantic 
knowledge will support a co-referential interpretation of the dog and the collie, 
or the burglar and the criminal (McKoon and Ratcliff, 1981).
Some studies of anaphoric reference are cited as evidence of this local 
coherence constraint. Clark and Sengul (1979), for instance, report reading time 
studies where anaphoric reference by both pronoun and definite NP to an 
antecedent in the immediately preceding clause was markedly easier than 
when the antecedent was two or three clauses back in the text (see 19, where 
the three potential antecedents are italicised).
(19) A  broadloom rug in rose and purple colours covered the floor.
Dim light from a small brass lamp cast shadows on the walls.
In one comer of the room was an upholstered chair.
They surmised that the immediately prior clause takes privileged status in 
working memory, while McKoon and Ratcliff interpret this as evidence that 
only the propositions which form that clause are still resident in STM and open 
to reference from the currently processed clause. Other evidence comes from . 
eye movement data reported by Ehrlich and Rayner (1983), which also suggests 
that reference to nearby antecedents is easier than reference to more distant 
ones. They observed an increased reading time following pronominal reference 
when the antecedent was distant in the text.14
However, a focus based account of anaphoric reference, like the one described 
in the previous chapter (also Sanford and Garrod, 1981; Garrod and Sanford, 
1991) also predicts that recently mentioned NPs are the most accessible to 
anaphoric reference, unless textual cues have been used to focus on more 
distant ones. This means that neither Clark and Sengul, nor Ehrlich and Rayner 
can separate minimalist and model-based theories. The minimalist position, in
14 The relationship between eye-m ovem cnt data and inferential processing is discussed in 
chapter 5. Generally it is assum ed that there is a sufficient coupling between eyc-m ovem ents 
and text processing to attribute increased gaze duration to increased processing (cf Pollalsek  
and Rayner, 1991).
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contrast, is vulnerable to examples of anaphoric reference based on situation- 
specific knowledge. These include the studies described in the previous section 
(Caramazza et al, 1977; Ehrlich, 1980; Oakhill and Garnham, 1985; Vonk 1985).
Other experimental demonstrations of the facilitation of pronoun resolution by 
situation-specific knowledge are reported by Sanford, Garrod and their 
colleagues. In one study, Anderson, Sanford and Garrod (1983) describe 
reference which depends on the continued accessibility of a cued scenario (a 
packet of situation-specific knowledge). They found that temporal adverbial 
phrases which expressed a time-shift beyond the current scenario reduced the 
availability of scenario-bound antecedents. For instance, in (20) the main 
character is introduced by name, and a secondary character is described by 
discourse role. Anderson et al manipulated the temporal adverbial phrase of 
the penultimate sentence to shift time either within or beyond a time constraint 
associated with the scenario (in this case the length of a film). Subsequent 
anaphoric reference (by feminine personal pronoun) to the main character was 
unaffected by this time-shift15, but reference to the scenario-bound character 
(this time by masculine personal pronoun) took longer following a time-shift 
out of the scenario.
(20) At the cinema.
Jenny found the film rather boring.
The projectionist had to keep changing reels.
It was supposed to be a silent classic.
[Ten minutes /  seven hours later] the film was forgotten.
[He /  she] was fast asleep.
In a subsequent study, Garrod and Sanford (1985)16 used a measure of spelling 
error detection latencies to demonstrate the detection of referential anomalies 
during reading, where this depended on situation-specific knowledge. Subjects 
read a number of passages like (21) where the pronoun could be resolved on 
the basis of gender but was followed by a verb which was either consistent or 
inconsistent with the discourse role of that antecedent. In this example, it is 
more likely that Elizabeth will sink than jump in the example material. 
Conversely, the lifeguard is more likely to jump than sink. When these verbs
15 I Iowever, in continuation studies, Anderson et al noticed a tendency to use proper name or 
full noun-phrase to refer to the main character. Vonk, H uslinx and Simons (1992) also observed 
that reference by proper name can be used to signal a shift in topic.
16 An eye-tracking study conducted by Garrod, Freudenlhal and Boyle (1993) replicated these 
findings and is review ed in chapter 5. A description of the earlier study is sufficient for present 
purposes.
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were misspelled, Garrod and Sanford found a shorter error detection latency 
when they were consistent with discourse roles of the pronominal antecedents. 
This indicated either that interpretation of the predictable verb was facilitated 
by situation-specific knowledge, or that the unpredictable verb was registered 
as anomalous.
(21) Elizabeth was a very experienced swimmer and wouldn't have gone 
into the pool if the lifeguard hadn't been nearby. But as soon as she was 
out of her depth she started to panic and wave her hands about in a 
frenzy. Within seconds [she /  he] [jumped /  sank] . . .
A final observation by Garnham (1993) makes a nonsense of McKoon and 
Ratcliff's claims. He notes that their prohibition of knowledge-based inferences 
forces McKoon and Ratcliff to conclude that knowledge about the likely 
instrument in (22) is unavailable as this sentence is read, yet once (23) is used as 
a continuation, the same knowledge is needed to make the local coherence 
inference that the spoon was used to stir the coffee.
(22) Mary stirred her coffee.
(23) The spoon was dirty.
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Taxonomies of inferences during reading
Theories of inference processing during text comprehension are successful to 
the extent that they produce a principled account of which inferences are made 
as the sentence is read and which are delayed or made in response to task 
demands. Two extreme positions can be ruled out immediately. It is self- 
evident that some inferences are made during reading. I have, for instance, 
already reviewed some evidence of anaphoric resolution during reading. 
Similarly, it is also self-evident that not all possible inferences are drawn (if 
only because there are infinitely many possible inferences). These include 
problem-solving inferences found in riddles and some forms of logical 
reasoning. Consider, as an example, the following syllogistic premises (24 & 
25). Johnson-Laird (1983) describes this form of syllogism as particularly 
difficult, and reports a study where no subject inferred the correct conclusion
(26). This is an inference which does not appear to be drawn either during 
reading or even when consciously evaluated. Not that this means that all 
logical inferences are as difficult. Johnson-Laird also gives an example of an 
easy syllogistic inference embedded in discourse, while Lea, O'Brien, Fisch, 
Noveck and Braine (1990) report evidence of propositional reasoning during 
normal reading.
(24) All of the bankers are athletes.
(25) None of the councillors are bankers.
(26) Some of the athletes are not councillors.
(from Johnson-Laird, 1983)
Most theories of text comprehension take a stance somewhere between these 
extremes. I have already criticised one theory (McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992) 
which argues for minimal inferences during reading. They, in turn, have 
attacked the mental models framework as a description of unlimited inference- 
making (see eg Garnham, 1992; Glenberg and Mathew, 1992; Zwaan and 
Graesser, 1992; Carreiras, 1993; for responses to McKoon and Ratcliff). Given 
my earlier description of mental model representations as only partial semantic 
representations, and the claim that communication is an attempt to maintain 
shared partial models (also Hall-Partee, 1979), it seems clear that McKoon and 
Ratcliff are attacking a straw man account of mental models. Nevertheless, 
mental models theorists, like those from more minimalist perspectives, have so 
far failed to specify which inferences are made during reading. The remainder 
of this chapter surveys several failed attempts at such a specification, and a 
final one which may be more promising.
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One strategy has been to build a taxonomy of inferences where a line can be 
drawn between those which are made during reading and others which are 
made later or in response to task demands. The most obvious scheme classifies 
inferences according to the type of information they add to the representation. 
One category is composed of anaphoric and co-referential inferences, which 
establish links between different descriptions of the same token. Another, 
similar category instantiates general terms (eg infer cow from milk the animal), 
while causal inferences link events (eg Keenan, Baillet and Brown, 1984), and 
instrumental inferences instantiate instrument roles for verbs (eg infer hammer 
from strike the nail). Most contentiously, there are predictive inferences which 
infer probable subsequent events. For example, McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) 
argue that if predictive inferences are made during the reading of the sentence, 
then this should lead subjects to conclude after reading sentence (27) that the 
actress died.
(27) The director and cameraman were ready to shoot closeups when 
suddenly the actress fell from the 14th storey.
Less well-researched categories include inferences about characters' emotional 
states (Gernsbacher and Robertson, 1992), and thematic and goal-based 
inferences (eg Long, Golding and Graesser, 1992; Long and Golding, 1993).
Although it is generally concluded that anaphoric and co-referential inferences 
are made during reading (eg Garnham, 1982; Sanford and Garrod, 1989; 
McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992; Graesser and Kreuz, 1993), there is mixed evidence 
of the processing of other inference types (cf. Keenan et al, 1991, for a collation 
of studies on these types of inference). As an illustration, Keenan et al list two 
demonstrations of instrumental inference during reading (Paris and Lindauer, 
1976; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1980), and three experiments where they failed to 
occur (Singer, 1979; Dosher and Corbett, 1982; Lucas et al, 1987). These studies 
used a variety of experimental techniques, including a self-paced reading study 
by Singer. In another instrumental inference study not listed by Keenan et al, 
Garrod and Sanford (1982) produced positive results using the same self-paced 
reading methodology. Cotter (1984) subsequently replicated both the Garrod 
and Sanford, and Singer results. She concluded that Garrod and Sanford found 
evidence of instrumental evidence because their instruments were integral to 
the meaning of the verbs used. For example, a key is part of the meaning of the 
verb to unlock. However, the instruments and verbs used by Singer were not so 
closely tied. This suggests that a categorisation of inference by the type of
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information which is added to the mental representation is not sufficient to 
determine whether an inference will occur as the sentence is read.
Other attempts to categorise inferences do not draw distinctions based on the 
type of information that is inferred, but by the function of the inference and the 
required knowledge resources. In particular, Carpenter and Just (1977) 
distinguish between forward inferences which add information to embellish 
the representation, and backwards inferences which search for this information 
as it is needed to fill a gap. They argue that only backwards inferences are 
performed during reading, and in response to current processing problems. 
Backwards inferences include the above categories of anaphoric and causal 
inferences, while instrumental and predictive inferences are interpreted as 
examples of forward inferences. Keenan et al (1991) describe backwards and 
forwards inferences as bridging (see also Haviland and Clark, 1974) and 
elaborative inferences respectively, to capture the supposed superfluousness of 
forward inferences.
Van den Broek, Fletcher and Risden (1993) further subdivide the backwards 
inference category into connecting inferences which link the currently 
processed statement to recently processed text, which may still reside in STM; 
reinstatements which connect the current statement to more distant text which 
is now in long-term memory (LTM); and backwards elaborations which draw 
on the reader's general knowledge. Because backwards inferences constitute a 
search process in response to current processing difficulty, it is possible that 
they will fail on some occasions (cf. Bosch, 1988, for examples of personal 
pronouns without antecedents). Van den Broek et al's sub-categorisation 
predicts that inferences about local aspects of the text are most likely to be 
successful. However, the distinction still fails to explain why forward 
inferences are made during reading under some conditions, but not others.
The minimalist position draws a different functional distinction, but results in 
similar claims. As described in the previous section, McKoon and Ratcliff 
(1992) distinguish between inferences which contribute to the local coherence of 
the representation, and others which contribute to the global coherence. Only 
the former, they argue, are automatically made during reading, and include 
anaphoric and co-referential inferences, and perhaps causal inferences. 
Inferences which draw on knowledge of the text stored in LTM, or general 
knowledge are not made automatically, but only when local inferences fail to 
maintain coherence, or as special strategy. For example, someone studying a 
text with the aim of producing a critical review may produce more knowledge-
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based inferences than someone browsing through a newspaper. McKoon and 
Ratcliff consider the mixed experimental evidence for forward inferences as 
evidence of their idiosyncratic nature. Perfetti argues (following Fodor, 1983) 
that such inferences are not amenable to scientific study because they lie 
outside the language-processing module, and are hard to quantify.
Apart from the weaknesses of the minimalist account which have already been 
noted, including the fact that anaphoric reference is often dependent on 
situation-based knowledge, other researchers (eg Garnham, 1992; Singer 1993) 
observe that the account is untestable as it stands, because it does not provide 
any independent means of determining which inferences are automatic, and 
which are strategic.
A third strategy emphasises extra-linguistic factors such as the motivation of 
the reader and nature of the text (Graesser and Kreuz, 1993; Graesser, Singer 
and Trabasso, 1994). Like McKoon and Ratcliff, Graesser and his colleagues 
suggest that the motivation of the reader will determine the degree of 
inference-making. More inferencing will take place during purposeful reading, 
when the reader has particular goals, or an interest in the text. Under other 
conditions, such as those which typical of the laboratory setting, readers will 
scan text at a shallower level and make fewer inferences. Inferences are also 
more likely to be made when the reader has sufficient background knowledge 
about the subject of the text (cf. Vonk and Noordman, 1991, discussed in the 
following section), and when the text promotes inferential activity. Although 
Graesser et al do not say what it is about a text which promotes inferences, they 
assert that the poor quality of most experimental texts tends to mitigate against 
a high degree of inferential activity.
Graesser et al propose a hierarchy of inferences where those at the bottom, 
including referential and causal inferences are most likely to be made, even 
under degenerate reading conditions, progressing upwards to include thematic 
and emotional inferences which require higher motivation by the reader and 
well-constructed texts. However there does not appear to be any principled 
reason for this hierarchy, other than that those inference types at the bottom of 
the scale are reliably observed in experimental studies, and those towards the 
top are only rarely observed. This still begs the question of why some 
inferences appear more easily made than others.
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Semantic and pragmatic constraints on inference-making 
A final classification scheme proposed by Vonk and Noordman (1991) is more 
appealing. They classify inferences on two dimensions. One of these is the 
distinction between necessary and elaborative inferences already mentioned. 
Their other dimension is more novel, and interesting. It distinguishes between 
what Vonk and Noordman call logically necessary and possible inferences17. 
Those in the logical necessary category include entailment, presupposition, 
conventional implication and transitive inference.
Although logical necessity is intended to describe the deductibility of 
inferences from a propositional description of the text (Vonk and Noordman, 
1991, pp453), presumably by the application of logical inference rules, the 
above sub-categories describe semantic properties of sentences, which allows a 
narrower interpretation of logically necessary inferences as just those inferences 
which are under semantic control. For example, Kempson (1977) defines 
entailment as the necessary truth of a second sentence given the truth of the 
first. So the truth of (28) necessitates the truth of (29), because the property of 
being a bachelor necessarily implies the property of being male (and, strictly 
speaking, of marriageable age).
(28) That person is a bachelor.
(29) That person is a man.
A presupposition describes another truth relation between sentences. When 
reading a sentence like (30), one presupposes the existence of a king of France 
in order to evaluate the truth of that sentence. Entailment and presupposition 
differ in that the falseness of (28) precludes a truth value for (29), while a non­
existent king of France means that the truth of (30) is indeterminate.
(30) The King of France is bald.
Conventional presupposition is a non-truth-conditional property of some 
lexical items (Grice, 1961, in Levinson, 1982). Grice argues that although the 
conjunction but has the same truth table as and, it is used differently, to contrast 
the connection between its conjuncts (see also Halliday and Hasan, 1976). 
Finally, transitive inference is a property of other function words (eg behind, in 
front of, to the left of, to the right of; cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983) whereby a transitive
17 Vonk and Noordm an also refer to logically necessary and possible inferences as invited and 
pragmanlic inferences respectively. Although they use the former pair of descriptions more 
widely, the latter pair arc more appropriate. I hope to show  that they capture a distinction  
between the semantic and pragmatic control of inference.
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relationship of the form A  is behind B and B is behind C, implies that A  is behind 
C.18
In contrast, possible inferences are expectations based on general or situation- 
specific knowledge, given the described state of affairs. Following the 
pragmatics literature (Levinson, 1982), these are more appropriately described 
as implicatures and are defeasible, unlike semantic inferences (conventional 
implicature is also non-defeasible: Levinson, 1982). This means, as Vonk and 
Noordman demonstrate, that implicatures can be negated by subsequent text, 
but the negation of a semantics-based inference produces a contradiction. One 
example of a possible inference is to conclude from (31) that John broke the 
pitcher. Subsequent text can deny this inference (eg 32) without contradiction.
(31) John slipped on a wet spot. He dropped the delicate pitcher on the 
floor.
(Johnson, Bransford and Solomon, 1973)
(32) It was undamaged because of the thick pile carpet.
The defeasibility of possible inferences suggests that these are weaker than 
semantics-based ones. It should be no surprise then, to find that there is 
inconsistant evidence for elaborative inferences during reading. Johnson et al 
(1973) showed, using an off-line sentence-recognition task, that subjects who 
read (31) inferred that the pitcher broke; but subsequent studies suggest that 
such inferences are not routinely made during comprehension. Neither Singer 
and Ferreira (1983), nor Potts, Keenan and Golding (1988) found any evidence 
of predictive inferences during reading, while McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) 
report equivocal results across a range of measures. Predictive inferences were 
observed on tests which were administered after reading (five minutes after the 
reading phase), or when subjects could take time to respond. On more 
immediate tests, or tests with a response deadline, the inferences were less 
apparent, or not observed at all. More recently, O'Brien et al (O'Brien, Shank, 
Myers and Rayner, 1988; Garrod, O'Brien, Morris and Rayner, 1990) reported 
the occurance of predictive inferences during reading when the context 
sufficiently constrained their likelihood.
McKoon and Ratcliff (1986,1990,1992) argue that forward inferences are only 
'minimally-encoded' during reading. This emphasises that inference-making is
8^ A llhough it m usl bo noted that spatial relation terms do not always give rise to transitive 
inference. For example, given that B is to the right o f A  and C is to the right o fB  it is not 
necessarily true that C is to the right of A. A, B and C m ay form of circle, for instance.
69
not an all-or-none affair, but that inferences will vary in their strength of 
encoding and specificity. If an inference is only partially encoded then subjects 
will show longer response times on tests of this inference compared to fully 
encoded ones, but less time than needed to generate the full inference at the 
time of test. McKoon and Ratcliff used a deadline recognition test to test for 
predictive inferences after subjects had read sentences like (27), repeated below.
(27) The director and cameraman were ready to shoot closeups when 
suddenly the actress fell from the 14th storey.
They expected that subjects would infer that the actress died, and asked them 
to indicate if the word dead had appeared in the sentence. Such an inference 
should slow decision time and increase the false recognition rate relative to a 
control condition. Further, because subjects were trained to respond within 
650msec of the test word presentation, there was insufficient time to generate 
the inference in response to the probe. However, McKoon and Ratcliff 
observed only a small increase in error rate, and concluded that the inference 
had been made, but not strongly encoded.
At the same time, non-specificity means that there m aybe a number of 
competing possible inferences. For example, a reader might infer after reading
(27) that the actress died, was injured and survived, or was miraculously 
unhurt. Now consider what this means for (32). That the pitcher broke is but 
one possible inference. It is also possible that it did not break, or that different 
aspects of the situation are salient - perhaps some consequence of the pitcher 
breaking (eg 33 and 34).
(33) No-one would taste the expensive Burgundy wine.
(34) John was grief-stricken. The pitcher was a gift from his recently 
deceased grandmother.
If the pitcher breaking belongs to a cluster of possible inferences it may be 
falsely recognised in an experimental paradigm like that used by Johnson et al, 
but not so evident on measures of inferential activity during reading.
However, if the context conspired to promote this inference (following O'Brien 
et al, 1988; Garrod et al, 1990), or if there was a semantic cue to the outcome 
(icrashed in 35, cf. Loftus and Palmer, 1972), then the inference that the pitcher 
broke is likely to be stronger or more specific, and be observed during the 
reading of the sentence.
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(35) John slipped on a wet spot. The delicate pitcher crashed to the 
floor.
A separation of semantic and pragmatic-based inferences is also possible for 
other inference types. The first section of this chapter catalogued semantic and 
pragmatic constraints on the resolution of anaphoric reference. Semantic 
factors include gender constraints and the influence of verb and conjunction 
constraints, but an anaphor will also be resolved to the appropriate antecedent 
on the basis of knowledge about discourse roles and properties.
Vonk and Noordman (1991) find a similar interaction of semantics and 
pragmatics behind the generation of causal inferences. They identify because as 
a semantic indicator of a causal relation between two clauses (see also Halliday 
and Hasan, 1976), but demonstrate that the likelihood that a subject will make 
this inference is mediated by pragmatic knowledge about the conjunct clauses. 
In one experiment, subjects who read (34) as part of a text about spraycans and 
the environment failed to infer during comprehension that good propellants 
will not react with other materials, but made this inference in a subsequent 
verification task. Vonk and Noordman argue that this is because subjects 
lacked specialised background knowledge about propellants. In a later 
experiment, using similar materials, they demonstrated that subjects with 
specialised knowledge about the subject matter of the sentence do make such 
inferences during reading.
(36) Chlorine compounds are frequently used as propellants, because they 
do not react with any other substances.
It is likely that a similar interaction of semantics and pragmatics will determine 
the interpretation of quantifiers. There was some evidence of this in the 
introductory chapters. For example, Chapter one reported directional 
monotone inference patterns associated with quantifier semantics, but also 
evidence of context-dependency given the non-extensionality, and possible 
non-conservativity, of some quantifiers. Then, in chapter two, we saw that 
quantifiers like few and not many exert a strong semantic preference for compset 
focus, but the content of continuations to sentences quantified by few  depended 
on the availability of knowledge-based inferences about the compset. When 
the quantified sentence described a violation of expectations about the situation 
there were more explanatory continuations than when the sentence matched 
expectations.
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At the same time the quantifier only a few was seen to have a weaker focusing 
function and be more open to contextual influence. For example, it puts focus 
on the compset when in the context of other negative lexical items or if 
pragmatically supported. Moxey and Sanford found that subjects were more 
likely to produce continuations which described the compset when the 
quantified sentence describes a situation that violates norm-expectations. For 
example, given the two quantified sentences in (37) and (38), Moxey and 
Sanford found that subjects produced more compset-focused continuations for 
(37) than for (38).
(37) Only a few of the MPs were at the meeting. They . . .
(38) Only a few of the children ate their ice-cream. They . . .
They argued that this difference arises because (38) describes a situation in 
which a small set of children enjoy the ice-cream, and this violates the 
expectation that most children enjoy ice-cream. Subjects therefore provided 
explanations of why the other children (the compset) did not enjoy the ice­
cream.
Two experiments are described in Chapter 8 which more directly test the claim 
that focus patterns associated with only a few  are mediated by contextual or 
pragmatic knowledge. This study used sets of materials in which the 
quantified sentence described a situation which either matched or violated 
expectations. For instance, (38) is an example of a norm-matching sentence, 
and (37) is an example of a norm-viola ting sentence. This is because the refset 
for (37) would be expected to be small (for the UK, at least) because it is 
unusual for women to be over six foot tall. Correspondingly, it is unusual for 
them to be under five foot tall, and in (38) a small refset violates this norm. If 
the quantifier only a few  is used to mark the refset is small relative to 
expectations, and focus is mediated by pragmatics, then this predicts that focus 
is placed on the refset in (37), and the compset in (38).
(37) Only a few of the women were over six foot tall.
(38) Only a few of the women were over five foot tall.
The studies test this claim in two ways. In one experiment subjects are asked to 
provide completions to sentences which begin with a plural pronoun that refers 
to the quantified sentence. Following Moxey and Sanford (1987), it was 
predicted that the content of these completion sentence would describe the 
property of the focused subset. That is, the continuation sentence for (37)
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would describe the refset of tall women, but the continuation sentence for (38) 
would describe the compset of short women. The second study tested whether 
this same interaction was observed during comprehension, and measured 
subjects' eye-movements as they read sentences which referred to either a 
property of either the refset or compset partition of a sentence like (39) or (38).
Conclusions
This chapter began by describing a proposed processing model for pronominal 
reference to a quantified sentence. This claimed that a pronoun is initially 
interpreted as reference to the focused subset of the quantified sentence, but 
that this interpretation can be revised if it proves to be anomalous. That is, a 
pronoun is initially interpreted as reference to the refset of a monotone- 
increasing quantified sentence. In contrast, when the sentence contains a 
monotone-decreasing quantifier, the pronoun is interpreted as reference to the 
compset. According to the processing model, reference will appear anomalous 
when there is a mismatch between the description of the anaphor and that of 
the antecedent. The process of detecting this mismatch will depend on 
pragmatic inference.
The model predicts that such a mismatch will trigger processing to re-analyse 
the pronoun as reference to an unfocused set. This means that there will be a 
longer processing latency for reference to the unfocused subset of a quantified 
sentence. It also predicts an asymmetry for reference to monotone-increasing 
and -decreasing quantified sentences. According to the production data 
reviewed in the previous chapter, only the refset is represented following 
monotone-increasing quantification, but both the refset and compset are 
represented, and plausible antecedents following monotone-decreasing 
quantification. This suggests that anomalous reference can be more easily, and 
therefore more quickly, revised following monotone-decreasing quantification.
The remainder of the chapter reviewed a number of studies on the processing 
of anaphora and inference during reading in support of the predictions made 
by the model. In particular, there were a number of studies which supported 
the claim that pronominal reference is processed during normal reading, and 
that difficulties experienced in processing pronominal reference are reflected in 
the time it takes to read the anaphoric sentence. Moreover, there were some 
evidence (e.g. Garrod and Sanford, 1985) that both focus and pragmatic 
inference constrain the resolution of pronominal reference during reading, and 
that readers detect a mismatch between the description of the anaphor and the 
focused antecedent.
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The review of the inference processing literature also suggested that there are 
separable semantic and pragmatic constraints on the likelihood that inferences 
are made during reading. These factors may constrain the interpretation of 
quantified sentences in different ways. In particular, semantics appears to be 
the primary determinant of set focus in monotone-increasing and -decreasing 
quantified sentences. However, given a non-monotonic quantifier like only a 
few, there may be both semantic and pragmatic determinants of focus. The 
chapter reported some evidence for this, and outlined some further 
experiments which are reported in Chapter 8 .
Chapter four:
The processing of anaphoric reference 
to a quantified noun-phrase 
Introduction
This chapter reports the results of a pilot study and two self-paced reading 
(SPR) investigations of anaphoric reference to a quantified noun-phrase. The 
pilot study was used to generate a set of materials for the self-paced reading 
studies, and also for the two eye movement studies reported in the next 
chapter. The SPR studies test the three-stage model of anaphoric reference 
outlined in the previous chapter, and the claim that quantifiers like a few  & 
many and few & not many are used to focus on different partitions of a 
quantified noun-phrase.
Chapter three's model of anaphoric reference proposed that some quantifiers 
divide noun-phrases into refset and compset partitions to place one of these 
partitions in discourse focus. Subsequent anaphoric reference is automatically 
attached to this focal subset, and the attachment is evaluated to either resolve 
the anaphor or force re-assignment. However, if both the refset and compset 
are both focused following monotone-decreasing quantification, then reference 
to these sets may be evaluated in parallel. Resolution is only possible if a 
semantic match is established between the anaphor and its antecedent. The 
model predicts both that reference to the focal subset is most felicitous, and that 
reference to the unfocused subset will require extra processing, which will be 
evident as a longer reading time for the anaphoric sentence (cf. Haviland and 
Clark, 1974). It also predicts that an anomalous temporary attachment of the 
anaphor and focal subset will produce the 'false-bonding' effect described by 
Sanford and Garrod (1989).
At the same time, I have described how quantifiers like a few  and many, which 
have positive and monotone-increasing linguistic properties, appear to focus on 
the refset partition of an NP, while other quantifiers, likefew  and not many, 
which are negative and monotone-decreasing, tend to focus on the compset. 
Such preferences have been demonstrated in off-line production (Moxey and 
Sanford, 1987), but whether they occur during comprehension remains an open 
question. If they do, the above model predicts an increased reading time for
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reference to the compset following quantification by a few  or many, and for 
refset reference following quantification by few  or not many.
However, this may be complicated by an asymmetry between the two types of 
quantifier. Monotone-increasing ones not only focus on the refset, but block 
reference to the compset. In contrast, monotone-decreasing quantifiers permit 
reference to both sets. This m aybe because the refset is a necessary 
representation, and always available for reference, while the compset is only a 
possible representation which is instantiated following monotone-decreasing 
quantification. The asymmetry predicts that reference to the unfocused 
compset may be more difficult following quantification by a few or many than 
reference to the unfocused refset after quantification by few  or not many.
Both SPR studies used short three-sentence passages like (1) as experimental 
materials, where an anaphor described a property of either the refset (their 
presence) or compset (their absence) of a quantified noun-phrase. The remainder 
of the anaphoric sentence was designed to remain neutral between refset and 
compset interpretations.
The first experiment compared the reading times for these reference types 
following quantification by either the positive and monotone-increasing 
quantifier a few, or the implicit negative and monotone-decreasing few. The 
second experiment compared the positive and monotone-increasing many with 
the explicit negative and monotone-decreasing not many.
(1) A Public Meeting.
Local MP's were invited to take part in a public enquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station. [Quantifier] of the MPs 
attended the meeting. Their [presence | absence] helped the meeting 
run more smoothly.
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Pilot study: 
An off-line measure of anaphoric reference to differentially 
focused subsets of a quantified noun-phrase. 
Introduction
The original Moxey and Sanford (1987) study had subjects provide 
continuations to discourse fragments composed of a simple quantified sentence 
with a partitive construction, and a second sentence which began with the 
plural pronoun they. It was expected that subjects would interpret the plural 
pronoun as reference to the focal subset of the quantified noun-phrase, and that 
this preference would be reflected in the content of their continuations.
The present study used a forced-choice selection task in place of the sentence- 
continuation task. Subjects read a number of two-sentence passages, where the 
first sentence provided a context, and the second was a quantified sentence 
with the same construction as the Moxey and Sanford materials. Two possible 
continuation sentences followed each passage. Both began with the plural 
possessive pronoun their, and differed only in the noun possessed by it, which 
described a property of either the refset or compset. The sentences were all 
simple narrative continuations. This meant that they were more similar to 
completions that subjects gave to monotone-increasing quantified sentences 
than monotone-decreasing ones in Moxey and Sanford's (1987) sentence- 
continuation study. Completions to the monotone-decreasing quantified 
sentences tended to provide explanations of the small refset. One result of this 
is that the present sentences may be more felicitous continuations to monotone- 
increasing that monotone-decreasing quantified sentences. However, this was 
judged to be unavoidable, since explanatory continuation sentences would be 
even less felicitous following monotone-increasing quantification. According 
to the Moxey and Sanford data, there was only a tendency for explanatory 
continuations following monotone-decreasing quantification, and some simple 
narrative completions were produced under these conditions, but no 
continuations provided explanations of the small refset following monotone- 
increasing quantification.
In the present study, subjects were asked to indicate which of two continuation 
sentences best continued the narrative. It was again expected that subjects 
would prefer the one which referred to the focal subset: the refset following
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quantification by a few or many, and the compset following quantification by 
few  or not many. An example material is illustrated in (2), with the critical noun 
italicised.
(2) A Public Meeting.
Local MP's were invited to take part in a public enquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station. [A few /  few] of the MP's 
attended the meeting.
1. Their presence helped the meeting run more smoothly.
2. Their absence helped the meeting run more smoothly.
The study was conducted in two phases. The first phase examined passages 
quantified by a few  and few. Each passage was evaluated by ten subjects, and 
no subject saw any passage in both quantifier conditions. Passages were 
accepted as experimental materials if the anticipated response for both 
quantifier conditions was equal to, or exceeded, a 70% criterion (although, in 
practise this requirement was only necessary for the monotone-decreasing 
condition), and the passages were incrementally tested until 24 had passed the 
criterion. This generated a set of broadly equivalent materials. These 24 
materials were then tested again for the quantifiers many and not many. No 
subject who saw the materials for a few & few  did so for many & not many.
Results
The mean 'correct' continuations19 for all four experimental conditions are 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. The final 24 materials from the first stage of the 
pilot produced a mean 8.58 (se=0.23) - from a maximum 10 - selected refset 
continuations when the passage was quantified using a few, and a mean 7.79 
(se=0.20) when quantified by few. In the second stage, the same materials 
produced a mean 9.58 (se=0.16) refset continuations following quantification by 
many, and a mean 9.33 (se=0.18) compset continuations following quantification 
by not many.
19 'Correct' continuations are those which made the predicted type of reference. Continuations 
were expected to describe the refset follow ing quantification by afezo or mam/, and the compset 
fo llow ing quantification by few  and not many.
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Figure 1: Mean 'correct' continuations (with standard error bars) 
for a few, few, many and not many
The overall results were analysed using a 2x2 related ANOVA - using a by 
items analysis only, because the first pilot did not use the same subjects to 
evaluate all of the materials - and produced a highly significant effect for the 
quantifier pair (F(l,23)=57.55, pcO.OOl), where there was a greater incidence of 
'correctly' selected continuations sentences for many and not many. There was 
also a significant difference between the monotone-increasing and decreasing 
pairs (F(l,23)=6.59, p<0.018), with a lower incidence of 'correct' continuations 
following monotone-decreasing quantification. There was no evidence of an 
interaction (F(l,23)=2.61, p<0.120).
Discussion
The most pertinent observation is that across all of the 24 passages monotone- 
increasing and monotone-decreasing quantifiers exhibited the expected 
contrasting focusing function. Subjects chose those sentences which described 
the refset as the appropriate continuations for sentences quantified by a few  or 
many, and showed a clear preference for sentences which described the 
compset as continuations to sentences quantified by few or not many.
There was also evidence of the anticipated asymmetry following monotone- 
increasing and monotone-decreasing quantification. I had suggested, based on 
the Moxey and Sanford (1987) off-line data, that there would be a more marked 
preference for continuations that described the reference set following 
quantification by a few and many, than for continuations that described the 
complement set following quantification by few  and not many. This pattern was 
evident in the results. Subjects were more liked to select the sentence that
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described the reference set following quantification by afeiv than they were to 
select the sentence that described the complement set following quantification 
by  few. Similarly, they were more likely to select the sentence that described 
the reference set following quantification by many than they were to select the 
sentence that described the complement set following quantification by not 
many.
What fine-grained differences there were between the investigated quantifiers 
were less expected. Subjects showed strong preferences for the 'correct' 
continuations following quantification by many and not many20, but markedly 
weaker preferences following quantification by afezo and fezv. This may 
indicate a difference in the strength of function of the individual quantifiers, 
with many a stronger predictor of refset focus than a few, and not many a 
correspondingly better predictor of compset focus than few. These differences 
may also appear during the reading of the sentence.
Experiment one: 
A reading time analysis of anaphoric reference to refset and 
compset partitions of a quantified noun-phrase following 
quantification by a few  and feiv. 
Introduction
This experiment used the materials validated by the pilot study.
It was predicted that the referential preferences observed there would be 
reflected in measures of sentence reading time. Which means that there would 
be a longer reading time for anaphoric reference to the compset following 
quantification b y  afezo, and for reference to the refset following quantification 
by few, compared to the other two referential conditions.
Reading times were also recorded for the context and quantified sentences, and 
although no reading time differences were expected for the context sentence 
across the experimental conditions, it was possible that there would be 
differences for the quantified sentence. This would arise from processing 
differences between monotone-increasing and monotone-decreasing 
quantification. According to my account, an extra processing stage is needed to
20 In facl, Ihc data suggests a ceiling effect for these responses.
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derive the compset following monotone-decreasing quantification, because this 
remains unrepresented following monotone-increasing quantification. If this is 
true, then the extra processing stage may well be evident as an increased 
reading time.
Method
Design
There were two within-subjects manipulations: the form of quantification was 
crossed with the form of reference. That is, the subject NP of a quantified 
sentence was either quantified by the monotone-increasing a few  or the 
monotone-decreasing/eu;, and the following sentence began with an anaphor 
which either described a property of the refset or compset of the quantified 
sentence.
The cross-over design proved necessary because it is not clear what a control 
condition would look like for this experiment. The most obvious one is 
anaphoric reference to a bare NP. However, it is possible that the bare NP will 
naturally decompose into refset and compset partitions in some situations. 
Newstead (1994), for example, reports implicit quantification by verbs.
Subjects
Twenty-four subjects were used. All subjects were students attending an 
introductory summer school at the University of Glasgow, or undergraduate 
students there. Subjects were not paid for their participation.
Apparatus
Materials were presented on a 1024x768 pixel black and white monitor 
controlled by either a Macintosh SE30 or Macintosh Ilsi computer running 
PsyScope experimental design software developed by Cohen, MacWhinney, 
Flatt, and Provost (1993) at Carnegie-Mellon University. A button box was 
used to measure subject responses. This had three buttons, coloured red, 
yellow and green from left to right. The central, yellow button was used to 
control the presentation of items and record reading time; the other two 
buttons recorded subject responses to comprehension questions. Red recorded 
YES responses and green recorded NO ones. The button box timer was 
accurate to one millisecond.
Materials
The experiment used the 24 materials validated by the pilot study. Each 
material had a title and was three sentences long. The passages were presented
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sentence-by-sentence and subjects were asked a comprehension question after 
every passage. This queried factual information about the first or second 
sentence in each passage, so as to avoid drawing attention to the referential 
manipulation in the third sentence. Half of the questions required a YES 
response, and the other half a NO response. Responses were recorded from the 
button box. An example material is given in (3).
(3) A PUBLIC MEETING
Local MPs were invited to take part in a public enquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station.
Quantifier of the MPs attended the meeting.
Their [presence /  absence] helped the meeting run more smoothly.
Was the enquiry about building a nuclear power station?
The materials were mixed with 18 filler passages (which also had 
comprehension questions), and subjects had a practice trial of 5 items before 
starting the experiment.
The experimental materials for each quantifier were divided into 4 blocks 
following a Latin Square design. Six subjects viewed each of the experimental 
blocks, and individual subjects viewed each material in only one of the 
experimental conditions. The materials were presented in a fixed order. The 
blocks with experimental materials, fillers and comprehension questions are 
listed in Appendix 1.
Procedure
Subjects read the following instructions before beginning the experiment:
"In this experiment you will read a number of short passages.
The passages are presented a line at time, and a question will 
appear at the end of each passage.
Before each passage begins an asterisk (*) will appear on the screen.
Look at the asterisk and wait for the title of the passage to appear.
Once you have read the title press the YELLOW button for the first 
sentence of the passage. When you have read a sentence press the 
YELLOW button for the next one.
The question at the end of each passage will have a YES or a NO 
answer. Press the RED button if your answer is YES, and the
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GREEN button if your answer is NO.
You should keep your fingers over the keys throughout the 
experiment and use the same finger for the same key all the time.
There will be a practice session first to make sure you know what 
to do.
Press the YELLOW button to start."
Subjects then read the passages sentence by sentence and at their own pace. A 
fixation spot appeared for in the top left comer of a presentation box prior to 
the presentation of each item. After 1500msec it was replaced by the passage 
title. Subjects then controlled the presentation of successive sentences using 
button-box responses. At the end of each item subjects were instructed to 
"Press the YELLOW button for next passage".
Results
8 .2 % of data points were lost prior to analysis because of recording errors with 
the button box.
Overall, subjects answered 9.6% of the comprehension questions incorrectly. 
Across the experimental conditions, this worked out as 11.1% errors for the a 
few /  refset reference condition, 8.9% for the a few  /  compset reference 
condition, 7.8% for the few  /  refset reference condition, and 10.7% for the few  /  
compset reference condition. A sign test compared the error rates for felicitous 
(a few  /  refset and few  /  compset) compared to anomalous reference (a few  /  
compset and few  /  refset) condition, and found no significant difference (x=3, 
N=10, p<0.18).
The reading times for the context, quantified and anaphoric sentences were 
separately analysed using 2x2 within subjects ANOVAs.
An analysis of the mean reading times for the anaphoric sentence revealed a 
significant interaction of monotone quantifier and reference types 
(Fl(l,23)=36.22, p<0.001; F2(l,23)=10.34, p<0.001). As can be seen from Figure 
2 , this is due to increased reading time for the two conditions making 
anomalous reference to the unfocused NP subset: that is, reference to the 
compset following quantification by a few, and reference to the refset following 
quantification by few. However, an analysis of the simple effect contrasts 
established that there was a highly reliable difference between the two
83
reference conditions following quantification by a few  (FI (1,23) =23.06, p<0 .001; 
F2(l,23)=13.14, p=0.001), and the contrast between the two few  conditions is 
only significant on a subjects analysis ((Fl(l,23)=6.02, p<0.022; F2(l,23)=0.853, 
p=0.365).
Simple effects mean contrast also demonstrated that there were no reliable 
differences between the two felicitous reference, and the two anomalous 
reference conditions. A comparison of refset reference following quantification 
by a few, with compset reference following quantification by few  was only 
significant by subjects (Fl(l,23)=4.42, p<0.047; F2(l,23)=2.59, p<0.121); with no 
difference between compset reference following quantification by a few, and 
refset reference following quantification by few  (Fl(l,23)=0.06, p<0.810, 
F2(l,31)=1.19, p<0.287).
There were no significant main effects for the anaphoric sentence, and no 
significant effects were observed on analyses of the context and quantified 
sentences (all F's<1.4).
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Figure 2: Mean reading time (with standard error bars) for sentences 
describing either the refset or compset partition of a 
noun-phrase quantified by a few or few.
Discussion
As predicted, there was a longer reading time for reference to the compset 
following quantification by a few. However, the difference in reading time for 
refset and compset reference following quantification by few was not so reliable. 
According to the subjects analysis, there was a longer reading time for refset 
reference. This was not supported by the items analysis, however.
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Since previous studies have shown that sentence reading time can reflect 
difficulties in integrating a sentence with prior discourse (Haviland and Clark, 
1974), and more particularly, the processing of anaphoric reference (Garrod and 
Sanford, 1977), it can be concluded that there is a greater processing difficulty 
when reference is made to the complement set of a sentence quantified by afezo. 
This is consistent with an account where the monotone-increasing a few  focuses 
on and enables reference to the refset, but blocks reference to the compset. In 
fact, the compset may even be unrepresented under these conditions. It was 
not possible to draw this or similar conclusions about the processing of 
reference following quantification by few. It appeared that reference was either 
equally easy, or equally difficult to process under these quantificational 
conditions. It suggests either that reference to an unfocused subset is more 
easily recovered from, or that both subsets are evaluated in parallel as potential 
antecedents, following quantification by few. The following experiment tested 
the same hypotheses for reference to sentences quantified by many and not 
many, to determine if it was possible to generalise the present conclusions to a 
broader range of monotone-increasing and decreasing quantifiers.
Experiment two: 
A reading time analysis of anaphoric reference to refset and 
compset partitions of a quantified noun-phrase following 
quantification by many and not many. 
Introduction
This second experiment replicated the previous study, but substituted the 
quantifiers many and not many for a few  and fezu. It followed the same design 
and procedure and used the same materials; and what methodological 
differences there were are listed below.
Method
Subjects
The 24 subjects used for this experiment were drawn from the same subject 
pool as the previous experiment, but no subject was used for both. Subjects 
were not paid for their participation.
Materials
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The experiment used the same materials and fillers as the previous study, but 
was run in conjunction with another discourse experiment which had 50 items. 
The order of the two experiments was counterbalanced across subjects.
Results
1 1 .1 % of data was lost prior to analysis because of errors associated with the 
button box.
An analysis of the question responses found 10.5% errors overall, with 9.5% in 
the many /  refset reference condition, 12.5% in the many /  compset reference 
condition, 1 0 .0 % in the not many /  refset condition, and 10.2  % in the not many /  
compset reference condition. A sign test comparison of errors made in 
felicitous (many /  refset and not many /  compset) and anomalous (many / 
compset and not many /  refset) reference conditions proved non-significant 
(x=6 , N=16, p<0.23).
As before, the reading times for the context, quantified and anaphoric sentences 
were separately analysed using within subjects 2x2 ANOVAs.
The analysis of the anaphoric sentence produced a significant interaction of 
monotone quantifier and reference types (Fl(l,23)=22.21, p<0.001; 
F2(l,23)=25.93, p<0.001), with increased reading times when the sentence 
described the unfocused noun-phrase subset (see Figure 3). Further analysis of 
simple effect contrasts again indicated that there was a highly reliable 
difference between the two reference conditions following quantification by 
many (Fl(l,23)=17.85, p<0.001; F2(l,23)=24.60, p<0.001); and that there was a 
significant difference between the two monotone-decreasing conditions 
(Fl(l,23)=5.95, p=0.023, F2(l,23)=5.03, p=0.035).
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Figure 3: Mean reading time (with standard error bars) for sentences describing 
either the refset or compset partition of a noun-phrase 
quantified by many or not many.
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Other simple effects means comparisons found no reliable difference between 
the two felicitous reference conditions, but a difference between the two 
anomalous reference ones. A comparison of refset reference following 
quantification by many, and compset reference following quantification by not 
many was non-significant (FI(1,23)=0.00, p<0.948; F2(l,23)=0.03, p<0.867). The 
comparison of compset reference following quantification by many, and refset 
reference following quantification by not many was marginal by subjects and 
significant by items (Fl(l,23)=3.43, p<0.077; F2(l,23)=6.49, p<0.019); with a 
longer reading for anomalous reference following quantification by many.
There was also a main effect of quantifier type (Fl(l,23)=5.02, p=0.035; 
F2(l,23)=3.54, p=0.073) which reflected an overall longer reading time for 
reference to sentences quantified by many than those quantified by not many. 
Finally, there was a main effect of reference type which was significant by items 
only (Fl(l,23)=2.80, p=0.108, F2(l,23)=4.75, p=0.040), which reflected an overall 
longer reading time for reference to the compset of quantified sentence.
The analysis of reading times for the quantified sentence produced a main 
effect of quantifier type, which was significant by subjects only (Fl(l,23)=4.53, 
p=0.044; F2(l,23)=2.38, p=0.136), and was due to a longer reading time for 
sentences quantified by not many. There were no other significant results (all 
F's <1.7).
Discussion
The results confirmed those for the previous study. There was a longer reading 
time for the anaphoric sentence when it referred to the unfocused subset of the 
quantified sentence. That is to say, there was longer reading time for the 
sentence when it referred to the complement set as compared to the reference 
set following quantification by many, and a longer reading time for the sentence 
when it referred to the reference set as compared to the complement set 
following quantification by not many.
The weak main effect for the quantified sentence (which was significant by 
subjects only) was in the predicted direction, with a longer reading time for 
monotone-decreasing quantified sentences. However, this may have been due 
to the extra word (not) in the monotone-decreasing condition.
Conclusions
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The self-paced reading experiments produced the same pattern of effects 
following monotone-increasing quantification. That is, there was an increased 
reading time for the anaphoric sentence when it referred to a property of the 
compset following quantification by either a few  or many. This allowed the 
conclusion that anaphoric reference to the compset is more difficult to process 
following monotone-increasing quantification, because this compset is either 
unfocused or unrepresented. Given the considerable difficulty that subjects 
have in reading the sentence under these conditions, it is very likely that the 
latter is true, and the compset is unrepresented.
There was a less reliable pattern of data following monotone-decreasing 
quantification, however. The results for not many were consistent with the 
experimental predications: there was a longer reading time for refset as 
compared to compset reference. This suggested that the compset is focused, 
and the preferred antecedent of anaphoric reference under this form of 
quantification. The same pattern of results was less reliable following 
quantification by few, however. It seems that both forms of reference are 
equally possible under these conditions. This is important because it indicates 
that these quantifiers do have a different function from monotone-increasing 
ones, but not in terms of contrasting focus. It may be more appropriate to view 
monotone-decreasing quantification as a means of introducing additional 
information into the mental representation, rather than as a means of reversing 
focal preferences.
While the experimental results permit conclusions about the ease in integrating 
the anaphoric sentence with prior discourse, and demonstrate that this depends 
on the form of quantification, the methodology was insufficiently fine-grained 
to enable an evaluation of the model of anaphoric processing which was 
outlined at the beginning of Chapter three. For instance, it is not possible to say 
whether the difficulties in integrating the anaphoric sentence with prior 
discourse are due to increased processing to recover from an anomalous 
interpretation of the anaphor as reference to the focused antecedent, or simply 
due to difficulties in recovering the unfocused antecedent from the discourse 
model. The former predicts that the pronoun is immediately interpreted as 
reference to the focused antecedent, and that this is detected as a referential 
anomaly at some point downstream, and probably at the following noun, when 
it describes a property of the unfocused subset. The experiments reported in 
the following chapter attempt to separate these possible accounts.
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Chapter five: 
The time course of plural anaphoric reference 
to a quantified noun-phrase. 
Introduction
The experiments reported in this chapter are intended to provide a more 
detailed account of the processes involved in anaphoric reference to a 
quantified NP. Those reported in the previous chapter have established that 
some quantifiers are used during reading to focus on specific subsets of the 
quantified NP, and that the interpretation of subsequent pronominal reference 
is contingent on this function. They showed that monotone-increasing 
quantifiers like a few  and many focus on and enable reference to the refset 
partition of a quantified NP, while blocking reference to the compset. In 
contrast, those which are monotone-decreasing, such as few  or not many, serve 
to direct the representation of the compset, and permit pronominal reference to 
either subset. There was also evidence to suggest that the complement set is 
the preferred referent following quantification by not many. Yet the studies are 
largely uninformative about the locus and time course of these processes. For 
instance, it m aybe that the interpretation of a quantifier as an instruction to 
focus on a particular NP subset is made on reading that quantifier, or in 
response to anaphoric reference, or even deferred until the sentence is fully 
read. At the same time, it is not clear whether referential processes are 
triggered by the anaphor itself, or delayed until later.
A more fine-grained measure, such as a record of subjects' eye movements, 
may help answer these questions, and in so doing be informative about the 
component processes of anaphoric reference. The model described in Chapter 
three proposed that pronominal reference to a quantified NP is initially 
interpreted as reference to the focal subset, and if this interpretation proves to 
be wrong, is later revised to the unfocused one (or to a superset interpretation). 
If this is the case, then it should be possible to determine the point in processing 
where this initial assignment is registered as anomalous. This will be referred 
to as the locus of referential anomaly detection. We can infer that anaphoric 
processes were initiated at or before the locus of referential anomaly detection, 
and completed at or beyond this point.
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Knowing the time course of processing can also help to further delineate those 
processes which are on-line and concurrent with reading, and others which are 
deferred until later. Some researchers (eg McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992; Perfetti, 
1994) have argued that only the former are a necessary part of comprehension. 
The next section reviews some evidence of on-line anaphoric processing. Given 
that the referential processes described in this thesis are more complex that 
those which are usually the subject of psychological study, it will be interesting 
to see if these too are computed on-line. There may even be differences 
between reference under the two types of quantification.
The time coarse of anaphoric processing
While many of the anaphoric reference studies cited in Chapter 3 are just as 
uninformative about the time course and component processes of anaphoric 
references as those reported in the previous chapter, the data reported by some 
suggests that processing is at least triggered, and sometimes completed, on 
encountering the anaphor. In particular, they suggest that processing can be 
completed when sufficient cues to the referential outcome are localised at the 
anaphoric expression. For example, co-referential definite NPs like the Prime 
Minister and John Major (given a contemporaneous discourse setting) can in 
principle be resolved immediately (but see Garrod, Freudenthal and Boyle, 
1994); and the same seems true of pronouns when gender or number are 
sufficient cues to their resolution.
The various paradigms used by the studies described in Chapter 3 may also be 
informative about different stages of anaphor resolution. For example, Sanford 
and Garrod (1989; also Garrod et al, 1994) argue that methodologies which 
interrupt the reading process with lexical decision or word recognition tasks 
are indicative of initiation processes. Such studies might describe the activation 
of candidate referents, and possibly the suppression of non-candidates, but do 
not indicate whether a commitment has been made to any particular 
antecedent. Other paradigms which present the same probes at the end of 
sentence (eg Corbett and Chang, 1983; Gernsbacher, 1989), or require subjects to 
indicate their referential decisions (eg Stevenson and Vitkovich, 1986), will 
describe the completion of anaphoric reference. Moreover, the task performed 
by subjects is also relevant. Cloitre and Bever (1988) had subjects read 
sentences containing either definite or pronominal reference to a previously- 
mentioned person or object. On encountering the pronoun subjects were 
presented with a target word that was either related or unrelated to the 
previously mentioned person or object. In one experiment, subjects had to 
decide if the target was a word or a non-word, and in another experiment they
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had to decide if it belonged a particular category (e.g. if it was a type of fruit). 
Cloitre and Bever found that subjects made faster lexical decisions word that 
were related as compared to unrelated to the antecedent when the sentence 
contained a definite referring expression, but no difference is decision latencies 
when the sentence contained a pronoun. In contrast, subjects made faster 
category decisions for related as compared to unrelated targets when the 
sentence contained either a definite referring expression or a pronoun. Cloitre 
and Bever concluded that the tasks were differentially sensitive to the 
processing of definite and pronominal reference.
Dell, McKoon and Ratcliff (1983), and O'Brien, Duffy and Myers (1986) used the 
former experimental paradigm to produce evidence of immediately initiated 
referential processes following definite NP reference. Both studies 
demonstrated that the recognition of a previously read NP is 
facilitated, relative to a control condition, by the immediately prior presentation 
of an anaphoric NP (Dell et al locate the effect within 250msec of presentation 
of the anaphor). For example, Dell et al conducted two experiments where 
subjects read passages like (1) completed by either the experimental sentence 
(2), or a control sentence (3).
(1) A burglar surveyed the garage set back from the street.
Several milk bottles were piled at the kerb.
The banker and her husband were on vacation.
(2) Thei crim inal slipped3 away4 from thes streetlamp .6
(3) Ai cat2 slipped3 away4 from thes streetlamp .6
In one of the experiments subjects performed a word recognition task (at points 
1 to 6 of the final sentence) on burglar, which had appeared earlier in the 
passage, and is a plausible antecedent of the criminal, but not of a cat. In the 
second experiment, subjects performed the same task on an associate word, 
garage, which was also presented earlier in the passage, and described by Dell 
et al as belonging to the same proposition as burglar. The results demonstrated 
that both the referent and associate were more quickly recognised as previously 
read words when tested at points 2, 3 and 4 of the experimental sentence than 
when tested at the same points in the control sentence. This suggests that 
burglar is registered as a candidate antecedent as soon as the anaphor is read 
and maintained as such until some distance downstream. It is also likely that it 
is selected as the appropriate antecedent at some point during this processing, 
but Dell et al cannot say when.
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Speelman and Kirsner (1990) replicated the Dell et al results, using pronouns in 
place of anaphoric NPs, and concluded that pronominal reference is as rapidly 
initiated as definite NP reference. However, Greene, McKoon and Ratcliff 
(1992) disputed this conclusion, and used a speeded reading and recognition 
task to suggest that the recognition of a previously presented antecedent is 
more rapid following definite NP reference than following pronominal 
reference. Subjects read short passages like (4), word-by-word and at a fixed 
rate (each word was presented for 250msec, with the last word of each line 
presented for 300msec to allow for sentence wrap-up processing), while 
subjects had also to complete the recognition task within a fixed time period 
(1 0 0 0msec). A recognition probe was presented at either points 1, 2 or 3 in the 
passage, testing recognition of the referent name {Mary, in this instance) 
relative to the non-referent name (John), or a non-referent control word {dishes).
(4) Mary and John were doing the dishes after dinner.
One of them was washing while the other dried.
Mary accidentally scratched John with a knife
and theni she dropped2 it on the counter.3
Although Greene et al found no evidence of facilitated recognition for the 
referent {Mary) compared to non-referent (John) conditions, these showed 
facilitated recognition relative to the non-referent control word (dishes) at all 
three test points. However, this only suggests that the named characters take 
privileged status relative to the non-referent control (see also Corbett and 
Chang, 1983), particularly as facilitated recognition was observed prior to 
pronominal reference (at point 1). When Greene et al replicated the earlier Dell 
et al study using the speeded reading and recognition task, they observed 
facilitated recognition of the referent noun-phrase (and its semantic associate), 
and concluded that their paradigm prevented time-consuming processing 
needed to effect pronominal reference, but allowed more rapidly completed 
and easily processed definite NP reference.
Other studies conducted by Corbett and Chang (1983), and Gemschbacher 
(1989), suggest subtler differences between NP and pronominal reference. For 
example, Corbett and Chang had subjects read sentences like (5), where the first 
mentioned character is referred to by proper name, pronoun or elliptical 
reference. The sentences were read word-by-word, but self-paced, and with a 
recognition probe presented at the end of each sentence. The response latencies 
indicated that recognition of the antecedent (Karen) was facilitated relative to
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the non-antecedent (Emily) whatever the reference type. However, an 
examination of response latencies for the non-antecedent probe (Emily) 
suggested slower recognition following proper name reference than following 
either pronominal or elliptical reference.
(5) Karen poured a drink for Emily and then [Karen /  she / ellipsis] put the 
bottle down.
Corbett and Chang suggest that proper names activate the representation of 
potential antecedents, and suppress non-antecedents, while pronouns simply 
activate the representations of all plausible antecedents. Gernsbacher observed 
similar effects when she used a modified version of this experiment to examine 
the time course of facilitated antecedent recognition. She found that the 
appropriate antecedent of a proper name anaphor showed facilitated 
recognition (relative to a non-antecedent) immediately following the anaphor, 
but the same effect was weaker and delayed until the end of sentence for 
pronominal reference.
These results suggest the immediate initiation of proper name anaphora (just as 
Dell et al found for definite NPs) and delayed initiation of pronominal 
anaphora. They also suggest a more specific function for proper name 
anaphora. They activate the representation of potential antecedents and inhibit 
the representations of non-antecedents, while pronominal anaphora only seem 
to activate the representations of plausible antecedents. However, both of these 
studies used materials where pronoun gender failed to unambiguously select 
an antecedent, and it m aybe that pronominal reference is delayed and exhibits 
a non-specific function under these conditions. After all, no delay was 
observed in the Speelman and Kirsner study where gender did unambiguously 
select the appropriate referent.
Furthermore, other studies using a cross-model priming task to investigate 
anaphoric processing during speech comprehension suggest the immediate 
initiation of pronominal reference when gender is a useful cue. Shillcock 
(1982), for example, presented sentences like (6) to subjects, who made lexical 
decisions about target words presented at either points a, b or c in the text. In 
this example the targets were either street or school, where school is semantically 
associated with the teacher, a potential antecedent of pronominal reference.
Street is a control word which is unassociated with either of the potential 
antecedents (the teacher or the train).
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(6) The teacher a did not board the train, for the b simple reason that it/he  
c was not going to the South Coast of England.
Shillcock reported equal lexical decision latencies for the two words at point a, 
and a faster decision time for school at point b. At point c, however, lexical 
decision was faster for school following reference by masculine personal 
pronoun (he), but equivalent to the decision latency for street following 
reference by neutral pronoun (it). Shillcock concluded that the discourse 
representation of the teacher was inhibited when it proved an inappropriate 
antecedent (following neutral pronoun reference) but maintained when the 
reference was more appropriate.
Other studies reviewed by Nicol and Swinney (1989) demonstrate that 
potential antecedents of a pronoun are immediately re-activated unless these 
are ruled out by structural constraints, and suggested that semantic and 
pragmatic constraints select from this candidate set. In one experiment, 
subjects listened sentences like (7), where structural constraints mean that the 
reflexive pronoun (himself) can only refer to the doctor, and made a lexical 
decision to visual presentations of semantic associates of each of the potential 
antecedents (the boxer, the skier, the doctor). These were presented at the point in 
the sentence marked by an asterisk. The 'i' indices denote the syntactically 
preferred co-referential interpretation.
(7) The boxer told the skier that the doctor} for the team would blame 
himselfi * for the recent injury.
Nicol and Swinney report that lexical decisions were significantly faster for a 
semantic associate of doctor as compared to a control word, but there was no 
difference between lexical decisions for semantic associates of boxer or skier 
compared to control words. Nicol and Swinney interpret this as evidence that 
syntax can be used to immediately constrain the candidate set of referents, and 
in this case select a unique referent, of a pronoun.
In a second study, subjects listened to similar sentences like (8), where the 
reflexive pronoun was replaced by an object pronoun (him). This time syntax 
only ruled out the doctor as an antecedent, but the boxer and the skier 
remained possible antecedents. Subjects again made lexical decisions to visual 
presentation of semantic associates of boxer, skier or doctor. These were 
presented at the point in the sentence denoted by an asterisk, and the
!I
!
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syntactically acceptable co-referential interpretations are indicated by Y 
indices.
(8) The boxer* told the skier* that the doctor for the team would blame 
him * for the recent injury.
This time there was no difference in decision latencies for a semantic associate 
of doctor compared to a control word, but shorter latencies for lexical decisions 
to semantic associates of boxer or skier compared to control words. Nicol and 
Swinney concluded that syntax can constrain the candidate set of potential 
antecedents, and argue that semantics and pragmatics will then serve to select 
between these alternatives. This may be compatible with Shillcock's findings, 
since pronoun gender is often considered a syntactic constraint. Both sets of 
results suggest the immediate initiation of pronominal reference, but that the 
set of candidate antecedents are also immediately constrained by syntactic 
factors.
Later cross-model priming studies conducted by Tyler and Marslen-Wilson 
(1982) and Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Koster (1993) were more informative 
about the locus of resolution, and examined discourse constraints on the 
resolution process. In the first of these studies (Tyler and Marslen-Wilson, 
1982), subjects heard passages like (8) which were completed by one of the 
sentence fragments (10) to (12). They were then visually presented with a 
probe (either the pronoun him or her). Subjects were required to name this 
probe. Tyler and Marslen-Wilson reasoned that there would be a shorter 
naming latency (i.e. the time taken to begin to pronounce the probe) when the 
object pronoun was consistent with the context (her in all cases), and that this 
would indicate the prior resolution of proper names (Philip, in 10), pronouns 
(eg 11) and elliptical reference (eg 12). They reported such a difference, with a 
less marked effect for the elliptical condition21.
(9) As Philip was walking back from the shop, he saw an old woman trip 
and fall flat on her face. She seemed to be unable to get up again.
(10) Philip ran towards . . .
(11) He ran towards . . .
(12) Running towards . . .
21 This may have occured because elliptical reference is a low -level phenom ena (see Sag and
I Iankamer, 1984) which may not attend to semantic information, but make an im m ediate and 
ballistic attachment to the focal referent. This m ay have been to the old wom an in Tyler and 
Marslcn-W ilson's study, which w ould produce a temporary anom aly and slow  processing.
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Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Koster (1993) conducted a modified version of this 
experiment which demonstrated that gender cues, pragmatic inference and 
discourse focus are all used to immediately constrain the interpretation of a 
pronoun. Marslen-Wilson et al found that when gender disambiguated the 
pronoun this was the dominant constraint, and there was a shorter naming 
latency for the probe. However, the discourse focus of the antecedent and 
knowledge that the antecedent was an appropriate patient of the preceding 
verb-phrase (e.g. ran towards or running toivards in 10,11 & 12) also influenced 
the naming latency of the probe. There was a shorter naming latency for the 
pronoun probe when it referred to the antecedent which could be pragmatically 
inferred to be the appropriate patient of the verb. For instance, it can be 
pragmatically inferred that the old woman in (9) is the most appropriate patient 
of the verb-phrase run toivards in (10) or (11), or nam ing towards in (12). Finally, 
there was a shorter naming latency for the pronoun probe when the antecedent 
was in discourse focus. That is, when it was consistently referred to by the 
subject NP of each sentence in the discourse. Although all of these constraints 
appeared to influence the resolution process, Marslen-Wilson et al argue that 
gender was the dominant constraint, pragmatic inference a less strong 
constraint, while discourse focus was the weakest.
With the exception of the Greene et al (1992) studies, the evidence appears to 
favour the immediate initiation of referential processing on encountering either 
a definite NP, proper name or pronoun. Some of the data also suggests that 
definite NPs or proper names are resolved earlier than pronouns, although 
gender did not unambiguously select an antecedent in these studies. The 
speech processing experiments (Shillcock, 1980; Tyler and Marslen-Wilson,
1982) suggest that pronominal reference is rapidly resolved when gender is a 
useful cue. Vonk (1984) used measures of eye movements and fixation 
duration during reading to also demonstrate early pronoun resolution. She 
found a small but reliable increase in fixation duration on the pronoun when 
gender identified the antecedent, and increased reading time on the following 
verb when it was not a useful cue.
Another study by Stevenson and Vitkovich (1986) suggests that pragmatic 
information about verb roles is also rapidly used to determine the appropriate 
antecedent of a pronoun when gender was not a useful cue. Subjects read 
sentences like (13) to (15) and had to indicate which of the potential antecedents 
was referred to by an anaphor. The verbs in the second clause of the 
experimental sentence were either informative (hurried in 13 and 14) or 
uninformative (forgot in 13 and 14) about the referential outcome, while
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reference was made by either a personal pronoun (13 and 15) or ellipsis (14 and 
16).
(13) Jane was late for her appointment with Sue and she hurried to get a 
taxi.
(14) Jane was late for her appointment with Sue and hurried to get a taxi.
(15) Anna lent Felicity the steam iron and she forgot to give the instructions.
(16) Anna lent Felicity the steam iron and forgot to give the instructions.
Stevenson and Vitkovich found that when the verbs enabled pronoun 
resolution, subjects indicated the appropriate antecedent immediately; but 
when the verbs were uninformative, this decision was delayed until further 
downstream.
Finally, Garrod et al (1994) replicated the Garrod and Sanford (1985) study 
described in Chapter 3, but used measures of eye movements to indicate the 
immediate use of pronoun gender, discourse focus, and verb pragmatics to 
resolve pronominal reference. Subjects read a number of passages where 
potential antecedents could be distinguished by gender in one condition (17), 
but not in another (20). These passages were continued by a sentence making 
pronominal reference where the following verb matched the discourse role of 
one of the potential antecedents. In the following examples, ordered matches 
the discourse role of the passenger, Joan, while poured better fits the role of the 
steward(ess). Sentences (18) or (19) continued gender differentiated passages 
like (17), while one of (21) to (26) continued passages like (20); and both 
passages were completed by a final sentence (25).
(17) Flying to America
Joani wasn't enjoying the flight at all. The dry air in the plane made 
her really thirsty. Just as she was about to call her, she noticed the 
stewardess2 coming down the aisle with the drinks trolley.
(18) Right away she orderedi a large glass of coke.
(19) Right away she poured2 a large glass of coke.
(20) Flying to America
Joani wasn't enjoying the flight at all. The dry air in the plane made 
her really thirsty. Just as she was about to call him, she noticed the 
steward2 coming down the aisle with the drinks trolley.
(21) Right away she orderedi a large glass of coke.
(22) Right away she poured2 a large glass of coke.
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(23) Right away he poured2 a large glass of coke.
(24) Right away he orderedi a large glass of coke.
(25) Joan finished it in one go and ordered another one.
Garrod et al identified three referential constraints. The first of these is the 
discourse focus of the two potential antecedents, where the form and order of 
mention of characters determines which is focal (eg Sanford and Garrod, 1981), 
with Joan the focal character in (17) and (20) because she is mentioned first and 
by proper name. A second factor is pronoun gender, and a third is the 
pragmatic fit of the verb-description. Significant effects of pronoun and focus, 
and an interaction of these factors with verb pragmatics were observed on the 
verb (ordered or poured) using a first pass reading time measure22, but not on the 
preceding pronoun. At the same time, all three factors were also seen to 
influence the total reading time of the anaphoric sentence. Garrod et al 
concluded that referential processes were triggered at the verb, and resolved 
further downstream, and that all three factors made an immediate impact on 
the referential process.
When Garrod et al replicated the experiment, but substituted names and 
definite descriptions for the pronouns, they found only total reading time 
indications of referential processes. Garrod et al concluded that anaphoric 
reference is immediately triggered on encountering pronouns, but not 
necessarily on encountering definite NPs or names. They suggest that this may 
be because a definite expression can either be interpreted anaphorically, or as 
the instruction to introduce a new element into the discourse representation. 
Garrod et al argue that these two possibilities are explored in parallel, but only 
selected between downstream of the expression.
This may explain the contradictory word recognition data, where definite NP 
reference appears to be more immediate than pronominal reference (eg Dell et 
al, 1983). Garrod et al suggest that the postulated anaphoric interpretation of a 
definite NP may access potential antecedents to the extent that their recognition
22 Garrod el al used Ihe same software to analyse their data as used in the present studies, and 
defined their measure of first pass reading lime as the initial set of fixations on a given region of 
lest, prior to rightwards eye m ovem ents to read subsequent regions of text, or leftwards eye 
movem ents to read previous regions of text. The first pass has generally been used as an 
indicator of imm ediate processing, and a description of early processes (Rayner and Pollalsek, 
1989). I lowever, its precise interpretation will depend on the size of the defined region of 
analysis. In the case of the Garrod et al materials these regions are small enough to warrant an 
immediacy interpretation. The total reading time m easure records all the fixations on a text 
region, including those which arc return visits to the region.
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is facilitated in a recognition paradigm, but that fuller referential processing is 
delayed until the processor has settled on an anaphoric interpretation of the 
expression.
It may also account for Greene et al's failure to observe facilitated recognition 
of a pronoun's antecedent in a speeded reading and recognition task. If 
anaphoric processing is immediately initiated on encountering a pronoun, and 
this depends on a number of sources of information, then this will be both 
demanding on processing resources, and time-consuming. Since there is 
limited time to read the sentence in the Greene et al task, it seems likely that the 
on-line processing of anaphoric reference was disrupted, and subjects were 
unable to recover the pronoun's antecedent as they read the sentence. In 
contrast, if definite NPs do not trigger referential processes, but simply activate 
potential antecedents, then the corresponding anaphoric processing is not so 
easily disrupted by the speeded reading and recognition task.
Cloitre and Bever (1988) report some further experimental evidence that 
pronouns and definite NPs are used to access antecedents in different levels of 
the text representation. They found that when subjects read (or heard) short 
passages which ended with either an object pronoun or definite NP, there was a 
different pattern of either lexical or category judgements about a visually 
presented adjective that was earlier used to modify the appropriate antecedent. 
Subjects made faster lexical decisions following definite NP reference, but faster 
category membership decisions following pronominal reference. Cloitre and 
Bever concluded that pronouns directly access a conceptual or discourse 
representation of the antecedent, while definite NPs first access a surface lexical 
representation.
The present study followed Garrod et al in manipulating discourse focus and 
the pragmatic match between an anaphor and its antecedent. These two 
manipulations are highlighted in (26). According to my original predictions, 
monotone-increasing quantification will focus on the refset partition of the 
quantified NP, while monotone-decreasing quantification will result in focus 
on the compset partition. However, the SPR studies suggest that the refset and 
compset are equally accessible to pronominal reference following monotone- 
decreasing quantification. This m aybe because both of the subsets are in 
discourse focus, or because it is more easy to recover from anomalous reference 
following monotone-decreasing quantification. The present studies will 
determine whether these findings can be replicated.
!
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(26) A Public Meeting.
Local MPs were invited to take part in a public enquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station. Quantifier of the MP's 
attended the meeting. Their [jpresence /  absence] helped the meeting run 
more smoothly.
The predictions are the same as those tested in the previous SPR studies, but 
with more precise claims about the locus of referential anomaly detection.
There should be evidence of increased processing difficulty when reference is 
made to the unfocused subset of the quantified NP. This will be evident as an 
increased reading time on measures of First pass and Total reading times, 
which predicts a longer reading time for reference to the compset following 
quantification by a few or many, and for refset reference following quantification 
by either few  or not many. The immediate detection of a referential anomaly 
should be observed an increased First pass reading time for the anaphoric NP. 
Failing this, there may be evidence of an increased number of regressions from 
this region of text.
Eye movements during reading
As already demonstrated by the Garrod et al study, an account of anaphoric 
reference which emphasises the initiation and completion of processing, and 
the integration of semantic and pragmatic constraints on resolution is amenable 
to the study of eye movements. It is also consonant with broader theoretical 
positions on the relationship between eye movements and cognitive processing.
Rayner and Pollatsek (1989) identify several theoretical stances. One position, 
which they describe as the global control hypothesis, proposes that eye 
movements proceed independently of cognitive processing. Other theories 
allow for the cognitive control of eye movements. Of these, the immediacy 
hypothesis proposed by Just and Carpenter (1980) makes the strongest claims. 
They argue that fixation is maintained on the currently processed word until 
processing of that word is completed. This means not only that visual and 
lexical processing is completed, but also syntactic and semantic processing, 
including the identification of referents. At the same time, Just and Carpenter 
allow for subsequent processing to revise initial and erroneous decisions. A 
less extreme position (Rayner and Pollatsek, 1989) argues that while eye 
movements are under linguistic control, they may not be rigidly shackled to 
current processing as supposed by Just and Carpenter. According to Rayner 
and Pollatsek, eye movements are likely to be under the direction of recently
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extracted text information, but not necessarily controlled by information 
extracted on the current fixation.
There is a body of evidence in support of the view that both eye movements 
and the duration of individual fixations are at least partly under cognitive 
control (see Rayner and Pollatsek, 1989, for a review). In terms of the evidence 
of eye movement control, a number of researchers (e.g. Rayner and McConkie, 
1976; Rayner, 1979) have found that eye movements are sensitive to the length 
of individual words, and tend to be made within the beginning or middle 
regions of a word. Other studies have shown that, although short words (e.g. 
3-letter words) tend not to be directly fixated, but are often 'skipped' during 
reading, those short words which are actually skipped also tend to have a high 
frequency of occurrence in language use, or are predictable from context.
It has also been widely demonstrated that the duration of individual fixations 
are under cognitive control. For instance, it has been widely reported (e.g. 
Inhoff and Rayner, 1986; Rayner and Duffy, 1986) that words which have a 
high frequency of occurrence in language are fixated with shorter latencies that 
those which have a low frequency of occurrence, even when controlling for 
word length. Longer fixation durations have also been reported for words 
which are syntactically ambiguous in the current sentence (Frazier and Rayner, 
1982), and those which are lexically ambiguous (Rayner and Duffy, 1986). At 
the same time, shorter fixations are often made on words which are highly 
predictable in the current context (e.g. Ehrlich and Rayner, 1981).
The results for pronoun resolution and antecedent search are more pertinent to 
the present studies. Ehrlich and Rayner (1983) found that the total reading time 
of an anaphor was longer if its antecedent was more distant in the text. This 
measure of reading time included both the fixation time on first encountering 
the word and later re-fixations. In contrast, Garrod et al (1994) found evidence 
of an immediate increase in reading time on an anaphor and following verb 
when its antecedent is unfocused or pragmatically anomalous.
Further evidence suggests that while eye movements are under cognitive 
control, the immediacy hypothesis is too strong a claim. In particular, there is 
considerable evidence (e.g. Rayner, Well, Pollatsek and Bertera, 1982; Inhoff 
and Rayner, 1986) that more than the current word is processed on each 
fixation, and that the duration of individual fixations may not index the full 
processing of a word. Rayner et al (1982) found that subjects can partially 
process information from the word to the right of the currently fixated word
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during that fixation. Subjects read sentence under three conditions: one where 
only the currently fixated word was visible, but all the letters to the left of 
fixation were replaced by other letters; one where only the current word and 
the word to the left were visible, but all other letters were replaced by others; 
and one where the current word and part of the following word were visible. 
Rayner et al found that there was no difference in reading rate in conditions 
where the current and following word were visible, and others where the 
current word and part of the following word were visible, even when those 
visible letters in the following word were replaced by visually similar ones. In 
both cases the reading rate was faster than when there was no visible 
information about the following word. Rayner et al concluded that more than 
the currently fixated word can be processed on each fixation. The reader will 
also process information about the location and size of the following word.
This information is used to program the next eye movement.
Inhoff and Rayner (1986) investigated the fixation duration on high and low 
frequency words in conditions where the word could or could not be pre­
viewed prior to fixating on it. Inhoff and Rayner only observed a frequency 
effect on the first fixation when subjects were able to preview the word. 
However, there was evidence of a frequency effect when they totalled the 
durations of all the fixations on that word prior to an eye movement to fixate 
either the following or previous word. This suggested that when subjects were 
able to preview the following word, the following fixation was influenced by 
cognitive factors, but when there was no preview the first fixation was 
completed automatically and without attending to cognitive factors. However, 
if this first fixation was insufficient to complete processing, then the word was 
re-fixated.
The results from these two experiments are consistent with Rayner and 
Pollatsek's weaker version of the cognitive control hypothesis. There is 
substantial evidence that eye movements are guided by the processing of 
recently extracted text, but that there is not a rigid relationship between eye 
movements and the currently processed word. In particular, Inhoff and Rayner 
demonstrate that much of the processing of the current word is anticipated 
during the processing of the fixated word.
This complicates any attempt to draw inferences about cognitive processes 
from measures of eye movements. If there was a stronger relationship between 
eye movements and cognitive processes, then it would be possible to use the 
duration of the first fixation on a word as a index of processing. However, this
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is problematic since this word may have been processed to some extent in the 
previous fixation (e.g. Rayner et al, 1982), and that re-fixations on this word 
may contribute to even low-level word recognition (Inhoff and Rayner, 1986). 
An alternative is to use a measure of First pass reading time for a single word, 
which is the summation of all fixations made on that word prior to either a 
forwards eye movement in the text, or a regressive eye movement to re-read 
part of the previous text. However, this method can also be criticised. For 
instance, it is not clear that all of the re-fixations on the current word are made 
with the intention of continuing the processing of this word. They may be 
made in preparation for a saccade to fixate the next word. Neither is it possible 
to conclude that zero fixations on a particular word means that the word was 
not processed. Short function words, like the definite and indefinite articles, 
may be processed during a fixation on the prior word, and words may be 
'skipped' because they are highly predictable from context and so processing is 
redundant.
This has proved problematic, and some researchers (e.g. Just and Carpenter, 
1980) have been criticised for including the zero values in their analyses. 
However, this is not such a problem in the present studies, since the critical 
regions are generally quite long (2 words). Those trials where zero fixations are 
recorded on neighbouring regions of text are removed from the analysis since 
this means that the eye-tracker has failed to record fixations across a 
considerable length of text, and if this is not due to equipment error, it is 
reasonable to conclude that subjects are not reading the text as directed, i.e. 
they are not reading for comprehension.
Two further measures are reported in the following experiment. A measure of 
Total reading time, or a summation of all fixations spent within a region, 
including return visits to that region, is reported as a measure of global 
difficulty in processing the sentence. This may prove descriptive of processing 
which is not completed during the particular word. For instance, Ehrlich and 
Rayner (1983) report an differences in Total reading time as evidence of greater 
processing difficulty in anaphor resolution when the antecedent is distant in 
the text. Finally, a measure of regressive eye movements is reported, since 
while many of these will constitute corrections to word landing position, they 
may also be an index of processing difficulty and the re-fixation of previous 
text to overcome these difficulties (Rayner and Pollatsek, 1989).
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Experiment three:
The time course of anaphoric reference to an NP 
quantified by a few  or few. 
Introduction
This first eye-tracking study was a replication of Experiment 1, which 
measured the reading time of plural anaphoric reference to an NP quantified by 
a few or few. The present study will provide a more fine-grained description of 
the time course of these processes.
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Method
Design
The experiment used the same cross-over design as the previous self-paced 
reading studies. There were two with-subjects manipulations: the subject NP of 
the quantified sentence was quantified by either the monotone-increasing a few 
or the monotone decreasing few', and the following sentence began with an 
anaphor which described a property of either the refset or compset of the 
quantified sentence.
Subjects
Twenty-four subjects were used. All subjects were students at Glasgow 
University and were paid £5 for their participation. Prior to viewing the 
experiments materials, subjects were set-up on the eye-tracker and calibrated 
within a set criterion for recording accuracy. Subjects who either could not be 
set-up, or failed to make the criterion level during calibration were replaced 
and paid a lesser amount.
Other subjects were replaced following data collection, but prior to analysis, if 
there was missing data for more than 6 experimental items (25%). Failed items 
included those where no data was available because of either subject or eye- 
tracker error, and items where zero fixation time was recorded for either of two 
large text regions (one which contained a context-setting first sentence, and 
another which contained the quantified sentence), or two successive regions of 
text23. Again this was attributed to either subject or tracker error. Two subjects 
were replaced for these reasons.
Apparatus
A Stanford Research Institute Dual-Purkinje Eye-tracker was used to monitor 
eye movements. The eye-tracker has an angular resolution of V arc. Although 
viewing was binocular, data was recorded from the right eye only.
Materials were presented on a VDU controlled by a Vanilla 386 computer. The 
subject's eye position was sampled every millisecond and analysed using 
software developed at the University of Massachusetts, and adapted by Keith 
Edwards at Glasgow University. The software continuously monitors the 
output to establish the sequence of fixations and measure their onset and end to 
the nearest millisecond.
23 These lexl regions are defined in the Dala analysis section.
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M aterials
The experiment used the 24 materials validated in the pilot study and used in 
the self-paced reading experiments reported in Chapter 4. Because the more 
fine-grained analysis afforded by the eye-tracking methodology also requires 
more stringent control of the materials, critical regions of the experimental 
materials were controlled for length and line position. The word length 
difference between the quantifiers could not be adjusted, but the other 
manipulated factor, the noun which qualified the plural pronoun was balanced 
as closely as possible across the two anaphoric conditions as closely as possible. 
It was a mean 6.83 characters long in the refset condition, and a mean 8.42 
characters in the compset condition. Although these are not perfectly balanced, 
this was not considered to be a serious flaw, since cross-over effects were 
required to reject the null hypothesis. An example passage is given in (27).
(27) A Public Meeting.
Local MP's were invited to take part in a public enquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station. Quantifier of the MP's 
attended the meeting. Their [presence /  absence] helped the meeting 
run more smoothly.
The monitor used to present the materials restricted line length to a maximum 
65 characters, and the materials were arranged to accommodate this constraint 
while keeping the critical anaphoric noun-phrase section of the text in an 
approximately central line position. The pronoun began a minimum 15 (and a 
mean 19.79) characters from the start of the line to avoid landing errors 
associated with the return sweep from the end of the preceding line (Rayner 
and Pollatsek, 1989). Passages were presented with a single line spacing.
Materials were placed into four experimental blocks following a Latin square 
design. Six subjects viewed each of the experimental blocks, and subjects saw 
each material in only one of the experimental conditions.
There were also 24 filler items which were materials in another experiment. 
These were mixed with the experimental materials, and the full set of materials 
and filler items were divided into four presentation blocks with rest intervals 
between blocks. A further two practise items were added to the beginning of 
each block to familiarise subjects with the reading task. Comprehension 
questions requiring a YES or NO button press response followed 25% of the 
presented passages to ensure careful reading.
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Experimental materials and filler items are listed in Appendix 1.
Procedure
Subjects read a sheet of instructions describing the general experimental 
procedure. They were then seated in front of the eye-tracker and the seat was 
adjusted for height and comfort. A head-strap and chin-rest were used to 
reduce head movement. Subjects fingers were placed on a key-pad with three 
keys: one to control the presentation of materials, and the others to give YES 
and NO responses to comprehension questions.
The eye-tracker was calibrated to the subject at the beginning of the experiment 
and following each of the 3 rest periods. A calibration check was made 
automatically before the presentation of each item, and subjects were re­
calibrated if this failed.
During the experimental phase subjects read materials at their own pace.
Data analysis
There were three phases of data analysis. In the first phase, eye-fixation y-co- 
ordinates (fixations were analysed as x and y letter co-ordinates) were corrected 
by hand24, before an automatic procedure summed short fixations within a 
given range of characters. All fixations separated by one character are pooled 
when where one or both of these fixations are less than 80 milliseconds. 
Fixations of less than 40 milliseconds are deleted from the eye movement 
record if they are separated by three or fewer characters from another fixation. 
These pooling procedures worked under the assumption that adjacent fixations 
of short duration represent the same fixation separated by a micro-saccade (see 
Rayner and Pollatsek, 1989). Following the data-correction procedures, 
measures of eye-movement and fixations were calculated across subjects and 
materials for specified region divisions.
The materials were first of all divided into sentence regions to produce data 
which was comparable with that from the SPR studies. The anaphoric sentence 
was then divided into smaller regions in order to produce a more detailed
24 Because the eye-m ovem ent output file is encoded as x and y letter co-ordinates, y  fixations 
which land towards the top or bottom of letters w as som etim es encoded with the value of a 
neighbouring line (ie fixations on text at line 8 could be encoded as line 7 or 9). These errors 
were corrected by hand, follow ing the rule that fixations could 'wander' by up to two lines, and 
those fixations which m onolonely increased along the x-axis should be interpreted as a series of 
fixations with the sam e y co-ordinate value.
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account of the time course of processing. The regions used for this analysis are 
illustrated in (28). Region 1 is the context region, and contains all of the text 
prior to the quantifier manipulation. Region 2 is the quantified sentence. The 
final sentence was divided into three regions, where region 3 contains the 
anaphoric noun-phrase manipulation, region 4 is the subsequent verb, and 
region 5 contains the remainder of the sentence.
(28) Rl: A Public Meeting.
R2
R3
R4
R5
Local MP's were invited to take part in a public enquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station.
Quantifier of the MP's attended the meeting.
Their presence /  absence 
helped
the meeting run more smoothly.
Eye-movement measures for the quantified sentence allowed an analysis of the 
processing differences between monotone-increasing and monotone- 
decreasing quantification suggested by the previous experiment, and 
verification studies (see Chapter 1 for a review of verification studies). Region 
3 is the critical measurement region for anaphoric reference, while region 4 was 
measured separately to record any limited spill-over effects (Ehrlich and 
Rayner, 1983; Rayner and Pollatsek, 1989; Garrod et al, 1994).
Reported eye-tracking measures
Three eye-movement measures are reported. Two of these are measures of 
reading time25: which is defined here as the time spent fixating on a piece of 
text not including the time required for eye movements. The Total reading 
time is a measure of reading time for all visits to a region of text, including 
return visits from downstream regions. An increase in reading time for this 
measure indicates either that extra processing is required to overcome a 
problem encountered at the current region, or that information is sampled from 
the region to solve a processing problem encountered at some point beyond the 
current region. These can be distinguished using results from the other 
measures. The Total reading time for a full sentence is comparable with the 
reading time data from the SPR studies, although it should be remembered that 
subjects cannot return to previously read sentences in the SPR experiment 
reported in this thesis, but can do in an eye movement study.
25 Measured here as m illiseconds per character, a correction for differences in region size (but 
see Tanncnhaus, Trueswell and Garnsey, 1994).
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First pass reading time is a measure of the time spent fixating in a region of 
text before movement in either direction out of that region, and is generally 
regarded as the best measure of immediate processing (Rayner and Pollatsek, 
1989). Rayner and his colleagues (eg. Rayner and Frazier, 1987) use the First 
pass measure to distinguish between initial syntactic processing and higher- 
level processing. As we are implicitly questioning this distinction, it seems 
reasonable to use the same measure to locate semantic and pragmatic 
influences on processing in the first pass. There are precedents for this 
approach. Garrod et al (1994) found evidence of immediate discourse focus 
and pragmatic influences on referential processing using this measure; while 
Garrod et al (1990) used it to detect on-line instrumental inference.
The third measure reported is the First pass regressions for a region. These are 
defined as any right to left eye movements made from the leading edge fixation 
in a region, i.e. the most rightward fixation that has so far been made in the 
region. The analysis included regressions made to other points within, and to 
points outside of the current region. Although the within-region regressions 
will include eye movements to accurately target a word (Rayner and Pollatsek, 
1989), others may represent back-tracking in response to current processing 
difficulties. It is assumed the corrective fixations will occur randomly across 
experimental conditions.
Results
Trials were removed prior to analysis of the First Pass or Total reading time if 
zero scores were recorded for the context or quantified sentence regions, or for 
neighbouring regions. Zero scores were either due to tracker loss, or subjects 
not fixating within the region. Although it could be claimed that subjects had 
made a deliberate decision not to spend any time in a particular region (and so 
return a zero value), since the present regions were fairly long, a zero score for 
two regions meant that the subject had skipped at least three words. This 
degree of word-skipping would suggest that subjects were not reading, or 
comprehending, the text as required. Approximately 5% of trials were 
removed prior to an analysis of the Total reading time, while 7% were lost prior 
to the First pass reading time. This difference arises from a greater tendency to 
skip regions in the First pass analysis. These regions are often returned to in a 
second pass.
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Sentence reading time
The Total reading time data was first of all analysed as a sentence reading time 
for the context, quantified and anaphoric sentences. This produced data which 
is comparable with SPR reading times. The data for the three sentences was 
separately analysed using 2x2 within subject ANOVAs.
The anaphoric sentence analysis produced a significant interaction of quantifier 
and reference types (Fl(l,23)=33.86, p<0.001; F2(l,23)=15.56, p<0.01), with 
longer reading times for reference to the compset partition of an NP quantified 
by a few, and reference to the refset of one quantified by few. The mean Total 
reading time for the four experimental conditions is illustrated in Figure 1.
Further analyses of simple effects confirmed that both quantifiers were 
responsible for the interaction. There was a significant difference in reading 
time between refset and compset reference following quantification by a few  
(Fl(l,23)=21.52, p<0.001; F2(l,23)=9.80, p<0.005); and between refset and 
compset reference following quantification by few  (Fl(l,23)=12.90, p<0.002; 
F2(l,23)=5.99, p<0.023). At the same time, the two anomalous reference 
conditions (compset reference following quantification by a few, and refset 
reference following quantification by few) were of the same magnitude, as were 
the contrasting felicitous reference conditions (all Fscl.O).
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Figure 1: mean total reading time (with standard error bars) 
for the anaphoric sentence following quantification bv a few and few
No significant effects were found for analyses of the context or quantified 
sentences (Fs<2.2).
Total reading time for regions of the anaphoric sentence 
Separate 2x2 within-subjects ANOVAs were used to analyse each of the region 
division of the anaphoric sentence, and revealed significant interactions of 
monotonicity and reference type on the anaphor, verb and final regions of
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analysis. The mean reading times for all five regions of analysis (including the 
context and quantified sentences) are illustrated in figure 2.
a few  /  refset
a few  /  compset 
few /  refset
50-
few  /  compset
45-
co 40-
C ontext Q sentence Anaphor F in a lVerb
Figure 2: Mean total reading time (with standard error bars) 
following quantification by a fezu and fezu
Anaphoric region
The interaction of quantifier and reference type (Fl(l,23)=14.71, p<0.001;
F2(l,23)=7.33, p<0.013) followed the same pattern at the sentence reading time 
results, with longer reading times for the two conditions making anomalous 
reference to the quantified NP.
An analysis of the simple effects contrasts for the anaphoric region confirmed 
that the interaction was due to significant differences between refset and 
compset reference in the two quantificational conditions. The difference in 
reading time between compset and refset reference following quantification by 
a fezu, was significant by subjects, and marginal by items (FI (1,23)=7.75, 
p<0.011; F2(l,23)=3.60, p<0.071); as was the difference in reading time between 
these reference conditions following quantification by fezu (Fl(l,23)=6.98, 
p<0.015; F2(l,23)=3.73, p<0.067). There was no reliable difference between the 
two felicitous referential conditions (Fs<0.1), or between the two anomalous 
reference conditions (FscO.l).
Verb region
The interaction of quantifier and reference type (Fl(l,23)=13.79, p<0.002; 
F2(l,23)=7.98, p<0.010) for this region was again due to longer reading times 
for the two anomalous reference conditions. An analysis of the simple effects 
confirmed that this was due to both quantifiers. There was a significant 
difference in reading time between refset and compset reference following
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quantification b y  a fezu which was significant by subjects and marginal by items 
(Fl(l,23)=6.53, p<0.018; F2(l,23)=4.20, p<0.053), and a significant difference 
following quantification b y  fezu which was also significant by subjects and 
marginal by items (FI(1,23)=7.27, p<0.013, F2(l,23)=3.79, p<0.065). This 
suggests that both quantificational conditions contributed to the interaction. 
There was no difference between the two felicitous reference conditions 
(Fs<1.0) or between the two anomalous reference conditions (Fs<1.0), which 
suggests that felicitous reference is equally easy, and anomalous reference 
equally difficult, following the two types of quantification.
Final region
The interaction of quantifier and reference type (Fl(l,23)=25.43, p<0.001; 
F2(l,23)=10.32, p<0.004) for this region had the same pattern again: longer 
reading times for anomalous reference to the quantified NP. An analysis of 
simple effects found significant differences in reading time for refset and 
compset reference following quantification by a fezu (Fl(l,23)=16.99, p<0.001; 
F2(l,23)=7.43, p<0.013); and a significant difference between these reference 
types following quantification b y  fezu on a subjects analysis only (FI (1,23)=9.07, 
p<0.007; F2(l,23)=3.30, p<0.083). There was no difference between the two 
felicitous reference conditions (Fs<1.0), and a difference between the two 
anomalous reference conditions which failed to reach significance 
(Fl(l,23)=2.42, p<0.134; F2(l,23)=l.ll, p<0.303).
Summary of total reading time results
The Total reading time measures were consistent with the original predictions. 
There was a longer reading time for reference to the unfocused subset of a 
quantified NP than for reference to the focal subset; which meant that there 
were longer reading times for reference to the compset following quantification 
by a fezu; and for refset reference following quantification by fezu. This pattern 
was evident in both an analysis of the Total reading time for the anaphoric 
sentence, and for more fine-grained analyses of component regions. 
Furthermore, both sets of data established that there was no difference in 
reading time between the two felicitous reference conditions, or between the 
two anomalous reference conditions, which suggests that the processing of 
anomalous reference is equally difficult, and the processing of felicitous 
reference equally easy, following monotone-increasing and monotone- 
decreasing quantification.
112
First pass reading time
The First pass reading time data for the five regions was separately analysed 
using a 2x2 within subjects ANOVA. The mean First pass reading times for all 
five regions is illustrated in Figure 3.
There was an interaction of quantifier and reference type in the predicted 
direction at the final region which was marginal by subjects (Fl(l,23)=4.19, 
p<0.052; F2(l,23)=2.39, p<0.136). An inspection of Figure 3 suggests that this 
effect is principally due to a longer reading time following reference to the 
compset of an NP quantified by a few. There was also a main effect of reference 
type for the quantified sentence (Fl(l,23)=8.07, p<0.001; F2(l,23)=5.55, p<0.028), 
with a longer reading time for those conditions making reference to the 
compset - although it must be noted that subjects had not yet encountered the 
region of text which made this reference. No other effects were observed on 
any of the regions (all Fs<1.3).
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Figure 3: mean first pass reading time (with standard error bars) 
following quantification by a few  and few
First pass regressions
As before, the regressions made from each region were separately analysed 
using 2x2 within subjects ANOVA's. However, these analyses only considered 
the anaphor, verb and final regions, as first pass regressions from the 
quantified sentence or context region are not informative about the 
experimental manipulation. Effects were observed on the anaphor and verb 
regions only (all other Fs<1.9); and are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 
respectively.
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Anaphor region
An analysis of the anaphor region produced a main effect of quantifier type 
which was significant by subjects, and marginal by items (FI(1,23)=7.04, 
p<0.014; F2(l, 23) =3.99, p<0.058). More regressions were made in the 
monotone-decreasing/hu conditions.
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Figure 4; First pass regressions from the anaphor region 
(with standard error bars) followine quantification by a few and few
Verb region
The verb region produced a marginal main effect of quantifier type by subjects, 
which was significant on an items analysis, and marginal by subjects 
(Fl(l,23)=3.50, p<0.074; F2(l, 23)=4.15, p<0.033); and an interaction of quantifier 
and reference type (FI(1,23) =5.99, p<0.0224; F2(l, 23)=6.14, p<0.020). An 
inspection of the means (see Figure 5) suggests that this was due to a greater 
number of regressions for compset reference following quantification by a few. 
An analysis of simple effects confirmed this contrast. There was a significant 
difference between refset and compset reference following quantification by a 
few (Fl(l,23)=7.25, p<0.013; F2(l,23)=8.09, p<0.009); a significant difference 
between the two anomalous reference conditions (Fl(l,23)=5.93, p<0.023; 
F2(l,23)=6.80, p<0.0160); and between the two felicitous reference conditions 
(Fl(l,23)=10.27, p<0.004; F2(l,23)=11.01, p<0.003).
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Figure 5: First pass regressions from the verb region 
(with standard error bars) following quantification by a few and few
Siumnary of first pass results
There was no clear evidence of immediate anomaly detection according to 
measures of either First pass reading time or First pass regressions. Flowever, 
there was evidence of an overall increase in regressions from the anaphor 
region following quantification by few, and an increased number of regressions 
from the following verb region when reference was made to the compset 
following quantification by a few. Since an increase in regressions can be 
interpreted as evidence of processing difficulty, it can be concluded that both of 
these findings indicate some difficulties in processing reference during the first 
pass of the sentence. In particular, there appears to be a general difficulty in 
processing reference following monotone-decreasing quantification by few; and 
some evidence that reference to the compset is more difficult following 
monotone-increasing quantification by a few. There was also some evidence 
that this difficulty in processing reference to the compset is reflected in the First 
pass reading time for the final region of the anaphoric sentence.
Discussion
The results from this first eye movement experiment were consistent with the 
findings of the previous self-paced reading experiments. That is, there was 
evidence of an increased reading time, and therefore processing difficulty, for 
anaphoric sentences which referred to a property of the unfocused subset.
According to both measures of Total reading time for the full sentence, and for 
regions of that sentence, there was an increased reading time when reference 
was made to the compset of a sentence quantified by a few, and reference to the 
refset of a sentence quantified by few. The analysis of sentence regions
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suggested that this disruption was localised to the anaphor and verb regions 
following quantification b y  fezu.
However, there was no convincing evidence that the anomalous reference was 
detected on-line, i.e. concurrently with the processing of the anaphor. There 
was some evidence from measures of First pass regressions that anaphoric 
reference was more difficult, and therefore resulted in more regressions, 
following quantification by fezu. Furthermore, there was evidence of increased 
regressions from the verb region, and a suggestion of an increased First pass 
reading time for the final region following reference to the compset of a 
sentence quantified by a fezu.
While these results can be interpreted as evidence of a disruption of processing 
during the first pass of a sentence when reference is made to an unfocused 
subset, these results were not predicted in advance, so must be treated with 
caution. Moreover, the first pass reading time results were complicated by a 
highly significant main effect of reference type at the quantified sentence, 
which was prior to the reference manipulation. This must be a spurious effect, 
because it is not based on any information available at that point in time. There 
was no evidence of a difference in the processing of the two forms of quantified 
sentence according to the measure of Total reading time.
In summary, the strongest conclusions that can be drawn is that there is a 
sentence-level difficulty in integrating the anaphoric sentence with prior 
discourse when the anaphor describes a property of the unfocused subset of the 
preceding quantified sentence. However, further conclusions about the on-line 
processing of reference are possible if the present pattern of First pass results 
are replicated. For that reason, a fourth experiment examines the processing of 
reference to a sentence quantified by either many or not many.
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Experiment four: 
The time course of anaphoric reference to an NP 
quantified by many or not many. 
Introduction
This experiment was a replication of the previous study, with the substitution 
of the quantifiers many and not many tor a few  and few  respectively.
Method
The experiment following the same design and procedure as Experiment three, 
and used the same set of materials. The only difference was that the passages 
were double-spaced in the presentation, which made easier the initial stages of 
data analysis.
Subjects
Twenty-four subjects were used for this study and paid £5 for their 
participation. Subjects who failed to calibrate were replaced and paid a lesser 
amount. Another four subjects were replaced prior to an analysis of the results 
because there was more than 25% data loss due to subject or tracker errors.
M aterials
The experimental materials were divided into the same text regions as used in 
the previous experiment. These are illustrated in (29). The first region 
contained all of the text until the quantified sentence, and the second region 
contained the quantified sentence. The anaphoric sentence was divided into 
three regions. Region 3 contained the anaphor, region 4 contained the 
following verb, and region 5 contained the remainder of the sentence.
(29) Rl: A Public Meeting.
Local MP's were invited to take part in a public enquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station.
R2: Quantifier of the MPs attended the meeting.
R3: Their presence /  absence
R4: helped
R5: the meeting run more smoothly.
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Results
As with the previous experiment, trials were removed prior to analyses of Total 
Time and First pass reading times if no fixations were made on the context 
region, quantified sentence, or two successive regions. These are due to tracker 
loss, or subjects' failing to fixate in the region. Approximately 5% of data were 
removed prior to the Total reading time analysis, and approximately 6% of data 
were removed prior to the First pass reading time analysis. As before, the 
difference between these amounts reflects a greater tendency to skip words 
during a first pass of the text.
Sentence reading time
The Total reading time data was first of all analysed as a sentence reading time 
for the context, quantified and anaphoric sentences using separate 2x2 within 
subject ANOVAs.
An analysis of the anaphoric sentence produced a significant main effect of 
reference type by subjects only (Fl(l,23)=6.73, p<0.017; F2(l,23)=2.29, p<0.144), 
which was due to longer reading times for those conditions which described 
the compset partition of the quantified NP; and a significant interaction of 
quantifier and reference type (Fl(l,23)=19.19, p<0.001; F2(l,23)=16.39, p<0.001). 
This was due to longer reading times for conditions making anomalous 
reference to the quantified NP. The mean Total reading times for the four 
experimental conditions is illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Mean total reading time (with standard error bars) 
for the anaphoric sentence following quantification 
by many and not many
An analysis of the simple effects suggested that quantification by many was 
primarily responsible for the interaction. There was a significant difference 
between refset and compset reference following quantification by many 
(Fl(l,23)=9.25, p<0.001; F2(l,23)=15.86, p<0.001); but only a marginal difference
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between the reference conditions following quantification by not many 
(Fl(l,23)=3.27, p<0.084; F2(l,23)=3.04, p<0.095). However, there was no 
difference between the two anomalous reference conditions, or between the 
two felicitous reference ones (all Fs<1.0).
The analyses of the other sentence reading times produced effects which were 
significant on the subjects analysis only. An analysis of the context region 
produced an interaction of quantifier and reference type in the predicted 
direction, which was marginal on the subjects analysis and non-significant by 
items (Fl(l,23)=3.43, p<0.077; F2(l,23)=0.33, p<0.575). Similarly, an analysis of 
the quantified sentence produced an interaction in the predicted direction 
which was only significant on the subjects analysis (Fl,23)=4.01, p<0.057;
F2(l,23)=1.492, p<0.234). There were no other significant effects (Fs<1.0).
Total reading time for regions of the anaphoric sentence 
Separate analyses of the total reading time were carried out for sub-regions of 
the anaphoric sentence using separate 2x2 within-subjects ANOVAs. Figure 7 
illustrates the mean Total reading times for these regions, and for the 
contextual and quantified sentences.
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Figure 7: Mean total reading time (with standard error bars) 
following quantification by mankind not many
Anaphor region
There was a significant interaction of quantifier and reference type in the 
predicted direction for the anaphor region (Fl(l,23)=14.35, p<0.001;
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F2(l,23)=10.16, p<0.005). This is illustrated in Figure 10 as a marked increase in 
reading time for the two anomalous reference conditions.
An analysis of simple effects means contrast confirmed that both quantifier 
manipulations were driving this interaction. There was a significant difference 
between refset and compset reference conditions following quantification by 
many (Fl(l,23)=8.83, p<0.007; F2(l,23)=5.78, p<0.025); and between the two 
reference conditions following quantification by not many (Fl(l,23)=5.69, 
p<0.026; F2(l,23)=4.43, p<0.047). Furthermore, there were no significant 
differences between the two felicitous reference conditions (Fscl.O), or between 
the two anomalous reference conditions (Fs<1.0).
Verb region
The analysis of the verb region also produced a significant interaction of 
quantifier and reference type (FI(1,23)=11.38, p<0.003; F2(l,23)=21.34, pcO.OOl). 
An inspection of Figure 10 suggests that a difference between the two reference 
conditions following quantification by many is responsible for this effect, and 
that there is no difference between the two reference conditions following 
quantification by not many. This was confirmed by subsequent simple effects 
means comparison tests.
There was a significant difference between refset and compset reference after 
quantification by many (FI(1,23) =21.54, pcO.OOl; F2(l,23)=36.62, pcO.OOl); but 
no significant difference between the reference conditions following 
quantification by not many (Fl(l,23)=0.017, p<0.898; F2(l,23)=0.23, p<0.635). At 
the same time, there was no significant difference between the felicitous 
reference conditions (Fl(l,23)=0.68, p<0.149; F2(l,23)=2.22, p<0.150), but a 
significantly shorter reading time for anomalous reference following 
quantification by not many compared to anomalous reference following 
quantification by many (Fl(l,23)=4.90, p<0.038; F2(l,23)=6.04, p<0.023).
Final region
Finally, an analysis of the final region produced results where an interaction in 
the predicted direction approached significance by both subjects and items 
(Fl(l,23)=3.29, p<0.083, F2(l,23)=3.11, p<0.092).
There were no other significant effects on analyses of any regions (all Fscl.O).
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Summary of the Total reading time results
The analysis of Total reading time supports the claim that there are global 
difficulties in processing the anaphoric sentence when reference is made to the 
unfocused subset. According to the analysis of sentence reading time, there 
was a longer reading time, and therefore greater processing difficulty, when 
reference was made to the compset as compared to the refset following 
quantification by many. However, there was no significant difference between 
the two reference conditions following quantification by iwt many.
On the surface, this suggests that reference was equally easy (or difficult) 
following quantification by not many. However, an analysis of Total reading 
time across the regions of text demonstrated that there was a longer reading 
time at the anaphor region when it referred to a property of the refset. It 
appears that the increased difficulty is a localised effect which is barely 
detectable at the level of sentence-reading time.
The analysis of Total reading time across the sentence regions confirmed the 
greater difficulty in processing reference to the compset following 
quantification by many, with longer reading times for both the anaphor and 
verb regions compared to refset reference.
First pass reading time
There were no significant effects at any region on an analysis of first pass 
reading time (all Fscl.O).
First pass regressions
As with experiment 2a, we analysed the first pass regressions for regions 2 to 5 
using separate 2x2 within-subjects ANOVAs.
Only an analysis of the final region produced significant results. There was a 
main effect of reference type which was significant by subjects only 
(Fl(l,23)=8.71, p<0.008; F2(l,23)=2.41, p<0.135) and an interaction of quantifier 
and reference type in the predicted direction (FI (1,23)=8.13, p <0.009; 
F2(l,23)=9.91, p<0.005). Inspection of the results (see Figure 8) shows that the 
effect is principally due to a greater number of regressions for compset 
reference following quantification by many, which was confirmed by an 
analysis of simple effects. There was a significant difference between the two 
reference conditions following quantification by many (Fl(l,23)=14.85, pcO.OOl; 
F2(l,23)=11.30, p<0.003), between the two compset reference conditions 
(Fl(l,23)=8.23, p<0.009; F2(l,23)=8.10, pcO.Ol), and between the many /
compset reference and not many /  refset reference conditions on the subjects 
analysis only (Fl(l,23)=7.23, p<0.014; F2(l,23)=3.07, p<0.094).
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Figure 8: First pass regressions from the final region 
(with standard error bars) following quantification 
by many and not many
Summary of first pass results
There was no evidence of on-line anomaly detection according to either 
measure of First pass reading time or regressions. That i s , there was no 
evidence on an increased reading time or increased number of regressions on 
the first pass through the anaphor region. However, the analysis of First pass 
regressions did provide some evidence of a disruption to processing during the 
first pass through the sentence when reference was made to the compset 
following quantification by many. There was a greater number of regressions 
from the final region of text in this compared to the other experimental 
conditions.
Discussion
As before, the results confirm that there are global difficulties in processing the 
anaphoric sentence when it made reference to the unfocused subset of a 
quantified sentence. However, while in the previous experiment this was 
evident from the Total reading time for the sentence, a more fine-grained 
analysis of the Total reading times for individual test regions proved necessary 
in the current experiment. A measure of sentence reading time suggested that, 
while there was a longer reading time in processing reference to the compset of 
a sentence quantified by many, there was no difference in reading time for 
reference to either the refset or compset following quantification by not many. 
However, an inspection of the Total reading times for individual text regions 
demonstrated that there was a longer reading time at the anaphor region for
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reference to the refset compared to the compset following quantification by not 
many. This finding is both a further demonstration that reference to an 
unfocused subset results in global processing difficulties, and that fine-grained 
measures of eye movements can detect short-lived and localised effects which 
cannot be observed on coarser measures of sentence reading time.
There was also some evidence that the context and quantified sentences was 
often re-read following anomalous reference, although these effects were only 
significant on a subjects analysis.
As with the previous eye movement experiment, there was no evidence of on­
line referential anomaly detection on the measure of First pass reading, 
meaning that anomalous reference produced either an increased First pass 
reading time or number of regressions as subjects read the anaphor. However, 
there was no evidence of the spurious effect observed at the quantified sentence 
in that experiment either.
There was some evidence of a processing disruption during the first pass of the 
anaphoric sentence when reference was made to the compset of a sentence 
quantified by many. This was found in an analysis of regressions. There was a 
significantly greater number of regressions from the final region.
In summary, there was further evidence that the anaphoric sentence is more 
difficult to integrate with previous discourse when it refers to a property of the 
unfocused subset of the preceding quantified sentence. There was no evidence 
that this anomaly was detected on-line, although there was some evidence that 
processing was disrupted during the first pass of the sentence when reference 
was made to the unfocused compset following quantification by many.
A combined analysis of Experiments 3 and 4
The First pass reading time and regressions data were combined in order to 
increase the power of the analysis. This would increase the likelihood that any 
weak effects would be detected. If this is the case, then there should be 
evidence of two-way interactions of monotonicity and reference type for either 
reading time or regressions within individual text regions. In contrast, three- 
way interactions of experiment, monotonicity type and reference will be due to 
effects for particular pairs of quantifier (a fezu &cfezv or many & not many) and 
may have been found in analyses of the separate experiments.
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First pass reading time
The First pass reading time results for the four quantifiers across the five 
regions were analysed separately using a 2 (experiment) x 2 (quantifier 
monotonicity) x2 (reference) mixed design ANOVA. Only an analysis of the 
final region produced an effect. There was a three-way interaction of 
experiment, monotonicity and reference type, which was significant by subjects 
and marginal by materials (Fl(l,46)=5.15, p<0.029; F2(l,46)=3.83, p<0.057). This 
effect is restricted to the a fezu & few  quantifier pair, and due to a longer reading 
time for compset reference following quantification by a fezu.
First pass regressions
The first pass regressions were also analysed using a 2 (experiment) x 2 
(quantifier monotonicity) x2 (reference) mixed design ANOVA. An interaction 
of experiment, monotonicity and reference type was observed on the anaphor 
region and was significant by subjects and marginal by materials 
(Fl(l,46)=4.73, p<0.035; F2(l,46)=3.800, p<0.058). The same interaction was 
observed on the following verb region, but failed to reach significance 
(Fl(l,46)=2.93, p<0.092; F2(l,46)=1.72, p<0.197), while an interaction of 
quantifier and reference type was significant by materials only (FI(1,46)=2.56, 
p<0.117; F2(l,46)=4.44, p<0.041). Finally, a main effect of reference type was 
observed on the final region (Fl(l,46)=8.67, p<0.006; F2(l,46)=4.17, p<0.047), 
which is due to an overall increase in regressions following reference to the 
compset. There was also a significant interaction of monotonicity and reference 
type on the materials analysis only for this region (Fl(l,46)=2.68, p<0.109; 
F2('l,46)=11.170, p<0.002). No other significant effects (Fs<2.8) were observed.
Discussion
The combined analysis failed to uncover any effects that were not already 
described by the analyses of the individual experiments. This suggested that 
there was no common patterns of processing during the First pass of the 
anaphoric sentence for either the two monotone-increasing or monotone- 
decreasing quantifiers, which invites the conclusion that quantifier 
monotonicity and contingent reference are not processed during the first pass.
Summary of the experimental findings
The eye-tracking experiments provided some further support to the claim that 
monotone-increasing and -decreasing quantifiers exhibit different patterns of 
focus license reference to different subset. There was evidence of an increased 
Total reading time for reference to a property of the compset of a monotone- 
increasing quantified sentence, and for reference to a property of the refset of a
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monotone-decreasing quantified sentence. Since increased Total reading time 
can be interpreted as evidence of difficulty in processing anaphoric reference 
(Ehrlich and Rayner, 1983), it was possible to conclude that reference was more 
difficult in these cases.
However, there was no evidence that anomalous reference was detected on­
line, i.e. concurrently with the processing of the anaphor, although the analysis 
of First pass reading time and regressions suggested that there was some 
disruption of processing some distance downstream of the referential 
manipulation. However, a combined analysis of these reading time and 
regression results failed to identify any common pattern of results, which 
suggests that monotonicity alone cannot account for the pattern of disruption 
observed in the individual experiments. This suggests that the results were 
either spurious, or that the disruption depends on individual properties of the 
quantifiers. The most reasonable conclusion is that referential anomalies are 
not detected in the first pass. The following chapter reviews the results from the 
four experiments reported so far, and considers why there the referential 
anomaly is not detected on-line.
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Chapter six: 
A discussion of the experimental findings. 
Introduction
This chapter will take some time out to review the experimental findings so far, 
and to consider what they add to our understanding of natural language 
quantification and referential processing. It will become clear that the studies 
invite more questions than they answer. In particular, it turns out that the use 
of eye-movement measures to identify the locus of referential anomaly 
detection only illustrates the complexity of this question, instead of providing 
an unequivocal answer. The remainder of the chapter considers the processing 
of referential anomaly detection in more depth, and suggests several 
modifications to the experimental design which might prove more informative 
about the time course of these processes. The next chapter reports some 
favourable results from an experiment which employed some of these 
modifications.
Results from the SPR and eye movement studies
Both the self-paced reading (SPR) experiments reported in Chapter 4, and the 
eye movement experiments reported in Chapter 5, support the hypothesis that 
some quantifiers are used to focus on and enable reference to different subsets 
of the quantified sentence. In particular, monotone-increasing quantifiers like a 
fezu and many focus on and enable reference to the refset partition, but block 
reference to the compset. In fact, given the difficulty experienced when 
reference is made to the compset, it seems likely that the compset is not 
mentally represented following monotone-increasing quantification. 
Monotone-decreasing quantifiers likefezu and not many appear to have a more 
diffuse pattern of focus, where both the refset and compset can be referred to, 
but the compset is the preferred antecedent.
The first SPR experiment measured the reading time for anaphoric sentences 
which referred to a property of the refset and compset partition of a sentence 
quantified by either a fezu or fezu. There was an increased reading time for 
reference to the compset as compared to the refset following quantification by a 
fezu; but no reliable difference between these two forms of reference following 
quantification b y  fezu. The second SPR experiment substituted many tor a fezu,
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and not many tor few. Again there was an increased reading time for reference 
to the compset as compared to the refset following quantification by many, but 
also an increased reading time for refset as compared to compset reference 
following quantification by not many.
Since measures of sentence reading time can be used as an index of the ease of 
integrating the current sentence with prior discourse (Haviland and Clark, 
1974), and more specifically the ease of processing anaphoric reference (Garrod 
and Sanford, 1977), it was possible to conclude that the increased reading times 
in the above examples were indicative of difficulties in referential processing in 
different quantificational conditions. That is, subjects found it difficult to 
process reference to the compset of a monotone-increasing quantified sentence 
(i.e. one quantified by either a few  or many). However, there was a less reliable 
pattern of results following monotone-decreasing quantification. It appeared 
that reference to the refset or compset were equally easy (or difficult) to process 
following quantification by  few) but that refset reference was more difficult 
following quantification by not many.
The eye movement experiments produced a similar pattern of results on 
measures of Total reading time across either the length of the anaphoric 
sentence, or sub-regions of text. On a comparison of reference to sentences 
quantified by a few or few, there was a longer Total reading time on the anaphor 
and following verb region for reference to the compset as compared to the 
refset following quantification by a few. Conversely, there was a longer Total 
reading time on the anaphor and verb regions when reference was made to the 
refset following quantification by few. The fourth experiment compared 
reference to sentences quantified by many and not many. This time there was an 
increased reading time at the anaphor and verb regions for reference to the 
compset following quantification by many, and at the anaphor region for refset 
reference following quantification by not many.
Interestingly, there was no evidence of a difference in reading time for the 
entire anaphoric sentence when reference was made to either the refset or 
compset following quantification by not many. This suggested that reference to 
an unfocused subset appears less anomalous, and more easily recovered from, 
following monotone-decreasing quantification. This is probably because both 
the refset and compset are plausible antecedents under these conditions. It 
may also explain the failure to find a difference in self-paced sentence reading 
time following quantification by few. If subjects found the experience of 
anomalous reference to be short-lived and easily recovered from in this
127
experiment, then the self-paced reading methodology may have been too 
course-grained to detect this difference.
The time course of processing
So far we have considered the relative magnitude of the reading time for 
anaphoric reference to monotone-increasing and monotone-decreasing 
quantified NPs. However, much of the reason for conducting eye movement 
studies was to gain a more fine-grained understanding of the time course of 
this processing, and the locus of referential anomaly detection. It should be 
possible to tell from this whether anaphoric reference to a quantified NP is 
computed on-line, and if there are any differences in the time course of 
processing for monotone-increasing and monotone-decreasing quantifiers.
I argued in the introduction to Chapter five that there was some precedent for 
using eye movement measures, and particularly measures of first pass reading 
time and regressions as indices of referential anomaly detection. A number of 
researchers have used the first pass reading time to as an index of referential 
processing, including Ehrlich and Rayner (1983), Vonk (1984), and Garrod et al 
(1994), while Ehrlich and Rayner found that subjects made regressive eye 
movements to locate the antecedents of pronouns.
Of these studies, the current eye movement experiments had most in common 
with Garrod et al, who found evidence of the immediate use of information 
about discourse focus, gender and verb-pragmatics in reference resolution. 
There was evidence of first pass anomaly detection when either the gender of a 
pronoun or the pragmatic fit of a verb failed to match the gender or discourse 
role of the focal antecedent. However, the current experiments failed to 
replicate these findings. There was no evidence of on-line anomaly detection, 
i.e. a disruption of processing caused by anomalous reference to an unfocused 
subset that was concurrent with the reading of the anaphor. While there was 
some evidence of disruptions to processing during the first pass of the sentence, 
this was inconsistent, and so difficult to interpret as evidence of First pass 
anomaly detection.
There are several possible explanations for the absence of First pass reading 
time effects. The most obvious of these is simply that referential anomalies of 
the type used here are not processed on-line, possibly because an interaction of 
quantification and anaphora is too complex for the on-line processor to handle.
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Such processing may be delayed until sufficient resources are available. This is 
essentially the case which Perfetti (1993) makes for minimal on-line inferential 
processing. Other possibilities arise from a more careful comparison with the 
Garrod et al study. One difference was that Garrod et al sited their anomaly 
manipulation on a verb, whereas the quantifier experiments used a noun. It 
may be that verbs play a more central role in sentence processing and produce 
more punctuate anomalies. This may be the most important difference 
between the present experiment and Garrod et al. As will be seen in a moment, 
the present materials were flawed by that fact that there always plausible 
continuations to the anaphor (their presence/ absence) that refer to the focused 
subset. Also, Garrod et al used singular personal pronouns which could be 
unambiguously resolved by gender information, while the quantifier studies 
used plural possessive pronouns. These may have failed to show punctuate 
anomaly detection because the plural pronouns are ambiguous in their 
reference.
One such ambiguity is between an interpretation of the pronoun as reference to 
the focal subset of the quantified NP, or as reference to the superset. This 
means that the plural pronoun in (1) could refer to either the refset of MPs who 
attended the meeting, or the full set of MPs who did or did not attend the 
meeting. Processing of the anomaly may be delayed until one of these sets has 
been selected as the appropriate antecedent.
(1) A few of the MPs went to the meeting. T hey . . .
A second ambiguity is more subtle. Unlike singular personal pronouns, plural 
pronouns can refer to implicit entities (Bosch, 1988). For example, if we 
imagine that (2) is a question addressed to a teacher by a student, then the 
singular masculine pronoun requires a referent if the question is to be 
understood. However, the plural pronoun does not, and can instead be 
understood as reference to an unknown group of people who are the implicit 
agents of asking an exam question. In the same way, the singular masculine 
pronoun requires an explicit antecedent in (3), but the plural pronoun refers to 
an implicit or contextually determined antecedent. This might be people from 
Edinburgh in general, or language researchers, or whoever, depending on the 
context of the utterance. As before, anomaly detection may be delayed until the 
processor has determined the appropriate antecedent. Presumably the plural 
possessive pronoun their will exhibit the same ambiguity as they does.
(2) What questions will he /  they ask in the exam?
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(from an example suggested by Martin Pickering).
(3) He /  they work(s) hard in Edinburgh, (from Yule, 1981).
This gives us two possible explanations for the absence of punctuate referential 
anomaly detection. It may be that a manipulation of the property description 
of an anaphor makes a lesser impact on processing than a manipulation of its 
verb-role, while the ambiguous nature of plural pronouns may delay their 
resolution. However, this still fails to explain why there was evidence of on­
line processing difficulty in the first pass regression data. In order to do so, we 
must consider how these two measures can be interpreted. For instance, it may 
prove interesting to distinguish between the detection of an anomaly, which is 
perhaps signalled by regressions, and the processing consequences of that 
anomaly, which may be more evident in a measure of first pass reading time. 
Under some conditions, the anomaly might be detected early, but have delayed 
consequences26. Now consider why this might happen.
The logic of the referential manipulation used in the quantifier studies was that 
the property described by the anaphor (their presence vs. their absence) would be 
immediately interpreted as either congruent or incongruent with the discourse 
role filled by the focal subset. However, it is possible to imagine continuations 
to these anaphoric NPs which would make congruous what was an apparently 
incongruous property description. For example, in (4) the apparent incongruity 
of referring to the presence of those MPs who were absent from the meeting has 
vanished by the end of the anaphoric sentence, and it becomes clear that the 
anaphor is actually making felicitous reference to the compset. In the same 
way, (5) demonstrates that the property described by the noun need not refer to 
the discourse role described by the quantified sentence. In both cases an 
apparently anomalous reference is ruled out by subsequent text.
26 Olher researchers (Liversedge and Pickering, 1995) have also begun to question traditional 
interpretations of eye m ovem ent data, and the assum ption of a close coupling between eye 
m ovem ents and menial processes. Liversedge and Pickering found systematic differences 
between three measures of First pass reading lim e across a set of experiment data. They  
compared the traditional First Pass definition (Frazier and Rayner, 1987), which is the measure 
used in this thesis, w ith a two other measures which include portions of reading lime follow ing  
leftward regressions out of the current region of text. The Regression Path (or Cumulative) 
measure includes all of the reading time from entry into the current region until a leftward  
m ovem ent out of it. This means that all regressive fixations are included. The Right-Bounded  
measure includes all fixations w ith the current region prior to a leftward saccade out of the 
region, including re-visits follow ing regressive saccades. Liversedge and Pickering found that 
the latter two measures w ere a better index of processing for som e types of experimental 
m anipulations, including those using anom aly detection paradigms. This suggests that 
anom aly detection can trigger regressive saccades and increased processing to resolve the 
anomaly, but that this increased processing m ay not be recorded in the region containing the 
anomaly. The Liversedge and Pickering measures may be a more appropriate index of the lime 
course of processing for the current manipulation.
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(4) Few of the MPs went to the meeting.
Their presence was demanded by the chairperson.
(5) Their presence at another event was a poor excuse.
In terms of the experimental results, this might mean that although the 
processor detects a possible anomaly at the anaphor, it does not commit to this 
interpretation, or allow it to impact on processing, until some point 
downstream when the defeasible interpretation has been ruled out. Moreover, 
since in the present study, the text downstream of the anaphor was designed to 
be uninformative about reference, the processing of the anomaly may have 
been delayed until the end of sentence. This would explain the lack of any first 
pass effects and the massive disruption of processing evident in the total 
reading time data. This is a tentative explanation, but there are two sources of 
evidence in its support: one from the pragmatics literature, and another from 
investigations of reference processing.
The pragmatics literature (e.g. Grice, 1973, in Levinson, 1982) describes a 
phenomena called 'defeasibility', which is defined as the cancellability of 
pragmatics-based inferences (or implicatures). Examples of this include the 
suspension or denial27 of conversational implicatures and presuppositions. 
Grice (1973) defines a conversational implicature as an implication of a 
sentence, which is separable from an entailment. This means that if (6) is true, 
then this entails the truth of (7), but only implies the truth of (8).
(6) John has three cows.
(7) John has two cows.
(8) John has three cows and no more.
Grice argues that this implicature arises from the listener's assumption that a 
speaker will be maximally informative. However, implicatures can be 
cancelled by other features of the discourse, while entailments cannot. For 
example, sentences (9) and (10) add if clauses which, in (9) suspends the 
implicature that John has no more than three cows, and in (10) attempts to 
suspend the entailment that he has two. The suspension of an implicature
27 Levinson distinguishes between the overt denial of an implicature and its suspension  
(Levinson, 1982, p p l l 5 ,194-195; see also Horn, 1972). Implicatures are suspended by the 
addition of an //-clause which questions the validity of the implicature or presupposition. For 
example, the sentence John didn't cheat again has the presupposition that John had cheated, but if 
this is given an //-clause which questions that presupposition, then it disappears: John didn't 
cheat again, if he ever had.
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makes no difference to the acceptability of a sentence, but any attempt to 
suspend an entailment results in an anomaly, as demonstrated by the 
unacceptability of (10).
(9) John has three cows, if not more.
(10)? John has three cows, if not two.
The defeasibility of presuppositions can be demonstrated in a similar way, 
which means that given a sentence like (11), this presupposes that (12) is true.
(11) Sue cried before she finished her thesis.
(12) Sue finished her thesis.
However, this can be overtly denied by changing the main verb, or suspended 
by the addition of an if-clause. So, although (11) is a valid presupposition of
(12), it is not a valid presupposition of either (13) or (14).
(13) Sue died before she finished her thesis.
(14) Sue cried before she finished her thesis, if in fact she ever did?
It is also interesting to note that defeasibility means that implicatures and 
presuppositions can be cancelled without producing any sense of anomaly 
(Levinson, 1982, pp 199).
Although defeasibility is a linguistic property of complete sentences, the 
quantifier studies may have illustrated an on-line processing correlate which 
applies to sentence fragments. Because the interpretation of their presence as an 
anomalous reference to the compset in (4) is defeasible, the processor may defer 
any commitment to this interpretation until the end of the sentence. However, 
it is not simply the case that all referential processing is delayed, because the 
measures of First pass regressions indicate that the referential anomaly is 
detected on-line. It just means that this anomaly detection does not impact on 
processing until the processor makes a commitment to the anomalous 
interpretation.
This is all very speculative, but the extent to which an interpretation is 
defeasible does appear to characterise referential processing in general. For 
instance, there is evidence that pronouns are immediately resolved on the basis 
of gender, which is semantic, or even morpho-syntactic in nature, and not 
defeasible. For example, in (15) gender clearly assigns the pronoun to Sue, and
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the subsequent attempt to cancel this only leads to a pragmatic anomaly: that 
poverty is not a reason to lend money.
(15) Sue lent Bill some money because she was poor.
In contrast, manipulations of the 'implicit verb causality' (see Stevenson and 
Vitkovich, 1986; Garnham and Oakhill, 1985; Gamham, Oakhill and 
Cruttenden, 1992; these results are all discussed in Chapter 3), either fail to find 
on-line evidence for verb constraints on pronominal reference, or else find that 
the relative informativeness of the verb determines the loci of resolution. 
Stevenson and Vitkovich found that subjects assigned a referent to a pronoun 
immediately on encountering a verb when that verb is informative', and defer 
assignment otherwise.
Furthermore, syntactic and semantic anomalies, which are non-defeasible, 
produce immediate and localised effects on measures of eye movements. For 
example, Frazier and Rayner (1982) found evidence of localised syntactic 
anomaly detection at seems when a minimal attachment interpretation is given 
to (16). Minimal attachment requires that the processor postulates a minimal 
number of nodes as it computes the syntactic representation of a sentence, 
which in (16) requires that a mile is interpreted as the direct object of jogs, and 
not as the subject of the following clause.
(16) Since Jay always jogs a mile seems like a short distance.
More recently, Pickering and Traxler (submitted) have used the detection of 
semantic anomalies as an index of syntactic processing. They found punctuate 
anomaly detection for materials like (17) when the yacht is interpreted as the 
direct object of editing, and not the subject of a second clause. This occurs 
because of the implausibility of someone editing a yacht. Since the sentence is 
perfectly grammatical, this is best described as a semantic anomaly, meaning 
that yacht is a poor recipient of the act of editing.
(17) While the woman was editing the yacht sailed across the harbour.
We can also relate defeasibility to the discussion of elaborative inferences in 
Chapter three. It was argued there that existing taxonomies of inferences 
cannot determine which are made on-line, and which are off-line, and that a 
better distinction can be made between those inferences which are under 
semantic control, and others which are based on pragmatic knowledge. The
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latter, it was argued, are unlikely to be observed on-line, unless the there are 
sufficient constraints on the probability of the inference. So, McKoon and 
Ratcliff found that when subjects read a story about an actress falling from a 
tower block, they failed to infer on-line that she died, possibly because there 
were so many alternative outcomes. However, when Garrod et al (1990) used 
strong contextual constraints, they did find evidence of on-line instrumental 
inference.
This contrast of strong and weak contextual constraints m aybe another way of 
saying that the defeasibility of a possible inference has or has not been ruled 
out during processing. When the context conspires to promote an inference, 
then the processor may make a commitment to that inference. While this is 
speculative, it is also more convincing than the existing attempts to delineate 
on-line and off-line inferences. The Garrod et al (1994) materials may also have 
been designed in such a way that the processor could make an early 
commitment to the anomalous referential interpretation.
Conclusions
Some clear conclusions can be drawn from the reported experiments. Both the 
SPR and eye-tracking methodologies have demonstrated that anaphoric 
reference to a quantified statement is processed during normal reading, and 
that resolution is contingent on the form of quantification. In particular, 
monotone-increasing quantifiers like a few  and many, focus on and enables 
reference to the refset, while blocking reference to the compset. In contrast, 
monotone-decreasing quantifiers like few  and not many appear to license 
reference to the compset. This means that under some conditions the compset 
is the preferred referent of reference. However, both the refset and compset are 
plausible referents, therefore subjects find refset reference to be much less 
anomalous, and more easily recovered from.
The motivation for using measures of eye movements during reading was to 
describe the time course of processing. However, this was less successful, and 
the experiments failed to find any evidence of on-line referential processing. 
That is, there was no evidence that subjects found difficulty in processing 
reference to an unfocused subset as they read the anaphor. Neither was their 
any reliable evidence that reference to the unfocused subset disrupted 
processing during the first pass through the sentence.
This chapter has included some speculations on why no effects were observed 
on the first pass. These were motivated by a comparison with the study
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conducted by Garrod et al (1994), who did find first pass evidence of referential 
anomaly detection. It was argued that siting the anomaly on an intransitive 
verb might produce more punctuate effects, since it is less likely that the 
remaining sentence will reverse the referential interpretation. That is, it is less 
likely that the initial referential interpretation will prove to be defeasible. It 
was also observed that plural pronouns introduce ambiguities which may 
mitigate against first pass effects. I want now to consider some experimental 
designs which might better explore the time course of referential processing.
Proposed experiments on the time course ofreferential processing
The results of the experiments conducted so far can be interpreted as evidence 
that monotone-increasing and monotone-decreasing quantifiers focus on and 
enable reference to different NP subsets, and the data suggests that this m aybe 
processed on-line. Just how immediate this is remains a open question, 
however. The following three proposed experiments are designed to 
investigate the locus and time course of referential processing. The first 
experiment incorporates several of the suggested modifications, but still 
employs plural pronoun reference. The second experiment replaces the plural 
pronoun with a singular one, while the third experiment examines the on-line 
commitment to a referential interpretation given the defeasibility of these 
inferences.
Experiment one: The on-line processing of plural pronoun 
reference to the refset and compset of a quantified NP
The first of these proposed experiments will use materials like (18), where the 
anomaly is sited on an intransitive verb-phrase (gambled recklessly), and the 
reference type manipulation is moved to the quantified clause. This makes for 
easier comparisons across the four experimental conditions, because the critical 
regions are identical. Finally, the quantified and referential clauses are linked 
by the causal connective so. Moxey and Sanford (1987) observed that causal 
connectives increase the incidence of compset-focused continuations in their 
off-line task. Presumably this will transfer to an on-line task, and the increased 
reliability of compset focus following monotone-decreasing quantification will 
enhance the contrast between the quantificational conditions, and increase the 
chances of seeing on-line anomaly detection. The experiment is designed to 
promote immediate anomaly detection on the verb-phrase
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(18) At the casino
A group of men won a lot of money on the roulette wheel.
Quantifier of the men were [careful careless] with their winnings 
so they gambled recklessly until the money was gone.
Experiment two: The on-line processing of singular pronoun 
reference to refset and compset partitions of a quantified NP 
Where the first proposed design retains the plural pronoun reference which 
was identified as a possible source of delay, the second proposed experiment 
replaces this with a singular pronoun, and uses the quantifiers one to focus on 
the refset, and all but one to focus on the compset (see 19a & 19b).
Again, it is predicted that any referential anomaly will be immediately detected 
on processing the verb-phrase, but this design rules out the referential 
ambiguity which is inherent in plural pronouns as the explanation of any 
delayed effects.
(19) At the casino
A group of men won a lot of money on the roulette wheel.
(19a) One of the men was [careful | careless] with his winnings 
(19b) All but one of the men was [carefid \ careless] with his winnings 
so he gambled recklessly until the money was gone.
Experiment three: Is there an early or late commitment to 
referential interpretations?
A third experiment is intended to determine whether the processor makes any 
early commitment to an anomalous referential interpretation. The design uses 
the same materials as the previous proposed designs, but removes the causal 
conjunction to produce separate quantified and referential sentences. In one 
condition the referential sentence begins with the adversative conjunction 
nevertheless (20a), and in other this is placed in sentence final position (19b). 
When the conjunction is used early in the sentence, it rules out the anomalous 
interpretation of the noun-phrase, but can only reverse this interpretation when 
it appears late in the sentence. If the processor makes an early commitment to 
the anomalous interpretation, then (20b) will have a longer reading time than 
(20a). A late commitment will produce no difference in reading time between 
the two sentences.
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(20) At the casino
A group of men won a lot of money on the roulette wheel.
Quantifier of the men had wanted to save their winnings.
(20a) Nevertheless they gambled recklessly until the money was gone.
(20b) They gambled recklessly until the money was gone nevertheless.
Other manipulations might determine the contribution made by conjunctions. 
The first proposed experiment includes a causal conjunction as a means of 
enhancing compset focus. Other studies could compare this with an 
unconjoined sentence, or ones containing stronger causal conjunctions (and so), 
or additive (and) or adversative (yet) conjunctions which are seen to inhibit 
compset focus in off-line tasks (Moxey and Sanford, 1987).
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Chapter seven: 
The locus of referential anomaly detection^.
Introduction
The study reported in this Chapter is the first of the experiments proposed in 
the previous chapter. It revised the design and methodology employed in 
Experiment 3 to measure eye movements while processing reference to the 
refset or compset of a sentence quantified by either a few  or few. In this 
experiment both the quantificational and referential manipulations were made 
in the quantified sentence, and the referential anomaly was sited on an 
intransitive verb-phrase. This meant that it was possible to make a direct 
comparison of the reading time measures within the same quantificational 
condition, and reduced the plausibility of continuations that reverse the initial 
referential interpretation. That is, siting the anomaly on an intransitive verb- 
phrase increased the likelihood of observing a punctuate effect. Finally, the 
causal connective so was used to conjoin the quantified and referential 
sentences, since causal connective increase the frequency of compset-focused 
interpretations (Moxey and Sanford, 1987).
Method
Design
The experiment followed the same design as the previous SPR and eye- 
movement experiments. There were two within-subjects manipulations. The 
subject NP of the quantified sentence was quantified by either the monotone- 
increasing a few  or the monotone decreasing/eiy. The predicate of the 
anaphoric sentence was also manipulated in order that subject NP of the 
following sentence described a plausible action of either the refset or compset 
of the quantified sentence.
Subjects
Thirty-two undergraduates from the University of Glasgow were paid £5 each 
for their participation. As before, subjects were set-up on the eye-tracker and 
calibrated within a set criterion for recording accuracy prior to viewing the 
experiments materials. Those who either could not be set-up, or failed to make 
the criterion level during calibration were replaced and paid a lesser amount.
28 I am grateful lo Liugene Daw ydiak at the University of G lasgow for his help in running this 
experiment, and lo Simon Liversedge who provided filler materials and helped run the study.
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Other subjects were replaced following data collection, but prior to analysis, if 
there was missing data for more than 8 experimental items (25%). Failed items 
included those where no data was available because of either subject or tracker 
loss, and items where zero fixation time was recorded for either of two large 
text regions (one which contained a context-setting first sentence, and another 
which contained the quantified sentence), or two successive regions of text. 
Again this was attributed to either subject or tracker error. Six subjects were 
replaced for these reasons.
Apparatus
As with Experiments three and four, a SRI Dual-Purkinje Eye-tracker was used 
to monitor eye movements, and interfaced with a 486 PC clone and button box. 
A bite bar and head restraint were used to minimise subjects' head movements.
Materials
Thirty-two experimental materials were used. These had a different structure 
from the materials used in Experiments three and four. In particular, both 
experimental manipulations were made in the quantified sentence, and the 
causal conjunction so was used to conjoin the quantified and anaphoric 
sentences. This was intended to increase the likelihood of compset focus 
following quantification by few (Moxey and Sanford, 1987). Other differences 
were that the plural subject pronoun they was used to refer to the quantified 
NP, and was followed by a verb-phrase which was either congruous or 
incongruous with the discourse role of the focal subset. The previous studies 
had used a possessive plural pronoun followed by a noun to describe a 
congruous or incongruous property of the subset.
The verb-phrases comprised an intransitive verb followed by an adverb. For 
half of the materials this verb-phrase was congruous with the positive version 
of the VP in the quantified sentence, and for the other half it was congruous 
with the negative version of this VP. For example, in (1) the verb surrendered is 
consonant with conceding defeat, and in (2) gambled is consonant with being 
careless with the casino winnings.
(1) After a hijacking
The hijackers were trapped in the aircraft and surrounded by police. 
Quantifier of the hijackers decided to [concede | resist] defeat, 
so they surrendered unconditionally before the police attacked.
(2) At the casino
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A group of men won a lot of money on the roulette wheel.
Quantifier of the men were [careful | careless] with their winnings, 
so they gambled recklessly until the money was gone.
The passages were always presented with the anaphoric sentence on a separate 
line, which meant that the critical verb always began 8 characters from the left 
hand edge of the text.
The experimental materials were mixed with 24 filler items which were 
materials for another experiment, and another 11 filler items. Three of these 
filler items were placed at the beginning of the experiment to orientate subjects 
to the task.
Subjects viewed each of the experimental passages in only one of the 
experimental conditions, and the materials were placed into experimental 
conditions following a Latin Square design. This produced four experimental 
blocks for each of the materials in each of the experimental conditions, and 
meant that there were 8 observations per cell.
The experimental materials and filler items are listed in Appendix 2.
Procedure
The experiment followed the same procedure as Experiments three and four, 
but with the additional use of a bite bar (in place of the chin rest) to minimise 
head movements during reading. This produces more accurate data, and was 
not available at the time of running the first two eye movement experiments.
Data Analysis
Again, this experiment followed the same analysis procedures as Experiments 
three and four, with a pre-analysis phase where fixation y co-ordinates were 
corrected by hand, before an automated procedure summed short fixations 
within a given range of characters. Both of these procedures are more fully 
described in Chapter 5.
The experimental materials were then split into regions, and Total and First 
pass reading time measures were calculated for these regions. The region 
divisions are illustrated in (3), where a slash denotes a region division. The 
first region is the context region, which includes the title and first sentence. The 
next region is the quantified sentence, and the subsequent anaphoric sentence 
was divided into six regions. The first contained the conjunction so, the next
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the anaphor and verb, then the adverb, temporal conjunction region, following 
NP and finally the VP at the end of the sentence. Gaze duration measures are 
also reported for a region which contains the anaphor, verb and adverb (they 
gambled recklessly).
(3) At the casino
A group of men won a lot of money on the roulette wheel.
/Q uantifier of the men were [careful | careless] with their winnings,
/  so /  they gambled / recklessly /un til /the  money /w as gone.
Results
As with the previous eye-movement studies, items were removed prior to 
analysis if zero fixations were recorded for the context region or quantified 
sentence, or if there were zero fixations for two consecutive regions of the 
anaphoric sentence. The removed items were separately calculated prior to the 
Total and First pass reading time analyses. About 4% of items were lost prior 
to the Total Time analysis, and about 7% prior to First Pass analysis.
Total reading time
Separate 2x2 within subjects ANOVAs were used to analyse the Total reading 
time recorded for each region. This produced significant effects on the 
quantified sentence, and across all six regions of the subsequent anaphoric 
sentence.
Results for the quantified sentence
An analysis of the quantified sentence produced a main effect of monotonicity 
type (Fl(l,31)=9.21, p<0.005; F2(l,31)=7.76, p<0.01), and an interaction of 
monotonicity and reference types (Fl(l,31)=6.60, p<0.016; F2(l,31)=4.99, 
p<0.033). This is illustrated in Figure 1, which suggests that the effect is 
primarily due to a shorter reading time for refset reference following 
quantification by a few  compared to the other three conditions.
This was confirmed by a simple effects analysis of the means, which found a 
significant difference between refset and compset reference following 
quantification by a few  (Fl(l,31)=5.69, p<0.024; F2(l,31)=4.96, p,0.034), but no 
comparable difference following quantification by feio (Fl(l,31)=1.56, p<0.222; 
F2(l,31)=0.87, p<0.358). Neither was there a difference between compset 
reference following quantification by a few, and refset reference following 
quantification by few  (Fl(l,31)=2.54, p<0.122; F2(l,31)=1.65, p<0.209); or any 
difference between compset reference following quantification by a few  and
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compset reference following quantification by  few  (Fl(l,31)=0.12, p<0.733; 
F2(l,31)=0.15, p<0.728). However, the average of these three conditions was 
significantly different from refset reference following quantification by a few 
(Fl(l,31)=13.78, p<0.001; F2(l,31)=11.53, p<0.002).
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Figure 1: Mean Total reading time in msec /character 
(with standard error bars) for the quantified sentence 
following quantification by a few  and few
Results for the anaphoric sentence
The mean Total reading time for the six regions of the anaphoric sentence are 
illustrated in Figure 2. The data points do not show the same clear divergence 
of felicitous and anomalous reference as the previous experiments, but suggest 
a more complex pattern of results. There is a consistently long reading time for 
compset reference following quantification by a few, which has the longest 
reading time from the anaphoric region until the end of the sentence. At the 
same time, refset reference to an NP quantified by a few  shows the shortest 
reading time across the anaphor, adverb and temporal conjunction regions, and 
remains substantially shorter across the NP and VP regions compared to the 
reading time for reference to the refset following quantification b y  few. As with 
the previous experiments, this suggests that there is considerable difficulty in 
recovering from anomalous reference to an NP quantified by a few.
The reading time for the two few  quantification conditions are similar and fall 
between the two afezu conditions for as far as the NP region, where there is a 
marked divergence, with a longer reading time for the refset reference 
condition. This divergence continues into the VP region. However, the Total 
reading for refset reference following quantification by few  is never as large as 
that for compset reference following quantification by a few. This suggests that 
reference is generally difficult following quantification by few, but does not
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produce the marked anomaly which is experienced following reference to the 
compset of an NP quantified by a few.
The analyses for the individual experimental regions are presented separately.
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Figure 2: Mean Total reading time in msec /character (with standard error 
bars) across six regions divisions for the anaphoric sentence 
following quantification by a few  and few
Conjunction region
An analysis of Total reading time in the conjunction region produced a 
significant main effect of monotonicity type by subjects only (Fl(l,31)=4.52, 
p<0.042; F2(l,31)=1.68, p<0.204), and a highly significant interaction of 
monotonicity and reference types (Fl,31)=14.42, p<0.001; F2(l,31)=7.13,
p<0.012).
The mean reading times are illustrated in Figure 3, where the above effects 
appear to be primarily due to a difference between the reference conditions 
following quantification by few, with a markedly longer reading time following 
refset reference. This was confirmed by a simple effects contrast of the means, 
which found a significant difference between refset and compset reference 
following quantification by few (Fl(l,31)=12.41, p<0.002; F2(l,31)=7.13, 
p<0.012); but no difference between these conditions following quantification 
by a few  (Fl(l,31)=3.41/ p<0.075; F2(l,31)=2.09, p<0.158).
Further means comparisons established that there was no significant difference 
between compset reference following quantification by few, and refset reference 
following quantification by a few  (Fl(l,31)=0.27, p<0.606; F2(l/31)=0.15, 
p<0.706); or between compset reference following quantification by few, and 
compset reference following quantification by a few  (Fl(l,31)=1.76, p<0.195;
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F2(l,31)=0.84, p<0.308). But there was a difference between these three 
conditions and refset reference following quantification by few  (Fl(l,31)=15.90, 
p<0.001; F2(l,31)=7.94, p<0.009). This suggests that the experimental effects are 
entirely due to an increased reading time following refset reference to an NP 
quantified by few.
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Figure 3: Mean Total reading time in msec /character 
(with standard error bars) for the conjunction region 
following quantification by a few  and few
Anaphor + verb region
An analysis of Total reading time within the anaphor + verb region produced a 
main effect of reference type (Fl(l,31)=4.54, p<0.041; F2(l,31)=5.08, p<0.032), 
with an overall longer reading time for reference to the compset; and an 
interaction of monotonicity and reference type (Fl(l,31)=12.64, p<0.002; 
F2(l,31)=11.64, p<0.002).
The mean results are illustrated in Figure 4, and suggest that the effect is 
primarily caused by a difference between refset and compset reference 
following quantification by a few. This was confirmed by a simple effects 
analysis of the means, which established a significant difference between the 
reference conditions following quantification b y  a few  (Fl(l,31)=15.99, p<0.001; 
F2(l,31)=14.81, pcO.OOl), but no difference between these conditions following 
quantification by few (Fl(l,31)=1.06, p<0.312; F2(l,31)=0.95, p<0.337). Further 
contrasts established that the two fezv quantification conditions had a 
significantly shorter reading time than that found for compset reference 
following quantification by a few  (Fl(l,31)=5.85, p<0.022; F2(l,31)=5.21, 
p<0.030); and a significantly longer reading time compared to refset reference 
following quantification by a few  (Fl(l,31)=4.83, p<0.036; F2(l,31)=4.67, 
p<0.040).
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Figure 4: Mean Total reading time in msec /  character 
(with standard error bars) for the anaphor + verb region 
following quantification by a few  and few
Adverb region
The analysis of Total reading time for the adverb region produced an 
interaction of monotonicity and reference types (Fl(l,31)=4.86, p<0.036; 
F2(l,31)=5.54, p<0.026), and an inspection of the means (illustrated in Figure 5) 
suggests that this effect is due to a shorter reading time for refset reference 
following quantification by a few.
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Figure 5: Mean Total reading time in msec /  character 
(with standard error bars) for the adverb region 
following quantification by a few  and few
This was confirmed by an analysis of the simple effects contrasts, which 
produced a significant difference between the reference conditions following 
quantification by a few (Fl(l,31)=8.31, p<0.008; F2(l,31)=8.82, p<0.006), but no 
comparable difference following quantification by few  (Fl(l,31)=0.06, p<0.816; 
F2(l,31)=0.13, p<0.722). Moreover, there was no difference between a
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comparison of compset reference following quantification by a fezv and refset 
reference following quantification by fezv (Fl(l,31)=0.07, p<0.799; F2(l,31)=0.03, 
p<0.871); or between compset reference to both types of quantified NPs 
(Fl(l,31)=0.24, p<0.627; F2(l,31)=0.28, p<0.604). However, there was a
reference following quantification by a fezv (Fl(l,31)=10.40, p<0.004; 
F2(l,31)=11.26,p<0.003).
Temporal conjunction region
The analysis of Total reading time for the temporal conjunction region 
produced a marginal interaction (Fl(l,31)=3.33, p<0.078; F2(l,31)=3.84, 
p<0.059). An inspection of the means (illustrated in Figure 2) suggests that the 
interaction was again primarily due to a difference between refset and compset 
reference following quantification by a few. However, no further analyses were 
conducted because of the lack of significance of the main analysis.
Noun-phrase region
The analysis of Total reading time for this region produced another interaction 
of monotonicity and reference type (Fl(l,31)=9.70, p<0.004; F2(l,31)=13.04, 
p<0.002), but also a marginal main effect of monotonicity type (Fl(l,31)=4.03, 
p<0.054; F2(l,31)=3.70, p<0.012) which is due to an overall longer reading time 
following quantification by a fezv. An inspection of the mean reading times (see 
Figure 6) suggests that the marginal main effect is caused by an overall longer 
reading time following quantification by a fezv; and the interaction is caused by 
a shorter reading time for compset reference following quantification by fezv, 
and a longer reading time for compset reference following quantification by a 
few.
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Figure 6: Mean Total reading time in msec / character 
(with standard error bars! for the noun-phrase region 
following quantification by a few  and fezv
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An simple effects analysis of the means confirmed that there is a significant 
difference between refset and compset reference following quantification by a 
few  (Fl(l,31)=4.42, p<0.044; F2(l,31)=5.81, p<0.023), and between these two 
reference conditions following quantification by few  (Fl(l,31)=5.31, p<0.029; 
F2(l,31)=7.27, p<0.012). There was also difference between compset reference 
for the two quantificational conditions (Fl(l,31)=12.58, p<0.002; F2(l,31)=16.40, 
p<0.001), with a longer reading time for compset reference following 
quantification by a few. However, there was no difference between refset 
reference in the two quantificational conditions (Fl(l,31)=0.74, p<0.398; 
F2(l,31)=1.12, p<0.299); between refset reference following quantification by a 
few, and compset reference following quantification by few  (FI (1,31)=1.55, 
p<0.223; F2(l,31)=1.83, p<0.186); or compset reference following quantification 
by a few  and refset reference following quantification by few  (Fl(l,31)=12.58, 
p<0.002; F2(l,31)=11.72, p<0.002).
This suggests that the interaction is due to a difference in reference type in 
opposite directions for both quantificational conditions, and a longer reading 
time for compset reference following quantification by a few  which is countered 
by a shorter reading time for compset reference following quantification b y fezv.
Verb-phrase region
Finally, an analysis of the Total reading time for the verb-phrase at the end of 
the anaphoric sentence produced similar effects to those found on the analysis 
of the noun-phrase. There was a main effect of monotonicity type 
(Fl(l,31)=6.75, p<0.015; F2(l,31)=8.03, p<0.009), which is due to an overall 
longer reading time following quantification by afeiir, and an interaction of 
monotonicity and reference type (Fl(l,31)=7.30, p<0.012; F2(l,31)=11.03, 
p<0.003). An inspection of the means (see Figure 7) suggests that this is again 
due to a longer reading time for compset reference to an NP quantified by a few, 
and a shorter reading time for compset reference to the same NP quantified by 
few.
A simple effects comparison of the means also found a significant difference 
between refset and compset reference following quantification b y  a few 
(Fl(l,31)=4.19, p<0.050; F2(l,31)=7.30, p<0.012); but a difference between these 
two reference conditions following quantification by fezv which was only 
marginal by both subjects and items (Fl(l,31)=3.15, p<0.086; F2(l,31)=3.98, 
p<0.055). Refset reference was not significantly different between the two 
quantificational conditions (Fl(l,31)=0.14, p<0.708; F2(l,31)=0.14, p<0.708); nor
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was there a significant difference between refset reference following 
quantification by a few, and compset reference following quantification by few. 
The difference between these three conditions and compset reference following 
quantification by a few  was significant (Fl(l,31)=8.55/ p<0.007; F2(l,31)=14.89, 
p<0.001). This suggests that the experimental effects are primarily due to 
longer reading time following anomalous reference to an NP quantified by a 
few.
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Figure 7: Mean Total reading time in msec /character 
(with standard error bars) for the verb-phrase region 
following quantification by a few and few
There were no other significant effects on any of the regions (all F's<2.1) 
Summary of Total reading time results
There are three main components to the pattern of Total reading time results. 
The first of these is the quantified sentence, where there was a longer reading 
time for both the two few  quantification conditions, and for compset reference 
following quantification by a few, compared to refset reference to an NP 
quantified by a few. If it turns out that there is no subsequent evidence of First 
pass differences for the quantified sentences, then these results can safely be 
interpreted as a description of second pass processing in response to later 
difficulties. This suggests that subject return to the quantified sentence 
following anomalous reference to an NP quantified by a few, and that there is a 
general difficulty in processing reference to one quantified by few. Moreover, 
this difficulty is as marked as anomalous reference in the monotone-increasing 
condition.
The second area of interest contains the anaphor+verb, adverb and temporal 
conjunction regions, where there is a similar differentiation of the two 
quantifiers. All three regions (with marginally significant results for the
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conjunction region) show longer Total reading times for refset compared to 
compset reference in the a few quantification condition, but with no difference 
between these reference conditions following quantification by few. The two 
few conditions have as long a reading time as that for anomalous reference to an 
NP quantified by a few at the adverb region, but lie between a few's anomalous 
and felicitous reference conditions at the anaphor+verb and temporal 
conjunction regions. Again these results can be interpreted as evidence for 
increased processing difficulty following compset reference to a monotone- 
increasing quantified NP, and a general difficulty in processing reference to a 
monotone-decreasing quantified one.
Finally, analyses of the NP and VP regions produce a true interaction, with 
longer reading time for compset reference following quantification by a few, 
and for refset reference following quantification by few. The result for a few  are 
consistent with those found in the earlier regions, but there are two possible 
interpretations of the data for few. Either refset reference leads to increased 
Total reading time which is localised at the NP and VP regions, or else it is the 
difficulty in processing compset reference which is localised at the anaphor, 
adverb and conjunction regions. When this disappears at the NP and VP 
regions, the difficulty in processing refset reference following few quantification 
which is spread across the entire sentence, just becomes more apparent. The 
latter explanation is most likely, given that it is consistent with observations of 
a difficulty in processing reference to an NP quantified by few  which is 
commensurate with the difficulty of anomalous reference to an NP quantified 
by a few, and that it is not clear how the NP and VP regions would aid the 
interpretation of anomalous reference on their own.
The only complication comes from the results for the causal conjunction region. 
Here there was a markedly longer reading time following refset reference to an 
NP quantified by few  compared to the other three conditions. This may 
indicate that subjects pay particular attention to the conjunction when 
processing anomalous reference to an NP quantified by few, which is possible, 
given that causal conjunctions do seem to influence the focus of monotone- 
decreasing quantifiers (Moxey and Sanford). However, it would be a mistake 
to place too much weight on the results for this region, because it is likely that 
any observed effects are skewed by other factors. These will include the small 
size of the region, and its early line position and sensitivity to errors in landing 
position following the return sweep from the end of the previous line. There 
was also a high incidence of word-skipping for this region (it was skipped on 
62% of items), which may also confound the observed effects.
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Anaphor + verb + adverb region
The Total reading times for a region containing the anaphor, verb and adverb 
was also conducted. There was a main effect of reference type (FI(1,31)=8.30, 
p<0.008; F2(l,31)=6.81, p<0.014), which is due to an overall longer reading time 
following reference to the compset, and an interaction of monotonicity and 
reference types (Fl(l,31)=10.61, p<0.003; F2(l,31)=10.65, p<0.003).
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Figure 8: Mean Total reading time in msec /  character 
(with standard error bars) for the anaphor + verb + adverb region 
following quantification by a few  and few
Analysis of the simple effects confirmed that this interaction is entirely due to a 
contrast between the reference conditions following quantification by a few  
(Fl(l,31)=15.69, p<0.001; F2(l,31)=15.28, p<0.001), with no difference between 
the same reference conditions following quantification by fezv (FI (1,31)=0.42, 
p<0.524; F2(l,31)=0.48, p<0.494).. Neither was there a difference between 
compset reference conditions across the two quantifiers (Fl(l,31)=2.84, p<0.103; 
F2(l,31)=2.37, p<0.135), nor between compset reference following 
quantification by a few and refset reference following quantification by few 
(Fl(l,31)=1.08, p<0.307; F2(l,31)=0.72, p<0.405). However there was a 
difference between these three conditions and refset reference following 
quantification b y  a few  (Fl(l,31)=13.98, p<0.001; F2(l,31)=14.67, p<0.001). The 
observed effects are principally due to a shorter reading time for this condition.
First pass reading time
As with the Total Time analysis, separate 2x2 within subjects ANOVAs were 
used to analyse the First pass reading time recorded for each region. There 
were no significant effects for any of the regions prior to the anaphor (all 
Fs<1.4). The mean reading times for the subsequent regions, from the 
anaphor+verb region to the end of the anaphoric sentence, are illustrated in
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Figure 8. The graph suggests that there are no effects until the NP and VP 
regions at the end of the sentence. This was confirmed by non-significant 
results for separate analyses of the anaphor + verb, adverb and conjunction 
regions (all Fs<1.8), while there were significant results for the NP and VP 
regions.
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Figure 9: Mean First pass reading time in msec / character 
(with standard error bars) across six regions 
divisions for the anaphoric sentence 
following quantification by a few  and few
Noun-phrase region
An analysis of the First pass reading time for this region produced an 
interaction of monotonicity and reference types which was significant by 
subjects and marginal by items (Fl(l,31)=4.80, p<0.037; Fl(l,31)=3.37, p<0.077). 
An inspection of these means suggests that this effect is principally due to a 
longer reading time for compset reference to an NP which is quantified by a 
few.
This was further supported by an analysis of the simple effects mean contrasts 
which showed a difference in reference type under quantification by a few 
which was significant by subjects (Fl(l,31)=5.04, p<0.032; F2(l,31)=2.51, 
p <0.123), but no difference in reference type following quantification b y  few  
(Fl(l,31)=0.725, p<0.402; F2(l,31)=1.02, p<0.321). Neither was there any 
difference between refset reference in the two quantificational conditions 
(Fl(l,31)=0.56, p<0.460; F2(l,31)=0.44, p<0.512); or between refset reference 
following quantification by a few  and compset reference following 
quantification byfezv (Fl(l,31)=0.01, p<0.920; F2(l,31)=0.12, p<0.733). However, 
there was a difference between these three conditions and compset reference
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following quantification by a few, which was significant on a subjects analysis 
(Fl(l,31)=6.18, p<0.020; F2(l,31)=3.29, p<0.080).
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Figure 10: Mean First pass reading time in msec /character 
(with standard error bars) for the noun-phrase region 
following quantification by a few  and few
Verb-phrase region
A similar pattern of results was obtained from an analysis of First pass reading 
time for the verb-phrase region. There was an interaction of monotonicity and 
reference types (Fl(l,31)=4.53, p<0.042; F2(l,31)=9.85, p<0.004), which appears 
to be due to a longer reading time for compset reference following 
quantification by a few.
Again, this was confirmed by an analysis of the simple effects mean contrasts, 
which showed a significant difference between reference conditions following 
quantification by a few (Fl(l,31)=4.12, p<0.052; F2(l,31)=10.63, p<0.003), but no 
comparable difference following quantification by few  (Fl(l,31)=0.96, p<0.334; 
F2(l,31)=1.39, p<0.248). There was also no difference between refset reference 
in the two quantificational conditions (Fl(l,31)=0.21, p<0.600; F2(l,31)=67, 
p <0.419), or between refset reference following quantification by a few and 
compset reference following quantification b y  few  (Fl(l,31)=0.20, p<0.656; 
F2(l,31)=0.13, p<0.723). There was difference between these three conditions 
and compset reference to an NP quantified by a few  (Fl(l,31)=6.01, p<0.021; 
F2(l,31)=14.47, p<0.001).
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Figure 11: Mean First pass reading time in msec /character 
(with standard error bars) for the verb-phrase region 
following quantification by a few  and few
The overall increase in reading time for this region compared to the previous 
region is probably due to sentence wrap-up processes.
Anaphor + verb + adverb region
So far the data suggests that first pass effects are delayed until some distance
regions both failed to identify any punctuate first pass effects. Flowever, to be 
certain that such a punctuate effect was not spread across of these regions, a 
further analysis of First pass reading time was carried out on an combined 
anaphor + verb + adverb region. This produced a significant main effect of 
reference type (Fl(,131)=9.58, p<0.005; F2(l,31)=5.38, pcO.028), with an overall 
shorter reading time when the anaphor is congruous with the discourse role 
filled by the refset. The mean First pass reading time results are illustrated in 
Figure 11.
downstream of the anaphor. Analyses of the anaphor + verb and adverb
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Figure 12: Mean First pass reading time in msec /character 
(with standard error bars) for the anaphor + verb + adverb region 
following quantification bv a few and few
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First Pass regressions
The mean first pass regressions made from each of the regions following the 
anaphoric manipulation (the anaphor + verb to final VP regions) were 
separately analysed using within subjects 2x2 ANOVAs. However, there was 
no evidence of a difference in frequency of regressions across the experimental 
conditions for any of the analysed regions (all F's<2.1).
Discussion
The results from this revised study of quantifier focus and anaphoric reference 
replicated the earlier finding that the ease of pronominal reference to subsets of 
a quantified NP is contingent on the form of quantification. At the same time, 
there was no strong evidence of on-line anomaly detection.
An analysis of the Total reading times produced the same evidence of an 
increased reading time for reference to the unfocused subset of the quantified 
NP as found in the previous experiments, but with a more idiosyncratic pattern 
of results across the individual quantificational conditions. As predicted, there 
was a longer reading time when the anaphoric VP described a property of the 
compset following quantification by a few  than when it described a property of 
the refset partition. This was observed at the quantified sentence, and across all 
regions of the anaphoric sentence, and is consistent with the claim that 
monotone-increasing quantifiers like a few  focus processing attention onto the 
refset, and block compset reference. At the same time, there was evidence of a 
more general difficulty in processing reference following quantification by few, 
with no difference in reading time for refset or compset reference at either the 
quantified sentence, or anaphor+verb, adverb or temporal conjunction regions 
of the anaphoric sentence. These reading times were often as long as those for 
anomalous reference to the compset following quantification by a few, and 
always longer than reading times in the contrasting refset reference condition. 
However, the results for other regions suggest that there was still a preference 
for compset reference following this type of quantification. The reading times 
for the causal conjunction, NP and VP regions of the anaphoric sentence were 
significantly longer in the refset reference condition.
In summary, this pattern of results support the earlier conclusion that 
monotone-increasing quantification focuses on and enables reference to the 
refset but blocks reference to the compset, to such an extent that it seems likely 
that the compset is unrepresented. In contrast, monotone-decreasing
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quantifiers likefew license reference to the compset, which means that both the 
refset and compset are plausible antecedents, but that the compset is often 
favoured.
According to the analysis of First pass reading times, there was no evidence of 
on-line anomaly detection for two quantificational conditions. However, there 
was evidence that reference to the compset resulted in a general increase in first 
pass reading time for a region of text containing the pronoun and intransitive 
verb-phrase. This suggested that there was a general difficulty in processing 
reference to the compset, whatever the prior form of quantification. These 
results can be interpreted in two different ways. It may indicate that 
quantification by a few resulted in focus on the refset, therefore reference to this 
subset was more easy to process, and so had a shorter reading time that 
reference to the compset. This was consistent with the experimental 
predictions. However, there is an alternative account, according to which it 
m ay be that a simple co-referential mapping was established between the act 
described by the anaphor and by the VP of the quantified sentence, regardless 
of quantificational information. The present results cannot separate these two 
possibilities.
The other First pass reading results were more easily interpreted as evidence 
that anomalous reference to an unfocused subset had processing consequences. 
There was an increased First pass reading time for both the sentence-final NP 
and VP regions of the anaphoric sentence when reference was made to the 
unfocused subset following quantification by a few, but there was no 
commensurate effect for reference to the refset following quantification by few. 
The results suggest that although there was no strong evidence of first pass 
anomaly detection, there is evidence that the anomaly is detected more quickly, 
and has an earlier impact on processing, following monotone-increasing 
quantification by a few. This may be consistent with a claim made by Dowty 
(unpublished) that monotone-decreasing quantification is non-referential, and 
that it is necessary to use pragmatics and situation-specific knowledge to 
resolve anaphora under these conditions.
In the light of the claims made in Chapter 6, it appears that the revised 
experimental design which, in particular, sited the referential anomaly on an 
intransitive VP was unable to provide convincing evidence of first pass 
anomaly detection following reference to the unfocused subset of a quantified 
sentence. However, the experiment still fails to address the possible 
ambiguities associated with plural pronominal evidence. It is still possible that
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punctuate referential anomaly detection will be detected by the other 
experiments proposed in Chapter 6.
A final point concerns the failure to find any evidence of a difference in 
regressions across the experimental conditions, despite finding effects in the 
previous experiments. There is no clear explanation for this, although it may 
indicate the unreliability of the previous results. Alternatively, it may be due to 
changing the site of the anomaly. It was sited on a noun-phrase in the previous 
experiments, and regressions were made either from this region, or from 
regions later in the sentence. However, in this experiment the anomaly was 
sited on a verb-phrase, which was more salient than the previous manipulation, 
and so may have reduced the need for eye movements to either check the 
content of the anaphor or the quantified sentence. Other explanations, such as 
it is unlikely that subjects will make regressions because the quantified 
sentence appeared in the previous line, are implausible since this was also true 
of the previous studies.
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Chapter eight: 
Pragmatic constraints on focus 
following quantification by only afeiv 
Introduction
This chapter contains the first of two digressions. Up to now the experiments 
have addressed the semantic constraints exerted on focus by monotone- 
increasing and monotone-decreasing quantifiers, and the interpretation of 
subsequent anaphoric reference. However, only afezv was included in the 
introductory chapters as an example of a quantifier which exhibits neither 
monotone-increasing nor monotone-decreasing properties. It proved difficult 
to classify on a number of semantic tests, and also produced a more complex 
pattern of results in a sentence-completion task (Moxey and Sanford, 1987). 
Under some conditions it favours focus on the refset partition of the quantified 
NP, but will also focus on the compset under other conditions.
The chapter reports two experimental studies on discourse focus following 
quantification by only a feiu. These studies explore the hypothesis that only a few  
exerts weak focusing preference which are modulated by contextual factors. 
These will be introduced by a recap on the formal semantic properties of only a 
few, some of which indicate the context-dependency of its interpretation; and 
review some sentence-continuation data reported by Moxey and Sanford (1987, 
1993a). The rationale of the current manipulation will then be outlined.
Formal properties of only a few
It was shown in chapter one that only a few  violates extensionality and 
conservativity constraints, which together imply a context-dependent function. 
Its non-extensionality is demonstrated by the possible falseness of (1) given the 
truth of (2), because the truth of (1) depends on what the set of surviving sailors 
is compared against.
(1) Only a few sailors survived.
(2) Only a few sailors were surviving sailors.
If it is compared against the total number of survivors, whether or not they are 
sailors, or against the total number of both survivors and non-survivors, again 
including those who are not sailors, then (1) m aybe false while (2) is true. For
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example, it could be that (1) is used to assert that only a few  sailors survived 
relative to a greater number of passengers, or that following a large number of 
casualties, the only survivors were a few sailors. However, if the comparison is 
restricted to the set of sailors, as it is in (2), then the two sentences will be 
synonymous and share truth-values.
At the same time a violation of the conservativity universal is demonstrated by 
an interpretation of (4) where the truth of the sentence is not solely determined 
by that part of the VP denotation which contains the NP. This means that the 
truth of (3) can be established by simply inspecting the set of fishermen, for 
which it should be possible to say that all of the set survived. This holds for 
one reading of (4), but on another it can be understood to imply that other non­
fishermen did not survive. Given this interpretation, (4) is falsified if there are 
surviving non-fishermen.
(3) All of the fishermen survived.
(4) Only a few of the fishermen survived.
Features of the discourse context also seem to determine whether or not only a 
few  take a conservative reading. If (5) is read as a context for (6) and (7), then 
(6) results in the same ambiguity between non-conservative and conservative 
readings as described above. It can be understood to either mean that many of 
the fishing boats and all of the ferries sank (a non-conservative reading), or that 
many of the fishing boats sank while implying nothing about the ferries (the 
conservative reading). However, when (5) is read as the context for (7), the 
non-conservative reading is blocked, and the sentence only implies that many 
boats sunk29.
(5) Both fishing boats and ferries were endangered by the storm.
(6) Only a few fishing boats survived.
(7) Only a few boats survived.
29 Given an appropriate context, non-conservative readings are also possible for sentences 
quantified by other quantifiers, like all, which are more usually classed as conservative (cf 
barwise and Cooper, 1981). Also, the availability of non-conservative readings can be 
promoted by stress patterns. Placing stress on fishermen in (4), or fishing  in (6), em phasises a 
contrast with the sets non-fishermen and boats other than fishing ones respectively (cf Klein, 
1994). It is possible that different patterns of stress, and using pauses break up the com posite 
quantifier, will allow  different syntactic analyses in w hich the quantifiers only and a few  are 
separated. The different syntactic analyses assigned to the phrase may well account for the 
different interpretations.
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If, as WesterstShl (1984; reviewed in Chapter 1) claims, the alternative readings 
are determined by the selection of different context sets for the quantified NP, 
then there is an obvious question of whether there are psycholinguistic 
correlates of the procedures needed to identify the appropriate context set.
Such processes would be similar to those required for anaphoric reference by 
definite NPs. In fact, there would be a case for claiming some uniformity 
between these two sets of processes, because quantifiers belong to the class of 
determiners according to generalised quantifier theory (cf. Barwise and Cooper, 
1981; Westerst&hl, 1989).
More generally, only a few  can be seen to have the value-judgmental function 
which Keenan and Stavi (1986) use as a justification for excluding many and few  
from their semantic analysis of natural language quantifiers. Not only is its 
interpretation dependent on aspects of the situation (the context set on which it 
operates), but it also signals that an expectation is held by the speaker. For 
example, when the set of surviving sailors is only a few  relative to the set of 
sailors, the speaker is signalling that she expected there to be more who 
survived. The same is true when the comparison is made against the total set 
of survivors (including non-sailors), or the combined set of survivors and non­
survivors. This value-judgmental function is particularly important for the 
current experimental manipulation, where it is predicted that the value- 
judgements licensed by the quantifier in a given context are used to guide 
focus.
The non-conservative and non-extensional readings for only a few are shared 
with most, and perhaps all of the five quantifiers considered in Chapter one. 
There it seemed clear that many, not many and few  produce such reading, and it 
is probable that a few  is both non-conservative and non-extensional, although 
judgements are more difficult for this quantifier. However, only a few does not 
find the same uniformity with these quantifiers on other semantic tests. For 
instance, it is more difficult to make intuitive judgements about its acceptability 
in test frames of upwards and downwards monotonicity (see 8 and 9), and 
those researchers who have commented its function generally categorise only a 
few as non-monotonic (Moxey and Sanford, 1987; Klein, 1994). It also difficult 
to judge on semantic tests of negativity and persistence.
(8) If only a few of the students passed the exam with ease,
then only a few  of the students passed the exam.
(9) If only a few of the students passed the exam,
then only a few  of the students passed the exam with ease.
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Klein (1994) proposes that only a few, and also only few, are complex quantifiers 
which combine the semantic properties of the simple quantifiers only and a few  
or few. This follows from Barwise and Cooper's (1981) claim that all simple 
quantifiers are either monotone-increasing or decreasing, and therefore non­
monotonic ones must be complex expressions which are composed of two or 
more simple quantifiers. Klein argues that a conjunction of the downwards 
monotone only and the upwards monotone a few  produces the non­
monotonicity of only a few, while a combination of only and the downwards 
monotone few  remains monotone-decreasing.
Only a few and focus
If only a few  is non-monotonic, then this suggests that it may not exhibit the 
same semantic function of either monotone-increasing or monotone-decreasing 
quantifiers. Moxey and Sanford (1987) included it in their sentence- 
continuation experiment and found a pattern of results which was quite 
different from that for either the monotone-increasing afeio and many, or 
monotone-decreasing/ezi; and not many. When only a few  was substituted into 
sentences like (10), subjects used their continuations to refer to the refset as 
often as when the sentence was quantified by a few. The same was true when 
the quantified and anaphoric sentences were conjoined using and or but, but 
when they were conjoined by because the pattern of results was more similar to 
that found following quantification by few.
(10) Quantifier of the MPs attended the meeting. They . . .
Moxey and Sanford argued that because is a compset-supporting operator, 
because it also increased the proportion of compset-focused continuation 
following quantification by few or not many. They suggest that although only a 
few  appears to have a default for refset focus, it can focus on the compset when 
it is in the environment of a compset supporting operator like because. This may 
also be true of other situations, such as when a negative polarity item appears 
in the sentence. It is also possible that pragmatics will influence focus for only a 
few. For instance, Moxey and Sanford (1987) observed that while two thirds of 
the continuations for (11) referred to the compset, hardly any did for (12).
(11) Only a few of the children ate their ice-cream. They . . .
(12) Only a few of the MPs were at the meeting. They . . .
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This might be explained by a difference in expectations associated with the two 
scenarios. It would normally be expected that children enjoy ice-cream, but 
this is violated by the assertion, in (11), that only a few  actually ate it. Readers 
respond to this violation by focusing on the compset of children who did not 
eat the ice-cream and infer reasons about why this might have happened. For 
example, a plausible continuation might explain that the children had already 
had a heavy meal and could not eat any more. In contrast, (20) does not violate 
any expectations about the situation it describes (possibly because readers do 
not have strong expectations about MPs attending meetings), and does not 
result in the same frequency of compset focus. Instead focus is maintained on 
the refset of MPs who did go to the meeting.
While such an explanation is consistent with the value-judgement function 
ascribed to some quantifiers by Keenan and Stavi, the contrast between these 
two sentences is not well-controlled, and it is possible that other differences 
between the two situations are responsible for the results. The following 
experiments make a more detailed study of pragmatic constraints on focus, and 
use more carefully controlled materials. The studies manipulate the verb- 
phrase of a sentence quantified by only a few  to produce two passages which 
describe the same situation, but make quantified assertions which either match 
or violate expectations about that situation. Sentences (13) and (14) illustrate 
the manipulation.
(13) Only a few of the women were over four feet tall.
(14) Only a few of the women were over six feet tall.
Given that the normal (UK) height for women is somewhere between five and 
six feet, (13) marks the small refset as unusual relative to that norm, and (14) 
marks a small refset which fits the norm. The reference patterns of plural 
pronoun continuations should reflect these differences. Sentence (13) is 
predicted to result in a focal refset, while (14) should result in a focal compset. 
By this account the function of only a few  is simplified to that of a quantifier 
which marks the refset partition of the NP as small, but the significance of this 
is determined relative to knowledge about the situation.
None of these observations, however, explain the tendency towards refset focus 
in the unconjoined, and and but sentence-continuation conditions. This seems 
to contradict any intuitions about the non-monotonicity, or even downwards 
mono tonicity, of only a few. Yet it may be better explained by the primacy of 
the refset representation. I have argued that only the refset is necessary
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representation, and that the compset is represented relative to this subset when 
required by monotone-decreasing quantification. Because only a few has no 
strong focal preferences of its own, the representational system defaults to 
refset focus (and no representation of the compset). However, compset- 
supporting environments, such as conjunction by because, switch focus to the 
compset. It is also possible that other situations, such as conjunction by but, or 
a pragmatically marked refset, will make only a few  focus on the refset, although 
this may be indistinguishable from the default situation.
Experiment six: 
Pragmatic constraints on focus for only a few. 
Introduction
This study tested the claim that the pragmatic interpretation of a sentence 
quantified by only a few  can influence focus. This depends on the quantifier 
having the relatively simple semantic function of marking a set as small, and 
allowing the pragmatics of the situation to determine the significance of this. 
For example, in both (13) and (14) only a few  marked the refset of women who 
are respectively over four and six feet tall as small in number. The former of 
these two cases conforms with the expectation that most women are between 
five and six feet tall, and that those who are taller are a small and exceptional 
group. The latter case violates the same expectation by suggesting that only a 
small number of the women fall within the:normal range. It was predicted that 
norm-matching sentences will maintain focus on the refset, but that norm- 
violation increases the tendency towards compset focus.
The following experiment uses a sentence-continuation methodology to test 
this claim. The experiment also includes the conjunction conditions used by 
Moxey and Sanford (1987) to determine whether there is evidence of an 
interaction between semantic and pragmatic constraints on focus. In particular, 
I was keen to assess the contribution of a compset-supporting operator like 
because, since causal conjunctions support compset focus. This appears to be 
due to the fact that many compset-focused continuations tend to be 
explanatory, and account for the small refset (Moxey and Sanford, 1987).
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Method
The experiment used the same sentence-continuation method described by 
Moxey and Sanford (1987). Subjects viewed single passages and were asked to 
provide one or two sentence continuations to plural noun pronouns. The 
results were then categorised by the set described by the continuation.
Design
There were two between-subjects manipulations. A sentence quantified by only 
a few  described a situation which either matched or violated norm expectations. 
These quantified sentences were followed by a plural pronoun (they), which 
either began a new sentence, or was connected to the quantified sentence by 
either and, but or because.
Each subject saw only one material in one of the experimental conditions to 
produce a fully between subjects design.
Subjects
600 under-graduate students at Glasgow University, who were not paid for 
their participation.
M aterials
Five experimental materials were used, and are listed in Appendix 3.
One of the experimental materials is illustrated in (15).
(15) In a restaurant
The.office party went to an up-market Italian restaurant for their 
Christmas dinner. Only a few of the office staff [offered to buy the 
waiter a drink / ate with their mouths closed]
. T hey ... 
and they ...  
but they ...  
because they ...
Procedure
Subjects were given a sheet of paper with one of the materials in one of the 
experimental conditions and instructed to "Please complete the following short 
passage with one or two sentences of your own". Following data collection, the 
resulting continuations were coded by the type of reference made: 'refset', 
'compset', 'superset' or 'other'.
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Results
The coded continuation results are summarised in Tables 1 and 2.
An analysis of variance by chi-square (Winer, 1991) for compset continuations 
produced significant main effects for the VP manipulation (x2=24.80, df=2, 
p<0.01) and for conjunction type (x2=26.22, df=3, p<0.01). There were no 
significant differences between the experimental passages, and no significant 
interactions. The main effect of continuation type was further investigated 
using an analysis of residuals (Seigel and Castellan, 1988). According to this 
analysis, there was no significant difference from chance for the frequency of 
compset-focused continuations for the no conjunction condition (Residual = 
0.27, p > 0.05), or the and (Residual = 1.1, p > 0.05) and but (Residual = 0.6, p > 
0.05) conjunction conditions. However, the frequency of compset-focused 
continuations for the because conjunction was significantly different from 
chance (Residual = 1.96, p < 0.05). The mean compset continuations collapsed 
across the five passages are graphed in Figure 1 below.
Conjunction refset compset superset other
. 9.60 3.60 1.40 0.60
and 11.20 1.80 0.60 1.40
but 7.20 3.60 3.60 0.60
because 5.20 9.00 0.40 0.40
Table 1: mean continuation categories for refset-predicting contexts.
Conjunction refset compset superset other
• 3.80 8.40 1.20 1.60
and 5.20 7.20 1.20 1.40
but 6.00 7.20 0.40 1.40
because 3.40 11.00 0.00 0.60
Table 2: mean continuation categories for compset-predicting contexts.
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■  refset-predicting context 
E2 com pset-predicting context
No conjuction and but b e cau se
Figure 1: mean compset continuations collapsed across items following 
quantification by only a few in norm-violating and norm-matching
pragmatic conditions.
Discussion
The first point to be made is that there was no significant difference between 
the five experimental materials. They worked in a sufficiently similar way to 
produce a difference in the proportion of compset continuation between the 
context types and between the connective types, and with no evidence of an 
interaction.
Subjects produced significantly more compset-focused continuations in the 
norm-violating conditions than in the norm-matching conditions, as was 
expected, which supports the hypothesis that focus is pragmatically mediated 
following quantification by only a few. According to the present theory, the 
quantifier is simply used to mark a set as small, and the significance of this is 
determined pragmatically. When the smallness of this set violates norm 
expectation, this results in an increased likelihood of focus on the compset, and 
defaults to refset focus otherwise.
At the same time the proportion of compset-focused continuations was 
increased in both contextual conditions when because was used to conjoin the 
quantified and anaphoric clauses. Conjunction by either and or but did not 
seem to influence the likelihood of compset focus however. This is consistent
165
with the claim that only a few is likely to focus on the compset in environments 
containing compset-supporting operators like because. This may be because 
these operators mark the fact that the situation described by the quantifier is 
unusual and requires explanation.
It should be noted, however, that both of these effects only lead to increased 
focus on the compset, but still permitted reference to the refset. Even a 
combination of those conditions which favoured compset focus, where there 
was conjunction by because in a norm-violating context, only resulted in a 73% 
incidence of compset focus. This forces the conclusion, as similar data did for 
monotone-decreasing quantification, that the manipulations make the compset 
more focal, but cannot push the refset out of focus.
One final observation is that there was a substantially higher frequency of 
compset focus in the no conjunction norm-matching condition that found by 
Moxey and Sanford (1987) - 24% compared to 5% - but no difference in 
frequency between the two experiments following conjunction by because 
(both were 60%). This may have been because Moxey and Sanford did not 
control for contextual constraints in their study, and their materials described 
situations which were open to a number of interpretations. For example, (16) 
could describe a situation where many football fans were expected, say a cup 
final, or one where few were expected, such as a local amateur match.
(16) Only a few football fans went to the match.
Under these conditions, focus will depend on the base-rate expectations for the 
interpretation which subjects assign to the quantified sentence. If this is high 
then there will be a greater tendency towards compset focus, but if it is low this 
tendency will be reduced. The because conjunction condition may be insensitive 
to this just because it signals that the situation requires explanation, which 
indicates to subjects that a low base-rate interpretation is appropriate. In 
contrast, the present materials used a title and contextual sentence which 
narrowed the number of possible situations that the sentences could describe.
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Experiment seven: 
The time course of anaphoric reference to an NP 
quantified by only a few
Introduction
Having demonstrated in an off-line production task that focus is mediated by 
pragmatics following quantification by only a few, the next step is to test the 
same manipulation on-line and in a comprehension task. This follows the 
rationale that was behind the SPR and eye movement experiments reported in 
Chapters four and five. Moxey and Sanford had demonstrated that monotone- 
increasing and monotone-decreasing quantifiers produced different patterns of 
focus in an off-line sentence-continuation task, so the SPR and eye movement 
experiments were used to determine whether this also occurred during 
comprehension. It was possible that the effects observed by Moxey and 
Sanford were peculiar to production, or even particular to the task they used, 
and dependent on problem-solving processes.
The present study followed the design and procedure used in the previous eye 
movement studies, and measured the time course of anaphoric reference to 
refset and compset partitions of a sentence quantified by only a few. An 
example material is given in (17). As before, the verb-phrase of the quantified 
sentence was manipulated to describe either a norm-matching (heaviest) or 
norm-violating (lightest) situation. It was predicted that the norm-matching 
manipulation would leave the refset in focus, but that norm-violation would 
result in focus on the compset. At the same time, the anaphoric NP which 
begins the following sentence either described a property of the refset (their 
strength) or compset (their weakness) of the quantified NP.
(17) At the gym.
Some expert weight-lifters from the gym held a weight-lifting 
competition. Only a few of the weight-lifters managed to lift 
the [heaviest/lightest] dumbbell. Their [strength/  weakness] was 
a surprise to their friends.
It was predicted that reference to the unfocused subset would prove anomalous 
and result in increased processing at or beyond the anaphor. Given the 
previous experimental results this might not be evident as a punctuate effect on
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measures of first pass reading time or regressions, but should still show as a 
disruption to processing on a measure of total reading time.
Before conducting this experiment, an off-line pilot study was carried out to 
generate a materials set.
Pilot study
The proposed experimental materials took the same format as those used in the 
previous eye movement experiments. They had a title and three sentences, the 
first of which was used to set the context. This was following by a quantified 
sentence of the form Quantifier NP VP, where the VP was manipulated to 
produce a predicate which either matched or violated norms for the described 
situation. In the norm-matching condition, the refset partition of the quantified 
NP was marked as small and exceptional for the given situation, while in the 
norm-violating situation the compset was marked as unusually large. The final 
sentence of each passage began with an anaphoric NP composed of the 
possessive plural pronoun their, and an NP which described a property of 
either the refset or compset of the earlier quantified NP.
The procedure used in the study was different in design to the one used to 
select materials in Chapter 4 . In that study, subjects saw both possible 
continuation sentences, and had to select the one which was most appropriate. 
This looked to be too difficult a task for the present manipulation, so subjects 
were instead given a sentence-continuation task, where they saw a number of 
proposed materials without the anaphoric sentence and were asked to produce 
a continuation to the plural pronoun they.
It was originally intended to select materials which passed a threshold of 70% 
refset-focused continuations in the norm-matching condition, and 70% 
compset-focused continuations in the norm-violating condition, but this 
criterion had to be relaxed when it proved difficult to generate materials with a 
high frequency of compset-focused continuations. Materials were finally 
selected if the frequency of compset-focused continuations exceeded 50% of 
those which could be classified as either refset- or compset-focused. This 
excluded those continuations which could not be classified in this way. 
Twenty-two materials were selected using this criterion, and an additional two 
were added to the material set prior to the eye-tracking study.
Fifteen continuations were collected for each verb-phrase conditions of the 22 
materials and categorised by the set which they described. Subjects produced a
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mean 11.00 (sd=2.52) refset continuations and a mean 1.73 (sd=1.55) compset 
continuations for materials in the norm-matching condition. In the norm- 
violating condition they produced a mean 7.09 (sd=3.78) refset continuations 
and a mean 6.18 (sd=3.32) compset continuations. Other continuations either 
referred to the superset or could not be classified.
There was some concern over the failure to produce materials with a high 
incidence of compset focus in the norm-violating condition, but this was 
mitigated by the fact that the Experiment six found only a 56% incidence of 
compset focus in the norm-violation condition when the quantified and 
anaphoric sentences were unconjoined. This reflects the fact that the 
manipulations only increase the likelihood of compset focus, but do not push 
the refset out of focus.
Method
This study replicated the method of the previous eye-tracking studies reported 
in chapter five. The following are those details which are particular to the 
present study.
Design
There were two within-subject variables. The VP of the quantified sentence 
was manipulated to describe a situation which either matched or violated norm 
expectation. This was crossed with the second variable, which manipulated the 
anaphoric subject NP of the following sentence to describe either the refset of 
compset partition of the quantified sentence.
Subjects
The experiment used 24 subjects with uncorrected vision who were 
undergraduate students at Glasgow University and paid £5 for their 
participation. Subjects who failed to complete the task were paid a lesser rate. 
No subjects had been used in the previous experiments.
Subjects who could not be set-up or failed to calibrate on the eyetracker were 
replaced before viewing the experimental materials, and no subjects had to be 
replaced following data collection.
Materials
The experiments used 24 passages containing a sentence with a noun-phrase 
quantified by only a few  and predicated by a verb-phrase describing either a 
norm-matching or norm-violating role for the refset. The following sentence
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began with an anaphoric NP which described a property of either the refset or 
compset partition of the quantified NP. The length of this noun-phrase was 
balanced across the two anaphoric conditions. It was a mean 8.67 (sd=2.10) 
characters in the refset-referring condition, and a mean 9.13 (sd=1.98) 
characters in the compset-referring condition.
The monitor used to present the materials restricted line length to a maximum 
65 characters. The materials were arranged to accommodate this constraint 
while keeping the critical anaphoric noun-phrase of the text in an 
approximately central line position to avoid landing errors associated with the 
return sweep from the end of the preceding line (Rayner and Pollatsek, 1989). 
The pronoun began a minimum 8 (and a mean 18.17, sd=8.29) characters from 
the start of the line.
A double line-spaced presentation was used to make data correction easier 
during pre-analysis.
The materials were mixed with 32 filler items which were materials for other 
experiments, and divided into 4 presentation blocks with rest intervals between 
each block. Two practise items began the first block, and a further practise item 
was added to the beginning of the other blocks to orient subjects to the reading 
task. Comprehension questions requiring a YES or NO button press response 
followed 25% of the presented passages to ensure careful reading.
Experimental materials, fillers and practise items are listed in Appendix 3.
Procedure
We followed the experimental procedure described for the previous eye- 
tracking experiments (see Chapter 5), with the addition of an off-line task 
following completion of the eye-tracking task. Subjects were given printed 
versions of the experimental materials which they had just viewed (excluding 
filler and practise items), but with both versions of the anaphoric reference 
placed in brackets within the text. Subjects were asked to indicate which of 
these two best-fitted the passage. This allowed subsequent comparison 
between on-line and off-line results, and provided independent criteria for 
subsequent data analysis.
Results
An initial analysis examined the sentence reading times. One of the clearest 
findings of the previous experiment was that anomalous reference produces a 
massive increase in reading time for the anaphoric sentence. A similar finding
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would demonstrate the effectiveness of the current experimental manipulation, 
and justify further analyses to determine the locus and time course of this 
processing. A corollary of this is that a failure to find sentence reading time 
effects would dispense with the need for these more fine-grained analyses.
The data was inspected prior to analysis, and trials were removed if zero scores 
were recorded for any of the sentence regions. These are due to tracker loss, or 
subjects not fixating within the region. Approximately 6% of the data was lost 
for this reason.
Sentence reading time
The reading times for the contextual, quantified and anaphoric sentences were 
separately analysed using 2x2 within subject ANOVA's. Only an analysis of 
the quantified sentence produced any significant differences which were due to 
the experimental manipulations, with a main effect of reference type which was 
significant by subjects only (Fl(l,23)=5.32, p<0.031; F2(l,23)=1.80, p<0.193), and 
reflected a longer reading time for reference to the refset partition of the 
quantified NP. There were no other significant effects (all Fs<2.0).
Total reading time for regions of the anaphoric sentence 
Although no effects were observed on the analysis of Total reading times for 
the anaphoric sentence, it was possible that there were short-lived effects 
within individual regions of the sentence. For this reason, the Total reading 
times were analysed for three regions of the anaphoric sentence. These regions 
are illustrated in (18), where the region divisions are denoted by slashes. The 
first region contained the anaphor, the second region contained the following 
verb-phrase, and the final sentence contained a prepositional phrase.
(18) Their [strength | weakness] /  was a surprise /  to their friends.
The Total reading times for these regions were analysed using separate 2 x 2  
within subjects ANOVAs. There was no evidence of a significant effect for 
either the anaphor region (Fs < 1.0), or the verb-phrase region (Fs < 1.0). The 
analysis of Total reading time for the prepositional phrase region found no 
evidence of a main effect of norm-matching or violation (F2 < 1.0), no effect of 
reference type (FI(1,23) = 1.80, p > 0.05; F2 < 1.0), nor an interaction of these 
factors. These results demonstrated that there were no short-lived effects 
within regions of the anaphoric sentence.
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First pass reading time for regions of the anaphoric sentence 
The First pass reading times for the three regions of the anaphoric sentence (e.g. 
18) were also analyse d using separate 2 x 2  within subjects ANOVAs. There 
was no evidence of any significant effects for either the anaphor region (Fs < 
1.0). Nor did an analysis of the First pass reading times for the following verb- 
phrase region produce either a significant main effect of norm-matching or 
violation (Fs < 1.0), an effect of reference type (FI(1,23) = 3.00, p > 0.05; F2 <1.0), 
or an interaction of these factors (Fs <1.0). Finally, an analysis of the final 
prepositional phrase region failed to find any significant effects (Fs <1.0).
Given these results, there was no evidence that the experimental manipulations 
affected the First pass reading time for any regions of the anaphoric sentence.
Discussion
There was no evidence of significant effects according to either measures of the 
Total sentence reading time, the reading times for individual regions of the 
anaphoric sentence, or according to measures of the First pass reading time of 
the anaphoric sentence. These results allowed us to conclude that the 
experimental manipulations failed to affect the processing of anaphoric 
reference to the refset and compset of a sentence quantified by only a few. This 
meant that not only was there no evidence that norm-violation resulted in focus 
on the compset, but that there was no evidence of a difference between 
reference to either the refset and compset when the quantified sentence 
described a situation which was consistent with norm-expectations, and 
therefore was predicted to maintain focus on the refset.
The one finding which was significant (by subjects only) according to the 
measure of Total reading time appears to be spurious. It suggests that there is 
an increased reading time for the quantified sentence following refset reference. 
This would suppose that subjects returned to re-read the quantified sentence in 
this reference condition, which is counter-intuitive because, if anything, it is 
compset reference which is likely to be more difficult, as this involves reference 
to an implicit entity. Given this it seems reasonable to discount the observed 
effect as a chance event.
The failure to find any evidence of an effect invites the conclusion that the 
reference to an NP quantified by only a few  is not processed as the sentence is 
read. While this is possibly true, because of difficulties associated with the 
interpretation of only a few, I inspected the off-line task completed by subjects 
immediately following eye-tracking, to be sure that the effects were not due to 
weaknesses in the experimental manipulation.
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Results from the off-line post-test
The off-line results suggested that the experimental manipulation had failed for 
many of the materials. However, this was not due to the difficulty in reaching 
a compset-focused interpretation suggested by the pre-test, where less than 
50% of continuations focused on the compset, but a failure to reach a refset- 
focused interpretation when this was predicted by the pragmatic manipulation. 
Overall, a mean 6.47 (sd=2.62) of a possible 12 refset-focused continuations 
were selected for materials in the refset-favouring context, and a mean 9.22 
(sd=1.72) compset-focused continuations were selected for materials in the 
compset-favouring context. Results for one item were dropped from the 
analysis because of typographic errors in some of the experimental materials.
It was decided to re-analyse a reduced set of eye movement data for those 
items which showed the expected pattern of data in the off-line task. This was 
done by setting a criterion of 50% refset-focused continuations in the norm- 
matching condition, and 50% compset-focused continuations in the norm- 
violating condition. Twelve of the off-line materials matched passed both of 
these criteria, and the corresponding eye movement data was re-analysed.
The mean data across items for the off-line task is included in Appendix 4, and 
the items selected for re-analysis are marked by as asterisk.
Sentence reading time results for the reduced data set 
The analysis of sentence reading times was repeated for the reduced data set, 
with separate analyses for the contextual, quantified and anaphoric sentence, 
using 2x2 within subjects ANOVAs.
This time the only effect was found on an analysis of the reading times for the 
anaphoric sentence, with a main effect of the pragmatic manipulation which 
was marginal by subjects (Fl(l,23)=3.64, p<0.067; F2(l,ll)=1.39, p<0.264). 
Although this failed to reach significance on the items analysis, this was most 
probably because of the reduced size of the data set, and the differences 
between means was in the same direction as those found in the subjects 
analysis. Reading times were longer when the quantified sentence violated 
norm expectations.
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Figure 2: Mean reading time in msec /  character for a sentence quantified 
by only a few in norm-violating and norm-matching conditions.
No other significant effects were observed, either for anaphoric sentence, or for 
analyses of the other sentence regions (all Fscl.O).
Discussion
The analysis of the reduced data set still failed to find any evidence that 
anaphoric reference was contingent on the differential focus of refset and 
compset NP partitions following in norm-matching or violating conditions. 
What it did find was an overall increase in reading time for the anaphoric 
sentence when the preceding quantified sentence described a situation which 
violated norm expectations. If this proves to be a reliable effect, then it suggests 
that anaphoric reference was generally more difficult in this condition.
General discussion
The off-line production and on-line comprehension experiments investigated 
the same hypothesis: that focus is determined by both semantic and pragmatic 
constraints following quantification by only a few. All of the previous 
experiments have investigated the semantic constraints exerted on focus by 
monotone-increasing and monotone-decreasing quantifiers. However, formal 
observations, and data from a sentence-continuation task (Moxey and Sanford, 
1987; 1993) suggests that only a few  does not fit into either of these categories, 
nor does it exhibit a clear pattern of focus. Its interpretation appears to be more 
open to contextual constraint. My hypothesis was that only a few  has the 
relatively simple semantic function of marking a set as small in size, but leaves 
it to pragmatics to determine the significance of this. It was predicted that 
when the marked small refset was consistent with pragmatic expectations, i.e. it 
was not unusually small given the described situation, then focus would be 
maintained on the refset. This meant that a subsequent pronoun would be
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interpreted as reference to this subset. In contrast, if the small refset violated 
expectations, i.e. it was unusually small, then the compset would be placed in 
focus, and there would be at least a tendency to interpret a subsequent pronoun 
as reference to this subset.
A production experiment in which subjects provided sentence completions that 
referred to the focused subset of a sentence quantified by only a few  provided 
evidence in support of these claims. A significantly greater number of 
continuation sentences described the compset when the quantified sentence 
described a situation that violated expectations. Given this finding, it was 
concluded that set focus could be pragmatically influenced following 
quantification by only a few. The experiment also manipulated the form of 
connective between the quantified sentence and the anaphoric completion, and 
a significantly greater number of continuation for the connective because, and 
no effect for either and, but or a no connective condition. This finding 
suggested that since causal connectives like because mark the need to explain 
the described situation, they will also support compset focus. This appeared to 
be independent of the pragmatic manipulation.
The second experiment measured subjects' eye movements as they read 
sentences which referred to either the refset or compset of a sentence quantified 
by only a few. These quantified sentences were again manipulated to either 
match or violate expectations about the described situation. That is, when the 
described set (the refset) was not unusually small relative to expectations, then 
it would be maintained in focus, but when it was unusually small, then the 
compset would be placed in focus. It was predicted that reference to the 
unfocused-subset would appear anomalous and be more difficult to process. If 
this was an immediate and short-lived difficulty then it should have been 
observed as an increased reading time for the anaphor as it was first read. 
Alternatively, if the difficulty was experienced later, and represented 
difficulties in integrating the anaphoric sentence with the previous discourse, 
then there should have been reflected in reading times for the entire anaphoric 
sentence.
However, there was no difference in either the first pass reading times for the 
anaphor, or the global sentence reading times, when reference was made to the 
unfocused subset. That is, there was no evidence of an increased reading time 
when the anaphor described a property of the compset and the small refset 
matched expectations, nor for reference to the refset when this was marked as
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small relative to expectations. The failure to observe any effects due to the 
experimental manipulation can be explained in several ways.
First of all, it m aybe that reference is generally difficult to process when it is 
made to a sentence quantified by only a few. This consistent with the claim that 
focus is strongly determined by pragmatic constraints following this form of 
quantification. Chapter 3 reviewed a number of studies which demonstrated 
that inferences tend not to be processed during reading when they are 
dependent on pragmatics. For instance, McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) found that 
subjects do not infer that an actress has died when they read that she has fallen 
from the top of a 14th storey building. It was argued that these inferences are 
not made because they are defeasible, meaning that they can be ruled out 
subsequent text. For example, the actress may not have died when she fell off 
the roof because there was a safety net, or someone caught her at the last 
moment. Similarly, since focus appears to depend on pragmatics following 
quantification by only a feiv, and this is supported by sentence-completion 
results, it may be that it too is not processed during reading.
Alternatively, there may have been serious weaknesses with the experimental 
materials. One possibility is that the experimental materials may not have been 
sufficiently biased towards focus on the compset in the expectation-violating 
condition. This was identified as a problem during the pilot study. Subjects 
were asked to complete sentences which made pronominal reference to a 
preceding quantified sentence, and it was intended to select those materials for 
which there was a strong tendency to produce continuations that described the 
refset when the quantified sentence matched expectations, and continuations 
that described the compset when the quantified sentence violated expectations. 
However, it proved difficult to produce materials for which there was a strong 
tendency for subject to describe the compset in the norm-violating condition.
At the same time, there was no independent measure of the effectiveness of the 
referential manipulation used in the eye movement study. This meant that it 
was not clear whether the anaphor unambiguously described a property of the 
refset or compset in each of the referential conditions. There was some 
evidence of this from the post-test administered to subjects once they had 
completed the eye movement study. These subjects were presented with the 
experimental materials and asked to indicate which of the two alternative 
forms of anaphor were most appropriate in each of the pragmatic conditions. 
While there was 77% agreement that the anaphor which described a property 
of the compset was most appropriate when the quantified sentence violated
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expectations, there was only 54% agreement that the anaphor which described 
the refset was most appropriate when the quantified sentence matched 
expectations.
Such problems suggest that a general improvement of the experimental 
methodology is required before any conclusions are drawn about the 
processing of reference to sentence quantified by only a few. At the same time, 
the experiment can be further improved by stacking the odds in favour of 
compset focus in the norm-violating condition. One way of doing this would 
be to conjoin the quantified and anaphoric sentences by a causal conjunction 
like because, or include another compset-supporting operator such as a negative 
polarity item. The results from the sentence-completion study have already 
demonstrated that conjunction by because increases the likelihood that subjects 
will produce continuations that describe the compset. It may also increase the 
likelihood that the compset is placed in focus during the reading of the 
quantified sentence. This would again be consistent with the observation made 
in Chapter 3 that possible inferences are more likely to be made during reading 
when they have semantic support. There is other, more anecdotal reasons for 
including a negative polarity item. When designing the experimental 
materials, it was noticed that there was a tendency to include negative items in 
those sentences intended to produce compset focus. For example, (19) appears 
to produce a more focal compset than (20).
(19) Only a few of the weight-lifters managed to lift even the lightest 
dumbbell.
(20) Only a few of the weight-lifters managed to lift the lightest dumbbell. 
Summary
There is off-line evidence that both semantics and pragmatics can constrain 
focus in some quantification conditions. The quantifier only a few  appears to be 
used to mark an NP as a small set, and the significance of this is determined by 
pragmatics. When the smallness of the set is consistent with norm expectations 
focus is maintained on the refset partition of the quantified NP. However, 
when it violates these expectations, the compset is placed in focus. There is also 
evidence that other function words, like connectives, will interact with 
quantification to constrain focus. In particular, causal connectives like because 
increase the likelihood that subjects will produce continuations that describe 
the compset. This is because causal connectives mark the need to explain the 
situation described by the quantified sentence (Moxey and Sanford, 1987).
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These effects were not replicated in an experiment which measured eye 
movements during reading. This can be interpreted as evidence that focus is 
not processed during reading when it is determined by pragmatics. However, 
there was also some evidence that weaknesses in the design of the experiment 
and experimental materials may have contributed towards the null results. 
Some alternative experimental designs were suggested.
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Chapter nine: 
Constraints on quantifier scope ambiguity 
Introduction
This chapter makes a further digression to consider the interpretation of 
sentences containing more than one quantifier. The introduction describes the 
formal account of these sentences, which claims that they are ambiguous 
between a set of alternative logical interpretations, and that the extent of this 
ambiguity is determined by the structure of the sentence.
The chapter goes on to consider some possible accounts of the processing of 
these sentences. In particular, there are a number of theorists (e.g. Lakoff, 1971, 
1972; Chomsky, 1976; Ioup, 1978) who claim that the preferred interpretation of 
these sentences is determined by structural information, and other researchers 
(e.g. Fodor, 1982; Kurtzman and MacDonald, 1993) who consider this as a 
processing constraint. However, other researchers (Ioup, 1978; Fodor, 1982; 
Sanford, 1990; Kurtzman and MacDonald, 1993) argue that there are more 
important semantic and pragmatic constraints on the interpretation of 
multiply-quantified sentences. According to some of these accounts, all three 
constraints (i.e. structure, semantics and pragmatics) may interact to determine 
the preferred interpretation of these sentences, and this may best characterised 
as a process of multiple constraint-satisfaction (Ioup, 1978; Kurtzman and 
MacDonald, 1993). That is, the various constraints may compete before the 
processing system finally settles on a best-fit interpretation.
The claims for semantic and pragmatic constraints are of particular interest 
because it appears that quantificational semantics m aybe at least partially 
responsible for resolving the scope ambiguity. The next chapter presents some 
off-line evidence of semantic and pragmatic constraints on scope resolution, 
and considers how it might be possible to investigate these constraints during 
normal reading.
Quantifier scope ambiguity
It is commonly observed (eg All wood, Andersson and Dahl, 1977) that 
sentences which contain two quantifiers are also two-ways ambiguous, because 
they can be assigned one of two logically distinct scope interpretations. For
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instance, a sentence like (1) is ambiguous between the interpretations 
paraphrased by (2) and (3).
(1) Every man loves some woman.
(2) Every man loves some or other woman.
(3) Every man loves a single and particular woman.
The first of these requires that every man takes scope over some woman30, and is 
represented in predicate calculus by a formula like (4), in which the relative 
scope of the universal (V) and existential (3) quantifiers is indicated by their 
order of mention. Because quantifiers on the left take scope over those on the 
right, the formula states that for every man there exists a woman such that man loves 
that woman.
(4) Vm 3w (L(m, w))
This scope relation is reversed for the other possible interpretation (as 
paraphrased by 3), so that some woman takes scope over every man, and can be 
logically represented using a formula like (5). This time the formula states that 
there exists some woman such that every man loves that woman.
(5) 3wVm(L(m, w))
Given that the possible interpretations differ only in the order of the quantifier 
prefixes, this implies that quantifier scope ambiguity has a factorial complexity. 
This means that a sentence with three quantifiers will have six possible 
quantifier scope readings, and one with five quantifiers will have 120 possible 
quantifier scope readings. If this ambiguity is experienced as part of linguistic 
performance, i.e. during language use, then the processing of multiply- 
quantified sentences will rapidly prove intractable as the number of quantifiers 
increase, or else there must be constraints on the availability of alternative 
interpretations.
This is intuitively plausible: the difficulty in comprehending multiply- 
quantified sentences does appear to follow a steep incline as more quantifiers 
are added; while many of the possible readings are unavailable. For example, 
Hobbs and Shieber (1987) assert that only five of the six possible readings are
3° Scope describes a dependence relation between functions, where one function is applied  
within the context, or scope, of another. I will som etim es talk about one NP exhibiting 
dominant scope, taking scope over another, or of an NP taking w ide or w idest scope (cf Fodor, 
1982, for a discussion of the appropriate terminologies).
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available for (6); and that only 42 of a possible 120 readings are available for (7). 
Since two of its five readings prove to be isomorphic, (6) can be understood to 
mean that representatives from the same company either each saw a set of 
samples, or saw the same set together; or that representatives from different 
companies either together or separately saw a set of samples. However, it 
requires considerable conscious effort to determine all of these readings, and it 
is extremely difficult to imagine many of the possible interpretations of (7).
(6) Every representative of a company saw most samples.
(7) Some representatives of every department in most companies saw a few 
samples of each product.
There are two views about the role of structural information in determining the 
possible readings of a multiply-quantified sentence. On one view (eg 
Jackendoff, 1972; May, 1977), structure determines the extent of the ambiguity, 
meaning that there will be as many possible readings as there are permutations 
of the relative quantifier order. These possible readings are then selected 
between by semantics and pragmatics. On the other view (Lakoff, 1971,1972; 
Chomsky, 1976), structural information is responsible for determining the 
preferred interpretation of a multiply-quantified sentence. Lakoff makes 
particularly a strong version of this claim, according to which multiply- 
quantified sentences are unambiguous, and the correct logical interpretation 
has the same order of quantifier terms as the surface sentence. However, 
Chomsky takes a less extreme position, according to which the surface order of 
quantifiers determines a preferred reading, but the other possible logical 
interpretations are available as alternative readings.
Lakoff s claims are formalised as two syntactic constraints. The first constraint 
asserts that scope ambiguity only holds over quantifiers which reside in the 
same clause, and that quantifiers from a superordinate clause will take scope 
over those in the subordinate one. This means that a sentence like (8) has an 
unambiguous reading where there is a single set of texts which every 
philosopher has read.
(8) There are some books which have been read by all philosophers.
The second constraint states that the scope relation of quantifiers within the 
same clause is also unambiguous, and determined by the surface linear order of 
the quantifiers, just as the linear order of quantifiers determines scope in
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predicate calculus formulae. This means that the leftmost quantifier takes 
scope over those on the right.
The claim that the surface order of quantifiers determines either the sole or 
preferred reading of a multiply-quantified sentence has been criticised by Ioup 
(1978). In particular, she presents counter-examples to Lakoff s claim that 
linear order disambiguates these sentences. She argues that the sentence in (9) 
is consistent with the linear order hypothesis, because the first mentioned 
quantified NP, aforeigit student, has dominant scope. This reading can be 
paraphrased as the claim that a particular student was persuaded to enrol in a 
num ber of different courses.
(9) I persuaded a foreign student to enrol in every course.
However, Ioup argues that (10) is a counter-example, which has a preferred 
reading in which the second mentioned quantified NP, every course, has 
dominant scope. This time the reading can be paraphrased as the expectation 
that some or other foreign student will enrol in each of the courses.
(10) I expected a foreign student to enrol in every course.
Given that surface linear order does not determine the preferred in reading of 
multiply-quantified sentences, Ioup proposes an alternative account according 
to which it is the relative grammatical position of quantifiers, and not their 
linear order, which determines scope. She describes a hierarchy (illustrated in 
Figure l 31) of grammatical categories which tend to take widest scope. At the 
top of this hierarchy are those constituents which contain the sentential topic. 
Ioup argues that the sentence topic is most likely to take wide scope in a 
sentence, and she notes that in English the topic NP is also the first mentioned 
one. This accounts for the considerable explanatory power of the linear order 
hypothesis. However, it is not a universal constraint, and there are other 
grammatical categories which can take wide scope. Below the sentential topic 
are those NPs which are both the deep and surface subject of the sentence, 
followed by those which are only the deep or surface subject. Then comes the 
indirect and direct objects, with the indirect object more likely to take scope 
over the direct one.
^ Ioup describes grammatical categories in terms of deep and surface structures which are 
found in standard and extended theories of generative grammar, but not in current theories 
(Chomsky, 1981).
182
topic
deep and surface subject 
deep subject/surface subject 
indirect object 
direct object
Figure 1: Ioup's hierarchy of grammatical categories 
most likely to receive highest scope
The evidence for this classification comes from intuitive judgements of scope 
preferences across a number of languages. However, only some of Ioup's 
English examples will be presented. First of all consider the sentences in (11) to 
(14).
(11) Every girl took a chemistry course.
(12) A chemistry course was taken by every girl.
(13) Every chemistry course was taken by a girl.
(14) A girl took every chemistry course.
Ioup argues that in (11) the universal quantified NP, every girl, has wide scope 
because it is both the surface and deep subject of the sentence, and that it tends 
towards wide scope in the passive version of this sentence (12) because the NP 
is still the deep subject. The tendency is less strong in (13) because every 
chemistry course is just the surface subject, and in (14) it falls under the scope of a 
girl because it is neither the surface or deep subject.
Similarly, (15) and (16) demonstrate that indirect objects take scope over direct 
objects. Although the linear order of the quantifiers is unchanged between the 
two sentences, every child takes highest scope in (15), and a child takes highest 
scope in (16).
(15) I told every child a story.
(16) I told every story to a child.
Given these observations, it seems likely that there is a more complex 
relationship between sentence structure and quantifier scope ambiguity than 
proposed by either Lakoff or Chomsky. The factorial of the number of 
quantified NPs can determine the extent of the logical ambiguity, but the 
surface linear order of quantified NPs need not correspond to the preferred
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logical interpretation. Ioup proposes that this is replaced by a more complex 
set of structural constraints.
Ioup also claims that semantic and pragmatic factors will help to determine the 
preferred reading of a sentence containing quantifier scope ambiguity, and that 
these constraints can over-ride structural preferences. In particular, the 
quantifier each will override structural constraints which favour an 
interpretation in which the NP quantified by each is under the scope of another 
NP. For example, although (17) has a structurally preferred reading in which 
the NP quantified by some takes wide scope, and means that a particular girl 
took each and every chemistry course; (18) has a different preferred reading in 
which the NP quantified by each has wide scope, and means that some or other 
girl took each and every course.
(17) Some girl took every chemistry course.
(18) Some girl took each chemistry course.
Ioup suggests that quantifiers can be hierarchically ordered by their tendency 
towards wide scope, in the same way that grammatical categories appear to 
form a hierarchy (see Figure 2). She places the universal quantifiers each and 
every at the top, then ranks the other quantifiers in terms of the size of set which 
they denote. Quantifiers which denote large amounts have a stronger tendency 
towards wide scope than those which denote small amounts. However, the 
scheme is weakened by its omissions. In particular, Ioup does not consider 
how negative quantifiers like not many and/ezu might fit into it.
each 
every 
all 
most 
many 
several 
some 
a few
Figure 2: Ioup's hierarchy of quantifiers which are 
most likely to receive highest scope
As with the hierarchy of grammatical categories, the evidence for this 
classification comes from cross-linguistic judgements. As before, I will only
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present some of Ioup's English examples in sentences (19) to (24). She claims 
that the preferred interpretation of (19) is one where there was a limited 
num ber of handouts and each of the pedestrians received one of them. 
However, as the second mentioned quantifier gets larger, the contrary scope 
reading, that each of the pedestrians received more than one handout, becomes 
dominant. This reading is strongly preferred in (23) and (24).
(19) Joan gave a few handouts to some pedestrians.
(20) Joan gave a few handouts to several pedestrians.
(21) Joan gave a few handouts to many pedestrians.
(22) Joan gave a few handouts to all pedestrians.
(23) Joan gave a few handouts to every pedestrian.
(24) Joan gave a few handouts to each pedestrian.
Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993) explore the further possibility that the 
thematic roles filled by quantified NPs will influence scope interpretation.
They argue, following Jackendoff (1972) and Grimshaw (1990) that there is a 
hierarchy of thematic roles according to which those NPs which fill an Agent 
role will tend to takes scope over those NPs which fill an Experiencer role. 
Agent roles are associated with action verbs like climb or hit, and are filled by 
the NP that performs the verb action. Experiencer roles, however, are 
associated with verbs of perception such as see or hear, and are filled by NPs 
which participate in these experiences. Finally, those NPs which are either the 
Agent or Experiencer will tend to take scope over NPs which fill the Theme 
role, where the Theme is the recipient of the action or perception.
In terms of selecting preferred interpretations, this hierarchy of thematic roles 
makes the same predictions as Ioup's thematic hierarchy when applied to 
simple active sentence. This means that the leftmost NP will take scope over 
the one on the right. However, the thematic hierarchy also predicts that the 
preferred reading of a passive sentence is one in which the rightmost quantifier 
takes scope over the one on the left. It also predicts that there will be a stronger 
bias towards these interpretations when an active rather than a perception verb 
is used. For example, in (25) the action verb climbed has an Agent as its first 
argument and a Theme as its second; while the structurally equivalent (26) 
contains a perception verb (saw) which has an Experiencer as its first argument, 
and a Theme as the second. The thematic hierarchy predicts that (25) will be 
more biased to a wide scope universal reading than (26), because Agents show 
a stronger tendency to dominant scope than do Experiencers.
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(25) Every kid climbed a tree.
(26) Eveiy kid saw a tree.
In terms of the processing of scope-ambiguous sentences, both Ioup, and 
Kurtzman and MacDonald, propose that there is an interaction between 
structural constraints, the semantics (e.g. the semantic properties of quantifiers 
and verbs) will determine the preferred scope interpretation, although Ioup 
does not specify a mechanism for this interaction. Kurtzman and MacDonald 
suggest that the processing of multiply-quantified sentences can be explained 
by the same constraint-satisfaction model which MacDonald and her colleagues 
(eg MacDonald, 1994; MacDonald, Pearlmutter and Seidenberg, 1994) have 
applied to the processing of garden path sentences. This requires that 
preferences are encoded at the lexical level, and these compete and combine 
during syntactic processing, to eventually settle on a stable interpretation. Such 
a scheme would propose that quantifiers are encoded in terms of their 
preference for dominant scope, and the argument structure of verbs will also 
favour particular scope interpretations. The differential strength of these 
constraints will determine the outcome.
An alternative account of the relationship between syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics is proposed by Fodor (1982). Unlike the other theories, this is 
deliberately pitched as a processing account, and depends on some 
assumptions which are very similar to claims made in Chapter 1 about the 
mental representation of language. The first of these assumptions is that 
language comprehension consists of the construction of mental model 
analogues of the described situation. These are similar in form to the 'mental 
models' proposed by Johnson-Laird (1983), and specify the number of actors 
and actions in a situation. It was argued in Chapter 1 that mental 
representations of this type are performance correlates of formal semantic 
models.
The manner in which Fodor's version of these models represent mixed 
existential and universal quantification is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 
3 illustrates the wide scope existential, or 3 V reading of (27), where the 
universally quantified NP is represented by an arbitrary number of tokens, 
each of which is connected by a line to a single representation of the 
existentially quantified NP. This line represents the sentence predicate loves. In 
contrast, Figure 4 illustrates a wide scope universal interpretation (or V3 
reading), where each of the men love a separately specified woman.
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(27) Every man loves some woman.
M
M
M
M
loves
Figure 3: A model representation of a wide scope 
existential interpretation of Every man loves some woman.
M ----------------------W
M ----------------------W
M --------------------- W
M --------------------- W
loves
Figure 4: A model representation of a wide scope 
universal interpretation of Every man loves some woman.
Fodor assumes that syntax and semantics specify the manner in which these 
models are constructed. Quantifier semantics correspond to mental procedures 
which determine the form of representation for NP and predicate information, 
while syntax specifies the order and context in which these procedures are 
applied. For example, active and passive sentences require that NPs are 
introduced into models in a different order. So, if (27) was written in the 
passive voice, then it would be represented by a mirror image of Figures 3 or 4, 
with the tokens for some women on the left in the model. This is very similar to 
Montagovian claims about the isomorphism of syntax and semantics, which 
Johnson-Laird paraphrased as semantic ingredients mixed to a syntactic recipe.
According to Fodor, quantifiers divide into those which prompt a single 
representation of NP and predicate information, and others which induce 
multiple representations. It is the latter set which have the marked function, 
and only these which can be said to exhibit scope. By this account, scope is not 
a dependency between quantifiers, but the propensity of a quantifier to induce 
multiple representations. Existential quantifiers do not exhibit scope simply
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because they do not induce multiple representations; and other quantifiers can 
be distinguished by the range of their scope. Fodor suggests that this might 
explain why some quantifiers, like each and every, exert a stronger tendency 
towards wide scope than others (Ioup, 1978).
A quantifier like all will take scope over a sentence like (28) in one of three 
ways.
(28) All the children lifted a rock.
Either scope will be restricted to the NP it quantifies, with the interpretation 
that all of the children collectively lifted a specific rock; or that it will range 
across the first NP and the verb to mean that all of the children individually 
lifted the same rock; or finally, it will range across the entire sentence, and 
mean that all of the children lifted a different rock. Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the 
models which correspond to these three alternative readings.
In the first of these models (Figure 5), the lines converge prior to the verb, 
which indicates that scope is restricted to the quantified NP. In the second 
model (Figure 6), they converge after the verb, and there is no convergence in 
the final model because the quantifier has scope over the entire sentence.
C
C
C
lifted
Figure 5: A mental representation for 
all of the children collectively lifted the same rock.
lifted
Figure 6: A mental representation for 
all of the children lifted the same rock individually.
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C -------------    R
C -------------— -------   R
C --------------    R
lifted
Figure 7: A mental representation for 
all of the children lifted a different rock.
Fodor argues that universal quantifiers each, every and all differ in the extent to 
which they take scope over other sentence components, and it seems likely that 
the same is true of the other quantifiers in Ioup's semantic hierarchy. Each 
shows the strongest tendency towards a wide scope interpretation, which 
Fodor accounts for as the requirement that at least one constituent other than 
the quantified NP is multiply instantiated. So in terms of the models illustrated 
in Figures 5 to 7, a sentence like (29) must be interpreted as Figure 6, with a 
multiple instantiation of both the quantified NP and verb, if not Figure 7, where 
all of the constituents are multiply instantiated. This requirement is less 
stringent following quantification by every, and does not apply to all.
(29) Each child lifted a rock.
The semantic constraints exerted by multiple-inducing quantifiers interact with 
syntactic constraints on the order in which sentential constituents are entered 
into a mental model; which may also account for the preferred readings of 
multiply-quantified sentences. Fodor describes how a sentence like (30) is 
incrementally interpreted to produce a model representation.
(30) A child saw every squirrel.
The unmarked existential quantifier a is first of all interpreted as an instruction 
to represent a single child performing a single act of seeing. But this 
interpretation must be revised on encountering the multiple-inducing 
quantifier every. The least costly revision is one which produces multiple acts 
of seeing a squirrel, which corresponding to the preferred 3 V reading of the 
sentence, as illustrated in Figure 8. This requires back-tracking to allow the 
universal quantifier to take scope over and induce multiple representations of
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the verb. The other possible interpretation, the V3 reading, is more costly 
because it requires further back-tracking to produce multiple representations of 
both the verb and the first NP.
Fodor's account of the preferred V3 reading for a sentence like (31) is less 
satisfactory however.
(31) Every child saw a squirrel.
She argues that every causes the multiple representation of child and saw, and 
also a squirrel, because the indefinite article is unmarked. This produces a 
representation which is consistent with the V3 reading of the sentence. 
However, Fodor also argues that it is difficult to reach the 3 V reading because 
the representational system uses a mental shorthand when producing multiple 
representations. Instead of instantiating an arbitrary number of NPs which are 
individually connected to other NPs, it represents one linked pair, with the 
mental footnote than the others should be represented in the same way. This 
shorthand representation, she argues, is more difficult to undo than the fully- 
instantiated model.
This is an ad hoc addition to her theory, and quite unnecessary. The difficulty 
in reaching the 3 V reading is better explained by the marked status of multiple- 
inducing quantifiers. It may simply be more costly to converge the multiple 
paths after then verb, than to multiple instantiate the second NP. Moreover, 
just how costly it is will depend on the type of quantifier used. For instance, 
the quantifier each will be less likely to allow convergence than all
There is also evidence that quantifier semantics will interact with pragmatic 
constraints. For instance, (32) has an 3V reading as its preferred interpretation,
saw
Figure 8: A mental representation of the 3V 
reading of a child saw a squirrel.
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despite the multiple-inducing property of all. The V3 reading is dispreferred 
because it is implausible that a soldier could surround a fort on his own.
(32) All soldiers surrounded a fort.
The substitution of every for all produces a synonymous sentence (see 33), and 
takes the plausible 3 V reading. However, the substitution of each into the 
sentence is unacceptable (see 34), because the strong multiple-inducing 
function of this quantifier over-rides pragmatic constraints to produce the 
implausible V3 reading.
(33) Every soldier surrounded a fort.
(34) Each soldier surrounded a fort.
Sanford and Moxey (1995) consider some other instances where pragmatics can 
override semantic constraints. The preferred interpretation of (35) is one where 
each student is supervised by a particular tutor, although they may share their 
tutor with other students. In contrast, the identically structured (36) is 
understood to mean that each room has its own bath, and none are shared. In 
fact, it would cause consternation for a guest to find that it actually meant that 
every room on the floor shared a bath at the end of the corridor.
(35) Each student has a tutor.
(36) Each room has a bath.
The evidence of strong pragmatic constraints has consequences for theories 
which depend on off-line measures or intuitions about quantifier use. It is not 
clear for instance, where the line is drawn between semantic and pragmatic 
contributions to scope resolution in the sentence frame used by Ioup to justify 
her hierarchy of semantic constraints. For instance, the preferred interpretation 
of (37), where all takes wide scope, may depend on the greater plausibility of 
this interpretation compared to one where every pedestrian receives a single 
handout, which in total number a few. A proper study of semantic constraints 
on scope resolution must consider the possible contribution of pragmatics, and 
preferably tease these apart on-line.
(37) Joan gave a few handouts to all pedestrians.
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Generalised quantifier theory
Most of the above observations of semantic constraints on scope resolution also 
appear in some recent formal semantic treatments of the interpretation of 
sentences with plural, co-ordinated or quantified NPs. The most important of 
these is Link's theory of the logic of plurals and mass terms (Link, 1983, 1987; 
also Lonning, 1987). Link argues that plural NPs have two possible 
representational states: one where they denote a collection of individual 
elements, and another where the NP is treated as an unindividuated whole. 
This is the same claim as made in Chapter 2, where it was observed that mass 
terms like water or sand, and group terms like committee or army are restricted to 
the latter type of representation, and argued that this is also the default 
representation for count nouns.
Link describes a sum operation which takes individual elements and conjoins 
them to produce an unindividuated structure. This procedure can be called 
during co-ordination, or is marked as a property of some predicates. In (38), 
for example, the use of and licenses a treatment of John aiid Mary as a single 
entity, which is supported by the predicate met in Munich.
(38) John and Mary met in Munich.
This can only be interpreted as predication over the conjoined pair, and not as a 
predicate which applies to the two individuals. Otherwise it would be possible 
to say that John met in Munich and Mary met in Munich, which is clearly 
unacceptable. Link describes this as collective predication, and there are a 
number of verbs which exhibit this property, including surrounded, gathered in, 
dispersed, evacuated and scattered. Collective verbs such as these cannot be used 
in sentences where the Agent NP is quantified by quantifiers like each. It has 
already been shown (in 34) that such a combination of each and surrounded 
appears anomalous.
Other predicates are ambiguous between collective and distributed readings. 
For instance, in (39) the predicate lifted a stone can either apply separately or 
conjointly to John and Harry. This ambiguity can be resolved by using a 
quantifier to mark one of the two readings (40).
(39) John and Harry lifted a stone.
(40) John and Harry each lifted a stone.
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Lonning (1987) argues that quantifiers can also be categorised into those which 
do and do not permit collective readings. Some, including every and each allow 
only the distributive readings. Others like two or an odd number of are usually 
understood collectively. However, most quantifiers tend to take a collective 
reading, but can be understood distributively when this is warranted. This 
latter group includes many, most,feiu, at least three and at most four. Link 
suggests that we start out with an analysis in terms of sums, then should we 
happen to meet a distributive predicate we move down to level of individuated 
predication.
The generalised quantifier approach has similarities with the representational 
account proposed in Chapter 2. In both cases, it is claimed that the default 
mental representation of plural or quantified count nouns is an unindividuated 
mass, but that they can be represented as a set of individual members when 
necessary. Given that distributive quantifiers like each are used to mark this 
more individuated representation, now Link suggests that VP predicates are 
similarly constraining.
Given this similarity, it may also be possible to extend the representational 
account outlined in Chapter 2 to include co-ordination structures, which Link 
identifies as a device for mapping individuals into a collective representation. 
This appears to be a complement of the use of quantifiers to produce more fine­
grained representations. According to this type of account, a quantifier like a 
few is used to map an NP into two subsets, which fill distinct roles in the 
underlying discourse, and place one of these subsets in focus. In (41), this 
means that the set of MPs is divided into those who attended the meeting, and 
some others who were absent. However, only the refset partition, those MPs 
who attended the meeting, or the superset, is available to pronominal reference.
(41) A  few  MPs attended a meeting.
A co-ordination structure like and, in contrast, maps individuals into a single 
discourse role, and licenses singular pronominal reference which will take the 
perspective of one of the individuals, and plural pronominal reference which 
takes the perspective of the conjoined pair. For example, continuations to (42) 
can refer to either Joan, James, or the conjoint pair.
(42) Joan and James went for a walk.
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Link suggests that the form of predication will also determine the likelihood a 
co-ordinated interpretation: those like gathered force the conjoint reading, while 
other predicates like lifted a stone are ambiguous between the co-ordinated and 
uncoordinated interpretations. There is other evidence that the form of co­
ordination plays a role. Sanford and Lockhart (1990; see also Sanford and 
Moxey, 1991) found that and was a better determinant of co-ordination than 
with. They also found that the co-ordinated individuals must have the same 
level of description. When one character was introduced by role description, 
and the other a named character, there was a lower tendency for plural 
reference than when both characters were introduced by either role description 
or name.
Summary
This section has concentrated on some theoretical accounts of quantifier scope 
ambiguity, and some attempts to produce processing accounts that are based 
on these observations. According to traditional formal accounts, the ambiguity 
arises from the possible linear order of the quantified terms when the sentence 
is translated into logical form.
Some theorists (e.g. Lakoff, 1971,1972; Chomsky, 1976) have argued that 
multiply-quantified sentences are either disambiguated in favour of a 
particular logical interpretation, or have a dominant or preferred logical 
interpretation. In both cases the preferred logical interpretation has the same 
order of quantifiers as the surface form of the sentence. However, Ioup (1978) 
provides some counter-examples to these accounts, and proposes that they are 
replaced with a more complex structural constraint, according to which there is 
a hierarchy of grammatical categories which tend towards widest scope. This 
means that NPs in those categories at the top of the hierarchy will take scope 
over NPs that are in categories that are lower in the hierarchy.
Ioup also argues that quantifiers and pragmatics are important determinants of 
the preferred interpretation of a multiply-quantified sentence. Although she 
does not consider the pragmatic constraints, she does propose a hierarchy of 
quantifiers which tend to take wide scope. The quantifiers each and every are at 
the top of this hierarchy. Other researchers (e.g. Fodor, 1982; Link, 1987; 
Lonning, 1987) also argue that NPs quantified by each and every tend to take 
widest scope, and define this tendency in terms of either semantic properties 
(i.e. these quantifiers are distributive) or processing principles (Fodor, 1982). 
These researchers also argue that properties associated with particular verbs 
will determine the preferred interpretation of a sentence. Link and Lonning
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argue that some verbs are semantically marked as 'collective', which means 
that they can only be used to predicate a plural (or quantified) NP as a whole, 
and cannot be interpreted as a predicate of the individual members of that NP. 
According to this account, when a collective verb appears in an active doubly- 
quantified sentence, the preferred interpretation is one in which the subject NP 
takes scope over the object NP. Fodor makes the same predictions for 
sentences containing these verbs, but argues that the preferences arise from the 
plausibility of the alternative interpretations.
Of these accounts, only Fodor's is intended as a processing theory, and this has 
some important differences from the formal accounts. Fodor argues that 
doubly-quantified sentences are not processed in terms of alternative logical 
interpretations, but in terms of more fine-grained representations of the 
relationships between participants in the described situation. These 
representations are similar in similar in form to the Mental Models described 
by Johnson-Laird. Fodor argues that, in terms of processing, scope describes 
the propensity of a quantifier to produce a multiple instantiation of sentence 
constituents. For instance, the quantifier each requires that there is a multiple- 
instantiation of the NP it quantifies and at least one other sentence constituent. 
These quantificational constraints will interact with other factors, including 
plausibility, and structural constraints. According to Fodor, sentence structure 
is important to the extent that it determines the entry of entities into the mental 
representation.
In summary, the formal literature has identified structural and semantic 
determinants of the interpretation of scope-ambiguous sentences, and allow for 
the influence of pragmatics. Moreover, these have all been proposed as 
processing constraints, and Fodor (1982) has described a processing account in 
which each of these constraints have an important role. Others (e.g. Kurtzman 
and MacDonald, 1993) propose a less specific model in which the preferred 
interpretation of a multiply-quantified sentence is reached by a processing of 
multiple constraint satisfaction. That is, the various constraints compete until 
the processing system settles on a final interpretation. However, these accounts 
are based on a limited amount of experimental investigation. The following 
section describes those experiments which have been conducted, while the next 
chapter reports an experiment on the interaction of context and quantifier 
semantics to determine the final interpretation of a doubly-quantified sentence.
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Experiments on quantifier scope ambiguity 
There are few empirical studies of the interpretation of scope ambiguous 
sentences, but what studies there are have mostly addressed the role of 
structural information. One of the earliest of these was conducted by Johnson- 
Laird (1969), and is often cited as evidence for that the linear order of 
quantifiers in the surface form of the sentence will determine the preferred 
logical interpretation.
Johnson-Laird's subjects read a number of doubly-quantified sentences which 
were logically quantified by some, every or no32, and included predicate 
negation in some conditions; and written in either the active or passive voice. 
Subjects had then to indicate which of a series of diagrams were consistent with 
the meaning of these sentences. Two example sentences are given in (43) to 
(45). The sentence in (43) illustrates one of the active sentence conditions where 
the first NP was quantified by every, and the second NP is quantified by some.
In other conditions the first NP was quantified by some and the second 
quantified by every, or both NPs were quantified by either every or some.
(43) Every man knows some woman.
Finally, some conditions included negation. In these conditions, the quantifier 
any was paired with some and the VP was negated (e.g. 44). These quantifiers 
appeared in both possible orders.
(43) Any man does not know some woman.
Subjects also read passive versions of these sentences (e.g. 45) which again 
varied the order of quantifiers.
(45) Some woman is known by every man.
Johnson-Laird's main finding was that subjects selected those diagrams which 
matched the preferred reading, as predicted by the linear order hypothesis, and 
that active and passive sentences received different interpretations. At the 
same time, a low frequency selection of the possible but dispreferred reading 
was evidence against that the linear order of quantifiers did not fully 
disambiguate the sentences, but that it was possible to reach the dispreferred 
reading. However, the interpretation of these findings as support for the linear
32 The quantifier any was also used lo express NP negation, ie A n y  woman is not known by some 
man.
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order hypothesis is tempered by Ioup's observation that linear order in English 
is confounded by a tendency of the subject NP to express the sentence topic. 
Also, since Johnson-Laird only considered the interpretation of logical 
quantifiers, it is not clear whether these findings transfer to non-logical or 
numerical quantification.
Gil (1982) used the same methodology to show that group readings are 
available for multiple numerically quantified sentences. His subjects read a 
number of sentences like (46), which is repeated below, then indicated which of 
a set of diagrams corresponded to the meaning of the sentence. He found that 
subjects selected those diagrams which represented both the two scope 
differentiated interpretations, and the two group ones.
(46) Two examiners marked six scripts.
While both of these studies concur with some of the theoretical claims made in 
the previous section, the off-line nature of the task precludes any strong 
conclusions about the processing of these sentences. For instance, Johnson- 
Laird observes that subjects found the task difficult (Johnson-Laird, 1969, pp 
10), while the time which his subjects took to classify a sentence indicates that 
considerable conscious effort was required (the mean classification time was 
52.4 seconds). Normal sentence comprehension takes place within a much 
shorter interval, and without the same allocation of processing resources; 
which means that it is possible that the observed effects will not occur on-line. 
Similarly, the group readings observed by Gil may be reached via knowledge 
about plausible scenarios for the sentence, and calculated when mapping the 
sentences onto diagrams, and not during sentence processing.
Both Gillen (1992), and Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993) used measures of 
sentence reading time, or the time taken to judge the acceptability of a sentence, 
to investigate the on-line processing of doubly-quantified sentences. Gillen 
presented subjects with sentences like (47) and (48), where the direct and 
indirect objects were quantified and produced a scope ambiguity between a 
quantified and indefinite NP. The quantifier was one of some, several, many, 
most, all, every or each. This sentence was then followed by a continuation 
sentence (49) which made either singular to plural reference to the indefinite 
NP. Subjects read these materials sentence by sentence, and at their own pace.
(47) Susan gave a recipe to QUANTIFIER friend(s).
(48) Susan gave QUANTIFIER friends a recipe.
(49) The [recipe was /  recipes were] for Hungarian goulash.
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Gillen found an overall increase in reading time for the quantified sentence 
when the quantifier was in the indirect object position (48), and a difference 
between the quantifier types which she attributed to a faster reading time 
following quantification by all. She also found a faster reading time for 
continuation sentence which made singular reference to the indefinite NP. 
However, these results have limited significance. The finding that quantifier 
first sentences are read quicker than quantifier second ones was predicted by 
Fodor. With the latter case the processor must backtrack to multiply-instantiate 
the indefinite NP. Yet this is contradicted by the finding of easier singular 
reference to the indefinite NP. That suggests that it is not multiply-instantiated.
There is an alternative explanation for the faster singular reference. An 
inspection of Gillen's materials shows that most of them are ambiguous 
between type and token readings. For example, (47) can either mean that Susan 
gave a separate recipe to each of her friends, or gave each of them a copy of the 
same recipe. This latter interpretation is consistent with a multiple 
instantiation of the indefinite NP but also with singular reference. Another 
example of this confound is given in (50) and (51). In (50), James is probably 
handing out a set of tickets which are almost identical to each other and for the 
same event. It is then perfectly felicitous to refer to these tickets by definite NP 
(eg (51).
(50) James handed a ticket to some shoppers.
(51) The ticket was for a charity.
It is even more likely that differences in the reading time for singular and plural 
reference was due to the fact that there are more characters in the plural 
reference sentence. Gillen did not carry out any transforms (e.g. a 
m s/character transform) to control for the difference in sentence length. This 
may also account for the differences in reading time between the quantified 
sentences.
Kurtzman and MacDonald used similar materials to Gillen, but asked their 
subjects to indicate whether the referential sentence was a reasonable discourse 
continuation for the quantified sentence. This followed the same rationale as 
the Gillen study: plural definite NP reference is felicitous when the antecedent 
quantified NP is within the scope of a universal quantifier. Kurtzman and 
MacDonald used quantified sentences which were disambiguated by the
198
inclusion of the post-determiners same and different (but see Carlson, 1987, for a 
treatment of these operators) as a baseline.
Kurtzman and MacDonald conducted three experiments: one to investigate the 
processing of simple active multiply-quantified sentence, another to investigate 
the corresponding passives, and a final study where the scope ambiguity 
resided within a prepositional phrase. All three studies used the universal 
quantifier every and the indefinite article a. The first two experiments also 
manipulated the type of verb used: either action verbs like climbed or 
perception verbs like seen.
In the first of these studies subjects read sentences like (52) and (55), followed 
by a sentence which made either singular or plural reference to the indefinite 
NP. Kurtzman and MacDonald found a general preference for the 
interpretation where the leftmost quantifier has wide-scope. This meant that 
(53) and (56) were the favoured continuations. However, this result was 
modulated by stronger evidence of this preference when a was the leftmost 
quantifier; and the dispreferred interpretation was more available for 
perception verbs. Kurtzman and MacDonald suggest that the last of these 
effects was due to a tendency for agents rather than experiencers to take scope 
over themes. They argue that this accords with Ioup's hierarchy of 
grammatical constituents.
(52) Every kid climbed [a | the same | a different] tree.
(53) The trees were full of apples.
(54) The tree was full of apples.
(55) [A | The same | A different] kid climbed every tree.
(56) The kid was full of energy.
(57) The kids were full of energy.
These results support suggest that the surface linear order of quantifiers can 
determine the preferred interpretation of a doubly-quantified sentence, but do 
not disambiguate the sentence since the low frequency acceptability of the 
dispreferred reading suggests that it was still available. However, the second 
experiment, which examined passive versions of the sentences, did not support 
these findings. This time there was no evidence of any preferred reading, and 
the two continuation sentences were judged equally acceptable. Moreover, 
because the frequency of acceptable judgements was not much lower than that
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for the active sentences, the results cannot simply reflect a greater difficulty in 
interpreting the passive form.
The third experiment examined sentences like (58) and (61), followed by 
sentences which made singular or plural reference to the indefinite NP. The 
control conditions were equivalent sentences which used each and the in place 
of every and a. This took advantage of strong lexical semantic preferences for a 
wide scope interpretation of these operators (see next section for a discussion of 
each).
(58) George has [every | each] photograph of [an | the] admiral.
(59) The admirals were quite famous.
(60) The admiral was quite famous.
(61) George has [a | the] photograph of [every | each] admiral.
(62) The photographs were quite famous.
(63) The photograph was quite famous.
As with the passive manipulation, the results failed to support the claim that 
the surface linear order of quantifiers determines the preferred reading, but 
instead suggested a clear preference for the rightmost NP to take wide scope. 
This meant that (60) was the preferred continuation of (58) and (63) the 
preferred continuation of (61), whatever the quantifier type or order. Even the 
strong lexical preferences of each and the were swamped by this preference.
Kurtzman and MacDonald conclude that there are two structural principles at 
work. One of these favours leftmost wide scope. This might be a linear order 
constraint, or due to the relative topicality of constituents. The other principle 
favours rightmost wide scope and may be explained by a thematic hierarchy. 
The first of these principles dominates when processing simple actives, but it is 
the latter which is dominant during the processing of passives. However, 
Kurtzman and MacDonald suggest that the two principles are balanced during 
the processing of passives, which explains the absence of any preferred 
reading. There may also be lexical semantic constraints exerted by quantifiers 
and verbs - and the form which these might take is considered in the next 
section.
The experimental studies, it seems, are either inconclusive about the 
processing of doubly quantified sentences, or suggest that there are several 
competing principles at work. The Gillen results, however, are flawed by a
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type/token ambiguities in the quantified sentences, and while the Kurtzman 
and MacDonald materials were less prone to this flaw, they are limited in their 
manipulation of quantification types. Finally, neither Gillen, nor Kurtzman 
and MacDonald control for the pragmatic influences noted by Fodor (1982) and 
formal semanticists like Link (1983, 1987) and Lonning (1987).
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Chapter ten: 
Experiment Eight: 
Semantic and pragmatic constraints on 
the interpretation of quantifier scope ambiguity. 
Introduction
The most obvious conclusion to the previous chapter is that very little is known 
about the processing of quantifier scope ambiguities. There is a hotchpotch of 
theories and principles, some of which are easily falsifiable, and others which 
make testable predictions. Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993), for instance, find 
some evidence of competing syntactic and semantic principles: where scope 
dominance depends on the linear order of quantifiers, and also on the thematic 
roles filled by the quantified NPs. This is particularly interesting because it is 
consistent with recent theories of parsing which also point to an interaction 
between structural processing principles and argument structure (eg Britt,
1994).
There is also the suggestion that some quantifiers are marked for scope 
dominance (Ioup, 1978; Fodor, 1982). This seems particularly true of the 
quantifier each', while Ioup describes a hierarchy of quantifiers which tend to 
take a dominant scope reading. However, at least one on-line study of the 
processing of quantified sentences (Gillen, 1992) has unsuccessfully 
manipulated this variable. This failure may indicate that quantifier semantics 
do not impact on scope resolution during on-line processing, or it might reflect 
flaws in Gillen's experimental design. For instance, I noted that many of the 
Gillen materials were ambiguous between type and token readings of one of 
the quantified NPs, which will have reduced the likelihood of observing any 
experimental effects.
The following experiment will test Ioup's hierarchy of quantifier semantics, but 
use an off-line sentence-continuation task. This will provide a more sound 
footing for subsequent on-line studies. If the off-line task does verify Ioup's 
hierarchy, then it leads to the question of whether the same effects can be 
observed in a time-limited task, and further questions about the loci of 
quantifier function. It also avoids the risk of failing to find any effects in a 
replication of the Gillen study, but still not knowing what happens off-line.
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The present study also includes a pragmatic manipulation since there is 
evidence of pragmatic constraints on scope resolution, and a risk that these 
have contaminated Ioup's judgements on quantifier function. I observed that 
one of the possible scope interpretations was more plausible that the other in 
some of Ioup's quantificational conditions; and this may have overridden 
quantifier preferences (eg Sanford and Moxey, in press). The confound can be 
avoided by controlling for plausibility, or by manipulating pragmatics. The 
present study used a bland experimental material (1) to avoid problems with 
plausibility, and embedded these sentences in contexts which favoured one of 
the two scope interpretations.
(1) QUANTIFIER reporter(s) interviewed a survivor.
Method
The experiment used two off-line tasks: a sentence-continuation task, and a 
second task where subjects had to produce a line-drawing of the relationship 
between the two quantified NPs. Although the second of these tasks is more 
difficult, it is easier to categorise the scope interpretation from a drawing than a 
sentence-continuation.
Design
Two between subjects variables were manipulated. The experimental passages 
contained a sentence (1) in which the subject NP was quantified by one of six 
quantifiers: each, every, all, most, many, several or some. This sentence was 
embedded into one of two contexts, one which favoured a wide-scope 
interpretation of the quantified NP, and another which favoured a wide-scope 
interpretation of the indefinite NP. Subjects saw only one item in one of the 
quantification and pragmatic conditions.
Only a single type of passage was used, which means that it was not possible to 
generalise findings across texts. However, the results provided a first 
approximation about the use of context and quantification in the interpretation 
of scope ambiguity, and will motivate further experiments to test whether it is 
possible to generalise from these findings.
Subjects
The study used 312 unpaid subjects who were students at the University of 
Glasgow.
203
Materials
One quantified sentence (1) was used for the experiment, and embedded in a 
passage which favoured one of the scope interpretations. Passage (2) was 
intended to favour an interpretation where a num ber of reporters interviewed 
the same survivor. This corresponds to a collective, or wide-scope indefinite 
NP interpretation.
(2) The CNN news-team were the last on the scene of the aircrash, and the 
authorities had already organised a press conference. The CNN 
reporters joined the other journalists, and positioned their cameras in 
front of the podium. QUANTIFIER reporter(s) interviewed a 
survivor.
The other passage (3) favours an interpretation of the quantified sentence 
where a number of reporters separately interviewed their own survivor. This 
is a distributed, or wide scope quantified NP reading.
(3) The CNN news-team were the first on the scene of the aircrash, and 
determined to find the best eye-witness before any other news-teams 
arrived. The CNN reporters split up and worked their way through 
the wreckage. QUANTIFIER reporter(s) interviewed a survivor.
The form of quantification was manipulated within each of these pragmatic 
conditions by substituting one of each, every, all, many, some or a few  for 
QUANTIFIER.
Procedure
Subjects were given two sheets of paper and instructed to complete the task 
described on the first page before turning to the second. They were given the 
sentence-continuation task first, and instructed to "Please read the short 
passage given below, then add one or two sentences to continue the story." 
They then read one of the experimental passages with the scope-ambiguous 
sentence in one of its quantifier conditions.
On a second page subjects were asked to draw the relationship described in the 
doubly-quantified sentence. They were instructed to "Please read again the 
passage on the previous page, and draw the diagram that you fell best 
represents the relationship between the participants of the final printed 
sentence (not your own final sentence)." Three diagrams of numerically- 
quantified sentences were provided as examples. The first (Figure 1) described
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a collective mapping and the second (Figure 2) a distributed mapping. The 
third (Figure 3) diagram described a mixed mapping.
Two pensioners got on a bus.
P
P
B
Figure 1: Example of a collectivelv-mapped diagram.
Four angler caught a fish.
A --------------------------  F
A --------------------------  F
A ----------------------------F
A --------------------------  p
Figure 2: Example of a distributed-mapped diagram.
Three students passed 
two exams.
Figure 3: Example of a mixed-mapped diagram.
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Results
The results for both the Diagram and Sentence-continuation task were 
categorised in terms of the mapping they described, either a collective 
m apping with a single instantiation of the indefinite NP, a distributed 
representation with multiple instantiations of the definite NP with a one-to-one 
m apping between reporters and survivors, or a mixed representation of a more 
complex situation.
Diagram Results
For a diagram to be classed as collective there had to be a single instantiation of 
the indefinite NP and a multiple instantiation of the quantified NP, with each 
of the quantified NP tokens attached to the indefinite NP token. This also 
included diagrams with additional and unattached quantified or indefinite NP 
tokens.
Distributed diagrams had to have a multiple instantiation of both NPs, and a 
one-to-one relationship between them. Diagrams of this form, but with 
additional unattached tokens were also classed as distributed. The mixed 
category comprised those diagrams that were neither collective or distributed, 
but described some complex intermediate position. A fourth category of 
unclassed diagrams was also added. This covered those diagrams where 
subjects had not understood (or followed) the instructions and produced 
diagrams which could not be classed as either collective, distributed or mixed. 
The mean results for these categories across context and quantifier conditions is 
summarised in Table 1.
This categorised data was analysed using an analysis of variance by chi-square 
(Winer, 1991). The collective and distributed categories were analysed 
separately because of their dependence; but the results for the mixed category 
could not be analysed as the expected cell frequency fell below the minimum of 
5.
The analysis of collectively-classed diagrams identified significant main effects 
of context type (x2(l) =6.44, p<0.05), with a greater incidence of collective 
diagrams in the collective contextual condition, and of quantifier type 
(y2(5) =60.95, p<0.001), but no evidence of an interaction.
A residual analysis (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) was used to determine whether 
the frequency of collectively-classed diagrams differed from chance for each of 
the quantifiers. This was significantly less collective diagrams for the
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quantifiers each (Residual = -3.91, p < 0.05) and every (Residual = -3.37, p < 0.05), 
and significantly more collective diagrams for the quantifiers some (Residual = 
3.49, p < 0.05) and a few (Residual = 3.49, p < 0.05). However, the frequency of 
collectively-classed diagrams did not differ from chance for either all (Residual 
= -1.20, p > 0.05) or many (Residual = 1.50, p > 0.05).
Context Quantifier Collective Distributed Mixed Other
Collective Each 8 9 9 0
Every 9 8 8 1
All 17 3 4 1
Many 25 0 0 1
Some 25 0 1 0
A few 25 0 0 1
Distributed Each 1 16 9 0
Every 3 13 9 1
All 7 10 4 433
Many 14 8 3 0
Some 25 0 0 1
A few 25 1 0 0
Table 1: Scope categories for diagrams.
The parallel analysis of diagrams in the distributed category produced a 
significant main effect of context type (x2(l) =11.53, p<0.001), with more 
distributed diagrams in the distributed context condition, and a significant 
main effect of quantifier type (x2(5) =46.71, p<0.001). Again there was no 
evidence of an interaction. An analysis of residuals (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) 
was used to determine if the frequency of distributively-classed diagrams 
differed from chance. There were significantly more distributive diagrams for 
the quantifiers each (Residual = 4.06, p < 0.05) and every (Residual = 2.87, p < 
0.05), but significantly less distributive diagrams for the quantifiers some 
(Residual = -3.37, p < 0.05) and a few  (Residual = 3.07, p < 0.05). The frequency 
of distributive diagrams did not differ from chance for the quantifier all 
(Residual = 0.50, p > 0.05) or many (0.99, p > 0.05).
Continuation Results
The continuation results were categorised by the number of survivors referred 
to by subjects. A collectively mapped interpretation requires that there is a 
single representation of the second NP. This will be reflected in continuations 
that refer to "he", "she", "the only survivor", or "the survivor". Continuations
33 All noled Ihe possible am biguily.
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that did so were classed as singular references. The following text fragments (4 
to 6) are examples of singular reference continuations.
(4) The survivor said that the crash was one of the most harrowing 
experiences he had had to deal with. The shock had not yet sunk in 
that his wife was dead.
(5) They were interested as to what he could remember about the time 
just before the crash.
(6) The man was too shocked to give more information.
In contrast a distributed representation requires that more than one survivor 
was interviewed, and continuations which referred to a plural number of 
survivors were categorised as multiple survivor references. Continuations that 
described the reporters as returning to compile separate interview data were 
included as multiple references. Again, (7) and (8) are examples of such 
continuations.
(7) Each of the survivors said it as horrendous . . .
(8) The CNN reporter was last to his feet to ask one of the female 
survivors the question that was on everyone's lips.
Continuations that referred to survivors other than those interviewed, or 
described the actions of the reporters without either directly or indirectly 
describing the number of survivors were not categorised. The categorised 
continuations are summarised in Table 2.
Context Quantifier Single
Survivor
M ultiple
Survivor
Unclassed
Collective Each 4 19 3
Every 8 14 4
All 16 6 5
Many 24 2 0
Some 20 0 6
A few 21 0 5
Distributed Each 2 23 1
Every 3 19 4
All 11 10 5
Many 11 12 3
Some 17 0 9
A few 21 1 4
Table 2: Scope categories for continuations.
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These category results were analysed using a Chi-Square ANOVA. The 
a nalysis of single survivor references produced significant main effects for 
context (x2(l)=4.96, p<0.05), and quantifier x2(5)=41.14, p<0.001). There was no 
evidence of an interaction. An analysis of residuals (Seigel and Castellan, 1988) 
w as used to determine if the frequency of single survivors continuations 
differed significantly from chance for each of the quantifiers. There were 
significantly fewer of these continuations for the quantifier each (Residual = 
-3.96, p < 0.05), and every (Residual = -2.98, p < 0.05), but there were 
significantly more of these continuations for the quantifiers some (Residual = 
2.08, p < 0.05) or a few (Residual = 3.06, p < 0.05). However, the frequency of 
single-survivor continuations did not differ from chance for the quantifiers all 
(Residual = -0.13, p < 0.05) or many (Residual = -0.06, p > 0.05).
An analysis of the multiple survivors category also produced main effects for 
context (x 2(1)=5.53, p<0.05) and quantifier (x2(4)=81.13, p<0.001), and no 
interaction effect. An analysis of residuals (Seigel and Castellan, 1988) was 
again used to determine if the frequency of multiple survivors continuations 
differed significantly from chance for each of the quantifiers. There were 
significant more multiple-survivor continuations for the quantifiers each 
(Residual = 5.78, p < 0.05) and every (Residual = 3.64, p < 0.05), but there were 
significantly fewer continuations for the quantifiers some (Residual = -4.21, p < 
0.05) or many (Residual = -3.97, p < 0.05). The frequency of multiple-survivor 
continuations did not differ from chance for the quantifiers all (Residual = -0.40, 
p  > 0.05) or many (Residual = -0.88, p > 0.05).
Discussion
The main experimental findings supported the hypothesis that both quantifier 
semantics and discourse context can contribute to the resolution of quantifier 
scope. An analysis of both the diagrams and continuations produced by 
subjects suggested that the scope interpretation of the quantified sentence was 
determined by the form of quantification and the context of the sentence. There 
was a strong tendency to interpret a sentence according to which the subject NP 
was quantified by either each or every as distributive, in which the subject NP 
took scope over the object NP, and there were multiple instances of the object 
NP. This resulted in diagrams where there was a one-to-one relationship 
between instances of the subject NP and instances of the object NP. Similarly, 
there was a greater tendency to produce continuations which referred to many 
or plural instances of the object NP (which was always indefinite).
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This is consistent with the widespread claim that each and every are inherently 
distributive (e.g. Vendler, 1967; Ioup, 1978; Fodor, 1982; Link, 1987). This 
appears to be a very strong constraint. Moreover, those few continuation 
sentences which were classed as collective in these conditions, often described a 
temporal distribution. That is, although the quantified sentence in (21) was 
interpreted to mean that each of the reporters interviewed the same survivor, 
they each interview the survivor at different times. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with Fodor's claim that the quantifier each must take scope over the 
quantified NP and at least one other sentence constituent. In this case, the 
quantifier takes scope over the verb interviezv to produce an interpretation in 
which there are many acts of interviewing the same survivor.
(21) Each of the reporters interviewed a survivor.
In contrast, there was a strong tendency to interpret a sentence in which the 
subject NP was quantified by either a few  or some as collective, according to 
which the object NP took scope over the subject NP, and there was only a single 
instance of this object NP. This resulted in diagrams where there was a many- 
to-one relationship between instances of the subject NP and a single instance of 
the object NP, and continuation sentences which referred to a single instance of 
the indefinite object NP. The quantifiers all and many did not exhibit a 
preference for either scope interpretation.
At the same time it was found that a manipulation of the discourse context 
could bias the interpretation of the scope-ambiguous sentence. When the 
discourse context was designed to favour the collective interpretation, there 
was a significant likelihood that subjects would produce diagrams in which 
there was a many-to-one relationship between instances of the subject NP and a 
single instance of the object NP; and a significant likelihood that continuations 
would describe single instances of the object NP. In contrast, when the 
discourse context was designed to favour the distributed interpretation, there 
was a greater tendency for subjects to produce diagrams with a one-to-one 
mapping between the subject and object NPs, and to produce diagrams which 
referred to multiple instances of the object NP.
The results across the quantificational conditions can be interpreted in line with 
Ioup's (1978) claim that quantifiers have a hierarchical tendency towards wide- 
scope. This could account for the strong tendency of each and every towards a 
wide-scope interpretation, and the contrasting weak tendency of a few and some. 
In fact, the almost exclusive narrow scope interpretation of sentences quantified
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by these can be explained by placing the indefinite article higher in the 
hierarchy (see Fodor, 1982). However, the problem with this explains is 
explaining where the hierarchy comes from.
Another possibility is that only some quantifiers, such as each and every are 
marked for wide scope (e.g. Link, 1987; Lonning, 1987). Scope interpretations 
of sentences containing the other quantifiers might be determined by syntactic 
and semantic factors like topic position and thematic roles which were not 
investigated in this experiment, but shown to be an important factor by 
Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993).
Quantifier scope resoltition during reading
As already noted, there is an extensive and often contradictory literature on 
quantifier scope ambiguity, little of which has been empirically tested. Not that 
this means that the resolution of quantifier scope ambiguity is an uninteresting 
question - because it raises a number of issues which are central to 
psycholinguistics. For instance, the claim that the surface linear order of 
quantifiers determines the preferred interpretation of a multiply-quantified 
sentence is a ruled-based account which is in a similar vein to the minimal 
attachment and late closure accounts of parsing. The fact that it does not 
appear to be wholly supported by the existing empirical data (Gillen, 1992; 
Kurtzman and MacDonald, 1993) has parallels with current research into 
parsing where there is a debate between rule-based accounts (e.g. Rayner and 
Frazier, 1982) and a constraint-satisfaction approach (e.g.) MacDonald, 
Pearlmutter and Seidenberg, 1994), in which constraints until before the 
processing system settles on a particular structural decision.
Both Kurtzman and MacDonald, and Ioup (1978) suggest that scope resolution 
might also be a constraint satisfaction problem, where syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics compete to determine the scope interpretation. However, they are 
vague about the relative contributions of these factors, and divided over the 
nature of the semantic constraints. Ioup's suggestion of a hierarchy of 
quantifiers which tend towards widest scope is only partly supported by 
present experimental findings, while Kurtzman and MacDonald suggest a 
similar hierarchy of thematic roles. This means that active sentences containing 
verbs like climbed, where the subject NP is a actor, will be more inclined 
towards a collective or wide scope universal reading than when a verb like saw 
is used, where the subject NP is an experiencer.
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Other verb constraints may be more pragmatic in origin. Fodor (1982), for 
instance, observes that some verbs like surrounded are marked for a collective 
reading, while other VP frames like broke a leg or sipped some wine strongly 
favour a distributed interpretation where each member of the subject NP 
separately performs the described act.
The interaction of these constraints during reading could be studied using the 
self-paced reading methodology employed by Gillen, and Kurtzman and 
MacDonald. Subjects would be presented with a discourse fragment like (22) 
which contains a scope ambiguous sentence where one of the NPs is indefinite, 
and a second sentence which refers to this indefinite NP by either singular or 
plural definite NP. Singular reference will be felicitous when the quantified 
sentence has a narrow scope interpretation, and there is a single instantiation of 
the second NP. Plural reference is felicitous when the sentence has a wide 
scope interpretation and there are multiple instantiations of the second NP. A 
manipulation of quantifier and syntactic structures will produce a clearer 
picture of how these interact to constrain the interpretation of scope-ambiguous 
sentences.
(22) QUANTIFIER of the kids climbed a tree.
The [tree was | trees were] full of apples.
Paterson and Edden (in preparation) use this self-paced reading methodology 
to examine the interaction of quantifier and verb constraints on the 
interpretation of doubly-quantified sentences. In one experiment (23) they 
investigate singular and plural definite NP reference to sentences where there 
is a scope ambiguity between an indefinite NP and one quantified by all. The 
sentences also include a verb which is marked for a collective reading (eg. 
shared) or unmarked (eg carried). According to Link (1987) and Lonning (1987), 
the quantifier all is unmarked, so singular and plural reference should be 
equally felicitous. However, because shared is marked for a collective 
interpretation, it should favour singular reference. It should be noted, 
however, that there are other plausible readings, including one in which each of 
the drug addicts shared the syringe with at least one other person34. If subjects 
reached this interpretation then either singular or plural reference would be 
plausible, which predicts that there would be no difference in reading time for 
the two continuation sentences.
(23) All of the drug addicts [shared | carried] a dirty syringe.
34 This reading was suggested by Alan Garnham.
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[The syringe was | syringes] were used to inject heroin.
The study will also follow Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993) in using materials 
like (24) and (25) as control conditions, where (24) is the baseline for a collective 
interpretation, and (25) is the baseline for a distributed interpretation.
(24) All of the drug addicts shared the same dirty syringe.
The syringe was used to inject heroin.
(25) All of the drug addicts carried a different dirty syringe.
The syringes were used to inject heroin.
A second experiment (26) will substitute the marked distributive quantifier each 
for all. This should favour plural reference when used alongside the unmarked 
verb, but conflict with the collective preference of the marked verb.
(26) Each of the drug addicts [shared | carried] a dirty syringe.
[The syringe was | syringes] were used to inject heroin.
Other studies will examine the interaction of these constraints for passive 
versions of the doubly-quantified sentences.
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Chapter eleven: 
Summary and conclusions
Formal and psychological approaches to semantics 
The experiments reported in this thesis have made a general exploration of the 
processing of natural language quantification during reading. The motivation 
for this was made clear in Chapter 1, where I argued for a parallel between 
formal and psychological approaches to natural language semantics. In 
particular, a correspondence was drawn between the model representations 
used by formalists and the model-like mental representations proposed by 
some psycholinguists. Others have made the same point, and drawn the same 
parallels, particularly Johnson-Laird (1982, 1983), whose Mental Models theory 
is in the spirit of formal semantics but with an awareness of the performance 
restrictions required by a psychological implementation. Mental Models are 
partial model representations, and communication - as both Johnson-Laird 
(1982) and Hall-Partee (1979) observe - is successful to the extent that the 
participants in a discourse share the same partial model. Quantifiers are one 
example of linguistic operators which control the structure of these mental 
representations, and so should be seen as a means of maintaining shared partial 
models.
At the same time it was noted that there are drawbacks to the Mental Models 
theory, particularly Johnson-Laird's assumption that the membership of a 
plural noun can be represented by an arbitrary number of tokens. This 
assumption is not appropriate for all types of NP. Mass and group nouns do 
not readily decompose into a set of member elements, and quantified NPs may 
not do so either. This is unfortunate, because Mental Models is a powerful 
theory which can explain human performance on a variety of reasoning tasks 
(cf. Steedman and Johnson-Laird, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne, 1991). My solution, which was detailed in Chapter 2, is to incorporate 
aspects of Mental Models theory within an account of discourse representation 
and processing proposed by Sanford and Garrod (1981; Garrod and Sanford, 
1982; 1991).
The result is an account where there are two levels to the mental representation 
of text. There is an explicit focus representation of those entities which are 
mentioned in the text, and a mapping between explicit focus and an implicit
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focus representation of the discourse roles in the underlying scenario. It is 
assumed that plural nouns take an unindividuated representation in explicit 
focus, unless there are quantifier or pragmatic constraints to the contrary. This 
means that they are represented by a single token in explicit focus, and map 
onto a single discourse role in the underlying scenario. Mapping the complex 
explicit focus representation onto a simple underlying disourse role is intended 
to express the idea that the unindividuated members of a plural noun fill the 
same single role. For example, the MPs in (1), is represented by a single explicit 
focus token and fills a solitary implicit focus role-slot, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
The upshot of this account is that pronominal reference is felicitous when it 
refers to the plural noun as a collective whole, and anomalous when it is made 
to member elements.
(1) The MPs attended a meeting.
Focus
Explicit
Implicit
Figure 1: The mental representation of
Set of MPs
the MPs attended a meeting
The function of quantifiers
Some forms of quantification are used to produce more fine-grained 
representations, and to focus processing attention onto particular aspects of the 
discourse model. Quantification by either a few  or few, for instance is used to 
divide the plural noun into refset and compset partitions, which are 
respectively true and false of the sentence predicate. These subsets have 
distinct explicit focus representations and map onto separate discourse roles in 
the underlying scenario. Mapping them into separate discourse roles marks the 
fact that the subsets are contrasted in terms of their discourse roles. However, 
only the refset appears to be mentally represented following quantification by a 
few, but both subsets are represented following quantification by few.
This suggests that while the mental representation of a sentence like (2) will be 
similar to that for the unquantified plural (e.g. 1), i.e. similar to Figure 1, the
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mental representation of the sentence in (3) will have two explicit focus tokens, 
one for the refset of MPs who attended the meeting, and another for the 
compset who were absent. These tokens are presumed to map onto separate 
role-slots in implicit focus, as illustrated in Figure 2.
(2) A few of the MPs attended a meeting.
(3) Few of the MPs attended the meeting.
Refset
Focus
Explicit
Implicit
Compset
Figure 2: The mental representation of 
few of the MPs attended a meeting
This account has consequences for the processing of pronominal reference. It 
suggests that pronominal reference to a sentence quantified by a few  will be 
interpreted as reference to the refset partition. However, if the pronoun is 
intended as reference to the compset, then this will appear anomalous, since the 
compset is not available as an antecedent. To overcome this anomaly, it is 
necessary to add the compset into the mental representation and revise the 
initial reference assignment from the refset to the compset. It was predicted 
that this would be a costly process and be evident as an increased reading time 
for the anaphoric sentence. In contrast, since the mental representation of a 
sentence quantified by few  has an explicit representation of both the refset and 
compset, this suggested that a pronoun could be plausibly interpreted as 
reference to either subset. However, off-line studies of language production 
(Moxey and Sanford, 1987) suggested that the compset is the preferred 
antecedent under these quantificational conditions, presumably because the 
compset is more focal. This suggested that during comprehension, there would 
also be a preference for interpreting the pronoun as reference to the compset. 
However, if the pronoun was intended as reference to the refset, then this 
would not appear anomalous - just dispreferred - and the assignment would be 
more easily revised.
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The first two experiments, reported in Chapter 4, used a sentence-by-sentence 
self-paced reading task to test whether pronominal reference is contingent on 
quantifier focus during normal reading. The first experiment measured the 
reading time for sentences which made plural pronominal reference to either 
the refset or compset of a sentence quantified by either a few  or few, while the 
second experiment replicated this experiment with the quantifiers many and 
not many. It was predicted that there would be greater difficulty in processing, 
and therefore a longer reading time for the anaphoric sentence when it referred 
to a property of the unfocused subset. That is, there would be a longer reading 
time for anaphoric sentences which referred to the compset of a monotone- 
decreasing quantified sentence (i.e. one quantified by either a few or many), and 
to the refset of a monotone-decreasing quantified sentence (i.e. one quantified 
by either few or not many).
The experimental results supported the claim that monotone-increasing and 
-decreasing quantifiers can be distinguished in terms of focusing properties, 
but did not support the claim that monotone-decreasing quantifiers focus on 
the compset. There was a longer reading time for the anaphoric sentence when 
it made reference to the compset following quantification by a few  or many, and 
a longer reading time for reference to the compset following quantification by 
not many. However, the difference in reading time for reference to either the 
refset or compset was not reliable following quantification by few. This 
suggested that both the refset and compset were plausible antecedents of 
pronominal reference following monotone-decreasing quantification, although 
there was a preference to interpret the pronoun as reference to the compset 
following quantification by not many.
The results were interpreted as evidence that quantifier focus occurs during 
and that pronoun resolution is contingent on the form of quantification. It was 
more difficult to integrate an anaphoric sentence with prior discourse when the 
sentence described a property of an unfocused subset. However, it was not 
possible to conclude that the increased reading times were due to the detection 
and revision of an initial and anomalous attachment to the focal subset, or 
simply indicative of greater processing difficulty for reference to the unfocused 
antecedent. The first of these explanations suggests that there is a point in the 
processing of the anaphoric sentence when anomalous reference it detected. 
Furthermore, it was predicted that referential anomaly detection would occur 
at the earliest possible point, when the anaphor refers to a property of the 
unfocused subset.
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The locus and time course ofreferential anomaly detection
Three studies of eye movements during reading were conducted in an attempt 
to identify the locus of referential anomaly detection. These experiments were 
conducted within the context of a number of studies which have demonstrated 
the on-line processing of pronominal reference - meaning that reference is 
processed as the pronoun is read - and particularly a study by Garrod, 
Freudenthal and Boyle (1994) which found evidence of the immediate impact of 
prior discourse focus and pragmatic inference. Garrod et al found an 
immediate increase in First Pass reading time when the role-description of the 
pronoun was incongruent with the discourse role of the focused antecedent. It 
was predicted that the current experiment should also find evidence of 
immediate anomaly detection when the anaphor described a property of the 
unfocused subset.
The first two studies replicated the previous self-paced reading experiments, 
and found a longer Total reading times for the anaphoric sentence when the 
anaphor described a property of the compset following quantification by either 
a few  or many. Similarly, there was a longer Total reading time for the 
anaphoric sentence when it described a property of the refset following 
quantification by few, but no difference in Total reading time for sentences 
which referred to a property of the refset or compset following quantification 
by not many. However, there was evidence of a more localised increase in Total 
reading time when the anaphor referred to the refset (their presence in 4) than 
when it referred to the compset (their absence). This was interpreted as evidence 
that reference to the refset of a monotone-decreasing quantified sentence 
produces only a short-lived difficulty, and that this is occurs because the refset 
is a necessary part of the mental representation of the sentence.
(4) / Quantifier of the MPs went to a meeting./
/Their [presence | absence] /helped / the meeting run more 
smoothly.
There was no reliable evidence of referential anomaly detection during the 
initial processing of the anaphoric sentence. According to a measure of First 
pass reading time, i.e. the fixation time on the first visit to a text region, there 
was no significant difference in reading time for either the anaphor or 
subsequent regions for text across quantifier and reference conditions.
However, there was some evidence of difference in the frequency of First pass 
regressions from particular regions of text. There were more regressions
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overall from the anaphoric region (their presence/absence in 4) following 
quantification by few, which may indicate general difficulties in processing 
reference under this type of quantification. At the same time, there was an 
increased number of regressions from the subsequent verb region (helped in 4) 
following anomalous reference to an NP quantified by a few, and from the final 
region (the meeting run more smoothly) for anomalous reference to an NP 
quantified by many. However, when the data from the two experiments were 
combined, there was no evidence of a common pattern of results within the 
monotone-increasing and -decreasing conditions, which suggested that the 
results were either spurious, or dependent on individual properties of the 
quantifiers. This meant that the measure of First pass regressions did not 
provide evidence of processing disruption that was due to the focusing 
properties of the quantifiers.
Chapter 6 attempted to account for the failure to observe punctuate referential 
anomaly detection in terms of the differences between the present experimental 
design and that employed by Garrod et al (1994). In particular, they sited their 
anomaly on an intransitive verb and investigated singular pronoun reference, 
while the present design sited the anomaly on a noun and used plural 
pronouns. The first of these differences may have contributed to the 
defeasibility of the pragmatic inference which detects the referential anomaly.
It was noted that the processor may not commit to an anomalous interpretation 
on encountering the anaphoric manipulation, because it is always possible that 
it will turn out to be acceptable at some point downstream in the text. For 
instance, what is an apparently anomalous reference to the unfocused compset 
in (5) turns out to be felicitous reference to the refset by the end of the sentence. 
This means that unless the manipulation itself is sufficiently strong, then there 
will be no evidence of a punctuate effect.
(5) A few of the MPs went to a meeting.
Their absence would have angered the Whips.
Using plural pronouns in place of singular pronouns may also have been a 
mistake because of ambiguities associated with plural pronoun reference. In 
the present materials the plural pronoun is always ambiguous between 
reference to either one of the subsets, or reference to the superset. There may 
be a delay in the processing of pragmatic inference until this referential 
ambiguity has been resolved.
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The third eye-movement study, reported in Chapter 7, incorporated some of 
the proposed revisions. The referential manipulation was moved to the 
quantified sentence, the referential anomaly was cited on an intransitive NP 
(gambled recklessly in 6), and a causal conjunction so was used to conjoin the 
quantified and referential sentences. These revisions had the added advantage 
of allowing a comparison of identical regions (they gambled recklessly) across 
experimental conditions.
(6) /  Quantifier of the men were [careful | careless] with their winnings,
/  so / they gambled /  recklessly /until /  the money /  was gone.
There was evidence of difficulty in processing reference to the compset of a 
sentence quantified by a few, with longer reading time for both the quantified 
and anaphoric sentences under theses conditions. There was also evidence of a 
general difficulty in processing reference following quantification by  few, with 
further evidence that refset reference produced a more long-term processing 
difficulty under these conditions. The Total reading times for the anaphoric 
sentence and early regions of the anaphoric sentence were generally long 
following quantification by few, and often as long as the Total reading times for 
reference to the compset following quantification by a few. However, the Total 
reading times for the later regions of the anaphoric sentence were significantly 
longer when reference was made to the compset following quantification by 
few. This was interpreted as evidence in favour of an account in which only the 
refset is a plausible antecedent following monotone-increasing quantification, 
but while both the refset and compset are plausible antecedents following 
monotone-decreasing quantification, the compset is the favoured one.
Despite the efforts to localise the referential effect, there was still no evidence of 
punctuate referential anomaly detection according to either First pass measures 
of reading time or regressions. There was evidence of an overall longer reading 
time for the anaphoric region (the pronoun + verb + adverb) when reference 
was made to the compset. This suggested that reference was initially processed 
independently of focus information, and certainly independently of focus 
information following quantification by few. There was also evidence of an 
increase in First pass reading time for the NP and VP regions at the end of the 
anaphoric sentence when reference was made to the compset following 
quantification by a few. This suggested the referential anomaly had a delayed 
impact on processing, however it occurred so late in the sentence as to be 
indistinguishable from second pass (i.e. Total reading time) effects.
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Given that all three eye-tracking experiments failed to find any evidence of 
immediate referential anomaly detection, it can be reasonably concluded that 
the difficulty in processing reference to the unfocused subset of a quantified 
sentence is not a localised phenomena, but a more global difficulty in 
integrating the anaphoric sentence with prior discourse. However, it could still 
be argued that the experimental manipulations were insufficiently powerful to 
find these effects, and some further experiments outlined in in Chapter 6 may 
provide a definitive answer. The first of these proposed experiments will use 
stronger predictors of compset focus to enhance the experimental contrast: 
hardly any will be substituted for few  (and contrasted with the monotone- 
increasing some), while and so will be substituted for the connective so. Off-line 
data suggests that both of these operators produce a large incidence of compset 
focus (Sanford et al, in press). An example material is illustrated in (7).
(7) /[Some | Hardly any] of the men were [careful | careless] with their 
winnings, / and so /  they gambled  /  recklessly /un til / the money / was 
gone.
Another study will avoid ambiguities associated with plural pronoun reference 
by comparing singular pronominal reference to NPs quantified by the 
monotone-increasing one and the complex exception-marking expression all bnt 
one. Again, an example material is illustrated in (8).
(8) /[One | All but one] of the men was [careful | careless] with his 
winnings. /H e gambled I recklessly /un til /  the money /  was 
gone.
Finally, a third study will directly test the alternative theories by comparing the 
reading time of sentences where apparently anomalous reference is made 
felicitous by placing the adversative connective nevertheless either at the 
beginning or the end of the anaphoric sentence. An example material is given 
in (9).
(9) /  [A few | Few] of the men were careful with their winnings.
/  [Nevertheless/] they gambled / recklessly / until / the money / was gone 
[/nevertheless].
Delayed referential processing predicts no difference between the reading time 
of sentences with nevertheless in these two sentence positions. However, an
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immediate initiation of referential processing predicts a temporary anomaly 
when nevertheless is in the sentence final position. This should result in a 
longer reading time compared to the case when nevertheless is placed at the 
beginning of the sentence. Replicating the experiment with monotone- 
increasing and monotone-decreasing quantification should also determine 
whether these quantificational conditions alter the time course of referential 
processing.
Pragmatic constraints on quantifier focus
The first set of experiments considered the function of monotone-increasing 
and monotone-decreasing quantifiers during comprehension. However, it was 
noted that there was a third category of quantifier, which are described as non­
monotonic because they do not license directional scalar inferences. One such 
quantifier is only a few, which is a complex quantifier composed of the negative 
and monotone-decreasing only and the positive and monotone-increasing a few. 
Moxey and Sanford (1987; 1993a) found that this has a default for refset focus, 
but can result in compset focus when supported by conjunction semantics, or 
other pragmatic constraints. In particular, Moxey and Sanford (1987) report an 
increased number of compset focused sentence continuations when the 
quantified sentence described a situation which is norm-violating.
Chapter 8 reports two experimental investigations of this claim. The first 
experiment was a large scale sentence-continuation task where subjects 
produced continuations to a quantified sentence which either matched (eg 10) 
or violated (eg 11) norm expectations. These sentences were either followed by 
a plural pronoun, or conjoined to a plural noun using and, but or because. There 
was a greater tendency for compset-focused continuations in the norm- 
violating condition (11), and when this was supported by the causal 
conjunction because.
(10) Only a few of the weight-lifters managed to lift the heaviest dumbbell.
(11) Only a few of the weight-lifters managed to lift the lightest dumbbell.
The second experiment transferred this pragmatic manipulation to a reading 
task, and measured subjects' eye movements as they read the same quantified 
sentences, but embedded in a short passages like (12).
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(12) At the gym.
Some expert weight-lifters from the gym held a weight-lifting 
competition. Only a few of the weight-lifters managed to lift 
the [heaviest/lightest] dumbbell. Their [strength/ weakness] was 
a surprise to their friends.
This experiment added the referential manipulation used in the previous 
studies, where an anaphoric NP (Their [strength /  weakness]) is used to refer to a 
property of either the refset or compset partition of the quantified NP. When 
the quantified sentence describes a norm-matching situation, then the refset 
should be in discourse focus, and the preferred antecedent of pronominal 
reference. This predicts a global increase in reading time when the anaphor 
describes a property of the compset, and perhaps also evidence of more 
punctuate referential anomaly detection. However, when the quantified 
sentence describes a norm-violating situation, then the compset should be more 
focal, and reference to the compset should be at least as easy as refset reference. 
However, no significant differences were found on an initial analysis of the eye 
movement data.
The data set was then reduced on the basis of an off-line forced choice task 
which had been administered immediately following the eye-movement task, 
and although the re-analysis still failed to find any significant differences, there 
was some evidence of an overall increase in Total reading time for the 
anaphoric sentence in the norm-violating conditions. If this is a replicable 
finding then it suggests that reference resolution is more time-consuming in 
this condition because of the complex pragmatic inferences required both to 
instantiate the compset, and to compute a match between the anaphor and 
antecedent.
It may be that the failure to find any convincing reading time effects is due to 
the weakness of the experimental manipulations. After all, the off-line task 
only produced an about 50% incidence of compset-focused continuations in the 
norm-violating condition. A more effective test of the on-line hypothesis 
would include a causal conjunction like because to increase the likelihood of 
compset focus.
Semantic and pragmatic constraints on quantifier scope ambiguity 
The final section of the thesis broadened the treatment of natural language 
quantification to include quantifier scope ambiguity. This ambiguity arises 
when two or more quantifiers (including the definite and indefinite articles)
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appear in the same clause. The standard account claims that a multiply- 
quantified sentence is ambiguous between logical representations which differ 
only in the order of the quantifier prefixes. For example, sentence (13) is 
ambiguous between the predicate calculus formulae in (14) and (15). The first 
of these can be paraphrased to mean that for each hoy there exists a girl who is 
loved by that boy. The second means that there exists a particular girl who is loved 
by every boy.
(13) Every boy loves some girl.
(14) Vboy Bgirl Loves (boy, girl)
(15) 3 girl Vboy Loves (boy, girl)
Chapter 9 reviewed some theoretical approaches to this problem, which 
variously argued for syntactic, semantic and pragmatic constraints solutions. 
What empirical studies have been conducted (Gillen, 1991; Kurtzman and 
MacDonald, 1993) find little evidence that syntax can resolve the ambiguity, but 
do identify semantic factors. Chapter 10 reported an off-line study which 
demonstrated an interaction of semantic and pragmatic constraints on the 
ultimate interpretation of a scope-ambiguous chapter, and argued for an 
similar approach to this question as taken in the earlier consideration of 
quantifiers and focus.
Following the approach taken by some formal semanticists (Link, 1983,1987; 
Lonning, 1987) and also by Fodor (1982), it was suggested that some 
quantifiers, such as each, have a marked preference for a individuated 
representation of the quantified NP, and some verbs, such as surrounded, have a 
marked collective interpretation. Other quantifiers and verbs are ambiguous 
between collective and distributed interpretation. These constraints can also be 
modelled within my representational account.
First of all consider the quantifiers. Given a sentence like (16) where both the 
quantifier and predicate are unmarked, the quantified NP (the soldiers) is 
assigned an unindividuated representation in Explicit focus as the default, and 
maps into a single role slot in Implicit focus - as illustrated in Figure 3. The lack 
of individuation means that the sentence predicate (visited a castle) holds over 
the quantified NP as a collective whole: so there is one act of visiting, and a 
single instantiation of the indefinite NP (a castle). The sentence is interpreted to 
mean that a contextually specified group of soldiers collectively visited a castle.
(16) All of the soldiers visited a castle.
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Focus
soldiers
Explicit
Implicit
Figure 3: The mental representation of 
all of the solders visited a castle.
However, when all is replaced by a marked distributive quantifier like each (17), 
then the quantified NP takes an individuated representation where a number of 
tokens which stand for individual soldiers are mapped into separate role-slots - 
as illustrated in Figure 4.
(17) Each of the solders visited a castle.
This individuation of the quantified NP means that the sentence predicate now 
applies to the individual set members, and the sentence is understood to either 
means that they separately visited the same castle, or that they visited different 
castles. Mapping the individuated entities into separate discourse roles 
emphasises the contrast between the characters. A sentence like (17) asserts 
that the soldiers visited a castle in a distnctive manner, i.e. by either visiting 
different castles or visiting at different times.
soldier
Explicit
Implicit
Figure 4: The mental representation of 
each of the solders visited a castle.
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Fodor (1982) suggests that these two readings are differentiated by the extent to 
which the quantifier takes scope over the rest of the sentence. In the first of the 
two readings the quantifier only takes scope over the verb, to produce a 
multiple instantiation of the acts of visiting. However, in the second reading it 
takes scope over the whole of the VP predicate to multiply instantiate both the 
acts of visiting, and the visited object.
This does not explain how the scope of the quantifier might be restricted. One 
possibility is that there is an interaction with verb constraints. When the verb is 
marked for a collective interpretation, it may block the individuating function 
of the quantifier. For example, the antagonistic function of the quantifier and 
verb in (18) appears to produce a preferred reading where soldiers perform 
multiple acts of gathering at a single castle.
(18) Each of the soldiers gathered in an ancient castle.
Of course this is all speculation, but it does produce testable claims. A first 
series of experiment (Paterson and Edden, in preparation) is intended to 
investigate the interaction of quantifier and verb constraints on the 
interpretation of multiply-quantified sentences. It will follow a similar 
methodology as Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993) and measure the 
acceptability of singular and plural definite NP reference to the indefinite NP of 
a scope-ambiguous sentence like (18). However, where they manipulated 
syntax and quantifier semantics, this study will manipulate quantifier and verb 
semantics.
Conclusion
Semantic processing has been neglected largely neglected in the sentence 
processing literature in favour of syntax. However, if the Formal semantic 
approaches are correct, then it may not be so easy to separate the two, and 
semantics may exert stronger constraints on initial sentence processing than has 
been supposed. The experiments reported in this thesis were intended as a 
starting point. They extend a set of observations made by Moxey and Sanford 
(1987,1993a), and show that quantificational semantics can direct referential 
processes. A further experiment was reported to consider whether the 
resolution of quantifier scope ambiguity can be explained in a similar manner. 
Quantifier scope ambiguity is becoming a more central concern for the sentence 
processing community (cf. Frazier, 1995), and is a topic where syntax and 
semantics converge. Even broader approaches might consider whether the
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quantificational semantics considered in this thesis plays a role in other topics 
which in the past have been considered to be a wholly syntactic concern, such 
as the interpretation of garden-path sentences.
227
References
All wood, J., Andersson, L-G., and Dahl, O. (1977). Logic in Linguistics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anderson, A., Garrod, S., and Sanford, A. J. (1983). The accessibility of 
pronominal antecedents as a function of episodic shifts in narrative texts. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 35A , 427-440.
Anscombre, J-C., and Ducrot, O. (1986). Argumentation et informativite. In 
Michel Meyer (Ed.), De la Metaphysique a la rhetorique. Brussels: Editions de 
l'Universite de Bruxelles.
Bach, K. (1982). Semantic nonspecificity and mixed quantifiers. Linguistics and 
Philosophy, 4, 593-605.
Barclay, J.R. (1973) The role of comprehension in remembering sentences. 
Cognitive Psychology, 4, 229-254.
Barker, C. (1994). Group terms in English: Representing groups as atoms. 
Journal of Semantics, 9, 69-93.
Barwise, J., and Cooper, R. (1981). Generalised quantifiers and natural 
language. Linguistics and Philosophy, 4 ,159-219.
Bosch, P. (1988). Representing and accessing focused referents. Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 3, 207-231.
Bower, G.H., Black, J.B., and Turner, T.J. (1979). Scripts in memory for text. 
Cognitive Psychology, 11 ,177-220.
Bransford, J. D. and Johnson, M. K. (1972). Contextual prerequisites for 
understanding: Some investigations of comprehension and recall. Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 717-26,
Bransford, J.D., Barclay, J.R. and Franks, J.J. (1972) The abstraction of linguistic 
ideas. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 331-350.
228
Britt, M. A. (1994). The interaction of referential ambiguity and argument 
structure in the parsing of prepositional phrases. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 33, 251-283.
Caramazza, A., Grober ,E. H., Garvey, C., and Yates, J. (1977). Comprehension 
of anaphoric pronouns. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour. 16, 601- 
609.
Carlson, G. N. (1987). Same and different: some consequences for syntax and 
semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy, 10,531-565.
Carpenter, P. A., and Just, M. A. (1972). Semantic control of eye movements in 
picture scanning during sentence-picture verification. Perception and 
Psychophysics, 12, 61-64.
Carpenter, P. A., and Just, M. A. (1975). Sentence comprehension: A 
psycholinguistic processing model of verification. Psychological Reviezv, 82, 45- 
73.
Carpenter, P. A., and Just, M. A. (1976). Models of sentence verification and 
linguistic comprehension. Psychological Review, 83, 318-322.
Carpenter, P. A., and Just M. A. (1977). Reading comprehension as eyes see it. 
In M. A. Just and P. A. Carpenter, Cognitive processes in comprehension. Erlbaum: 
Hillsdale, NJ.
Carreiras, M. (1993). Minimalist misconceptions of mental models. 
PSYCOLOQUY 3(64) reading-inference-.7
Carreiras, M., Garnham, A., and Oakhill, J. (1993). The use of superficial and 
meaning-based representations in interpreting pronouns: Evidence from 
Spanish. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 5, 93-116.
Chafe, W. L. (1972). Discourse structure and human knowledge. In J.B. Carroll, 
and R. O. Freedle (Eds.), Language Comprehension and the aquisition of knowledge. 
Washington DC: Winston.
Chafe, W. L. (1976). Giveness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics, 
and point of view. In C. N. Li (Ed.), Subject and topic. Academic Press: New 
York.
229
Champaud, C., and Bassano, D. (1987). Argumentative and informative 
functions of French Intensity modifiers 'presque' (almost), 'a peine' (just, 
barely) and 'a peu pres' (about): An experimental study of children and adults. 
European Bulletin of Cognitive Psychology, 7, 605-631.
Chase, W. G., and Clark, H.H. (1971). Semantics in the perception of 
verticality. British Journal of Psychology, 62, 311-326.
Chomsky, N. (1976). Reflections on language. Fontana: London.
Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and representations. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
Clark, H. FI. (1976). Semantics and comprehension. The Hague: Mouton.
Clark, H. H., and Chase, W. G. (1972). On the process of comparing sentences 
against pictures. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 472-517.
Clark, H. H., and Clark, E. V. (1977). Psychology and language: An introduction to 
psycholinguistics. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York.
Clark, H. H., and Sengul, C. J. (1979) In search of referents for noun-phrases 
and pronouns. Memory and Cognition, 7, 35-41.
Cloitre, M., and Bever, T. G. (1989). Linguistic anaphors, levels of 
representation, and discourse. Language and Cognitive Processes, 3, 293-322.
Cohen, J. D., MacWhinney, B., Flatt, M., and Provost, J. (1993). PsyScope: A 
new graphic interactive environment for designing psychology experiments. 
Behavioral Research Methods, Instruments & Computers, 25, 257-271.
Corbett, A. T., and Chang, F. R. (1983). Pronoun disambiguation: Accessing 
potential antecedents. Memory and Cognition, 11, 283-294.
Cotter, C. A. (1984). Inferring indirect objects in sentences: Some implications 
for the semantics of verbs. Language and Speech, 27, 24-45.
Dell, G.S., McKoon, G., and Ratcliff, R. (1983). The activation of antecedent 
information during the processing of anaphoric reference in reading. Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2 2 ,121-132.
230
Dooling, D.J. and Lachman,R. (1972) Effects of comprehension on the retention 
of prose. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 97, 216-222.
Dosher, B. A., and Corbett, A. T. (1982). Instrument inferences and verb 
schemata. Memory and Cognition, 10, 531-539.
Dowty, D.R. (unpublished). Monotonicity-based logics and why natural 
languages have negative polarity and negative concord marking. Ohio State 
University.
Dowty, D.R., Peters, P.S, and Wall, R. (1981) A n introduction to Montague 
Grammar. Dordecht: Reidel.
Ehrlich, K. (1980) The comprehension of pronouns. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 32, 247-255.
Ehrlich, K., and Rayner, K. (1983). Pronoun assignment and semantic 
integration during reading: Eye movements and immediacy of processing. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 75-87.
Ehrlich, S. F., and Rayner, K. (1981). Contextual effects on word perception and 
eye movements during reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 
20, 641-655.
Fauconnier, G. (1979). Implication reversal in a natural language. In F. 
Guenther, and S.J. Schmidt (Eds.), Formal semantics and pragmatics for natural 
language. Dordecht: Reidel.
Fauconnier, G. (1985). Mental Spaces: Aspects of meaning construction in natural 
language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fischler, I., Bloom, P. A., Childers, D. G., Roucos, S. E., and Perry, N. W. (1983). 
Brain potentials related to stages of sentence verification. Psychophysiology. 20, 
400-409.
Fodor, J. A. (1983) Modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Fodor, J. D. (1982) The mental representation of quantifiers. In S. Peters and E. 
Saarinen (Eds.), Processes, beliefs, and questions. Dordecht: Reidel.
231
Fodor, J. D., Fodor, J. A., and Garrett, M. F. (1975). The psychological unreality 
of semantic representations. Linguistic Inquiry, 6, 515-531.
Frazier, L. (1995) On interpretation: Minimal Towering'. Paper presented at 
the 'Architectures and mechanisms for language processing' conference, 
December 1- 2, The Carlton Highland Hotel, Edinburgh.
Frazier, L., and Fodor, J. D. (1978). The sausage machine: A new two-stage 
parsing model. Cognition, 6, 291-325.
Frazier, L. and Rayner, K. (1982) Making and correcting errors during sentence 
comprehension: eye movements in the analysis of structurally ambiguous 
sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 14 ,178-210.
Frege, G. (1892) 'Uber Sinn und Bedeuteng'. Translated in Geach, P. and Black, 
M. (1966) Tranlations from the Philosophical zuritings of Gottlob Frege, 56-78, 
Blackwell: Oxford.
Galambos, J. A., and Rips, L. J. (1982). Memory for routines. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 260-281.
Garnham, A. (1979) Instantiation of verbs. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 31, 207-214.
Garnham, A. (1981). Mental models as representations of text. Memory and 
Cognition, 9, 560-565.
Garnham, A. (1982). Testing psychological theories about inference making. 
Memory and Cognition, 10, 341-349.
Garnham, A. (1987). Mental models as representations of discourse and text. 
Chichester: Ellis Horwood.
Garnham, A. (1992). Minimilism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in 
theories of inference during reading. PSYCOLOQUY 3(63) reading-inference- 
1.1
Garnham, A. (1993). An impartial view of inference making. PSYCOLOQUY 
3(64) reading-inference-.ll
232
Garnham, A., and Oakhill, J. (1985). On-line resolution of anaphoric pronouns: 
Effects of inference making and verb semantics. British Journal of Psycholog}/, 76, 
385-393.
Garnham, A., Oakhill, J., and Cruttenden, H. (1992). The role of implicit 
causality and gender cue in the interpretation of pronouns. Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 7, 231-255.
Garrod S. C., and Sanford, A. J. (1977). Interpreting anaphoric relations: the 
intergration of semantic information while reading. Journal of Verbal Learning 
and Verbal Behavior, 16, 77-90.
Garrod S. C., and Sanford, A. J. (1982) The mental representation of discourse 
in a focused memory system: Implications for the interpretation of anaphoric 
noun-phrases. Journal of Semantics, 1, 21-41.
Garrod S. C., and Sanford, A. J. (1985). On the real-time character of 
interpretation during reading. Language and Cognitive Processes, 1, 43-59.
Garrod S. C., and Sanford, A. J. (1991) Referential processing in reading: 
Focusing on roles and individuals. In D. A. Balota, G. B. Flores d'Arcais and K. 
Rayner (Eds). Comprehension Processes in Reading, 465-484.
Garrod S. C., Freudenthal, D., and Boyle, E. (1994). The role of different types 
of anaphor in the on-line resolution of sentences in a discourse. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 32, 39-68.
Garrod S. C., O'Brien, E. J., Morris, R. K„ and Rayner, K. (1990). Elaborative 
inferencing as an active or passive process. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 16, 250-257.
Garrod, S. C. (1985). Incremental pragmatic interpretation versus occasional 
inferencing during fluent reading. In G. Rickheit and H. Strohner (Eds.), 
Inferences in text processing. Elsevier: North-Holland.
Gernsbacher, M. A. (1989). Mechanisms that improve referential access. 
Cognition, 32, 99-156.
233
Gernsbacher, M. A., and Robertson, R. R. W. (1992). Knowledge activation 
versus sentence mapping when representing fictional characters' emotional 
states. Language and Cognitive Processes, 7, 353-371.
Gil, D. (1982). Quantifier scope, linguistic variation and natural language 
semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy, 5, 421-472.
Gillen, K. (1991). The comprehension of doubly-quantified sentences. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Durham.
Glenberg, A. G., and Mathew, S. (1992). When minimalism is not enough: 
Mental models in reading comprehension. PSYCOLOQUY 3(64) reading- 
inference-2.1
Graesser, A. C , and Kreuz, R. J. (1993). A theory of inference generation during 
text comprehension. Discourse Processes, 1 6 ,145-160.
Graesser, A. C., Singer, M., and Trabasso, T. (1994). Constructing inferences 
during narrative text comprehension. Psychological Review, 101, 371-395.
Greene, J. M. (1970). The semantic function of negatives and passives. British 
Journal of Psychology, 6 1 ,17-22.
Greene, S. B., McKoon, G., and Ratcliff, R. (1992). Pronoun resolution and 
discourse models. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18, 266-283.
Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. 3 5 ,121-152.
Grice, H. P. (1973) Probability, defeasibility and mood operators. Paper 
delivered at the Texas Conference on Perfomatives, Presuppositions and 
Implicatures.
Grimshaw, J. (1990). Argument structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hall-Partee, B. (1979). Semantics - Mathematics or psychology? In R. Baurle, U. 
Egli, and A von Stechow (Eds.), Semantics from different points of view. Springer- 
Vertag: Berlin.
234
Halliday, M. A. K., and Hasan, R. (1976) Cohesion in English. London:
Longman.
Haviland, S. E. and Clark, H. H. (1974) W hat's new? Aquiring new 
information as a process of comprehension. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 13, 512-521.
Hobbs, J., and Sheiber, S. (1987). An algorithm for generating quantifier 
scopings. Computational Linguistics, 13, 47-63.
Hormann, H. (1983). The calculating listener or how many are einige, mehrere 
and ein paar (some, several and a few)? In R. Baurle, C. Shwarze, and A. von 
Stechow (Eds.), Meaning, use and the interpretation of language. Walter de 
Gruyter: Berlin.
Inhoff, A. W., and Rayner, K. (1986). Parafoveal word processing during eye 
fixations in reading: Effects of word frequency. Perception and Psychophysics, 40, 
431-439.
Ioup. G. (1978). Some universals for quantifier scope. In J. Kimball (Ed.) Syntax 
and Semantics (vol. 4), New York: Academic Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1972). Semantic interpretation in generative grammar. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Jarvella, R. J., and Lundquist, L. (1994). Scales in the interpretation of words, 
sentences and texts. Journal of Semantics, 10,171-198.
Johnson, M. K., Bransford, J. D. and Solomon, S. (1973). Memory for tacit 
implications of sentences. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 98, 203-205.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Steedman, M. (1978). The psychology of syllogisms, 
Cognitive Psychology, 10, 64-99.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J., and Tabossi, P. (1989). Reasoning by 
model: The case of multiple quantification. Psychological Review, 96, 658-673.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1969). On understanding logically complex sentences. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2 1 ,1-13.
235
Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1982) Formal semantics and the psychology of meaning. 
In S. Peters and E. Saarinen (eds) Processes, Beliefs and Questions. Dordecht: 
Reidel.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1983) Mental Models. Towards a cognitive science of 
language, inference and consciousness. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R. (1991). Deduction. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Ltd.
Just, M. A. (1974). Comprehending quantified sentences: The relation between 
sentence-picture and semantic memory verification. Cognitive Psychology, 6, 
216-236.
Just, M. A., and Carpenter, P. A. (1971). Comprehension of negation with 
quantification. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 10, 244-253.
Just, M. A., and Carpenter, P. A. (1980). A theory of reading: From eye fixations 
to comprehension. Psychological Review, 87, 329-354.
Katz, J. J. and Postal, P. M. (1965) An integrated theory of linguistic descriptions. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Keenan, E. L., and Stavi, J. (1986). A semantic characterisation of natural 
language determiners, Linguistics and Philosophy, 9, 253-326.
Keenan, J. M., Baillet, S. D., and Brown, P. (1984). The effects of causal cohesion 
on comprehension and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning arid Verbal Behavior, 
2 3 ,115-126.
Keenan, J. M., Golding, J. M., and Jennings, T. M. (1991). Which elaborative 
inferences are drawn during reading? A question of methodologies. In D. A. 
Balota, G. B. Flores d'Arcais, and Rayner, K, Comprehension processes in reading. 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ.
Kempson, R. M. (1977) Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kintsch, W. (1974) The Representation of Meaning in Memory. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum.
236
Kintsch, W. (1988). The role of knowledge in discourse comprehension: A 
construction-integration model. Psychological Review, 9 5 ,163-182.
Kintsch, W. (1993). Information accretion and reduction in text processing: 
Inferences. Discourse Processes, 1 6 ,193-202.
Kintsch, W. and van Dijk, T. A. (1978) Towards a model of text comprehension 
and reproduction. Psychological Review, 85, 363-394.
Klein, H. (1994). Only (a) few. Unpublished manuscript. Faculty of Letters, 
University of Groningen.
Klima, E. S. (1964). Negation in English. In J. A. Fodor and J. J. Katz (Eds.), The 
structure of language. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kurtzman, H. S., and MacDonald, M. C. (1993). Resolution of quantifier scope 
ambiguities. Cognition, 48, 243-279.
Ladusaw, S. (1979). On the notion of affective in the analysis of negative 
polarity items. Paper presented to the 1979 Meeting of the Linguistics Society 
of America, Los Angeles.
Lakoff, G. (1971). On generative semantics. In D. Steinberg and L. Jakobovits 
(Eds.), Semantics. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Lakoff, G. (1972). Linguistics and natural logic. In G. Harman and D.
Davidson (Eds.), Semantics for natural language. Dordecht: Reidel.
Laport, L. (1994). Cognitive aspects of quantification. Unpublished manuscript. 
Dutch Institute, University of Groningen.
Lea R. B., O'Brien D. P., Fisch, S. M., Noveck, I. A., and Braine, M. D. S. (1990). 
Predicting propositional logic inferences in text comprehension. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 29, 361-387.
Levinson, S. C. (1982). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Link, G. (1983). The logical analysis of plurals and mass terms, a lattice- 
theoretical approach. In R. Baurle, C. Shwarze, and A. vam Stechow (Eds.), 
Meaning, use and the interpretation of language. Walter de Gruyter: Berlin.
237
Link, G. (1987). Generalised quantifiers and plurals. In P. Gardenfors (Ed.), 
Generalised quantifiers: Linguistic and logical approaches. D. Reidel: Dordecht.
Liversedge, S. P., and Pickering, M. J. (1995). Investigations into analyses of eye 
movements during reading. Paper presented at the Eighth European 
Conference on Eye movements, University of Derby, U.K., 6-9 September, 1995.
Loftus, E. F., and Palmer, J. P. (1972). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: 
An example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 585-589.
Long, D. L., and Golding, J. M. (1993). Superordinate goal inferences: Are they 
automatically generated during comprehension? Discourse Processes, 16, 55-73.
Long, D. L., Golding, J. M., and Graesser, A. C. (1992). A test of the on-line 
status of goal-related inferences. Journal of Memory arid Language, 31, 634-637.
Lonning, J. T. (1987). Collective readings of definite and indefinite noun­
phrases. In P. Gardenfors (Ed.), Generalised quantifiers: Linguistic and logical 
approaches. D. Reidel: Dordecht.
MacDonald, M. C. (1994). Probabilisitic constraints and syntactic ambiguity 
resolution. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 56-98.
MacDonald, M. C., Pearlmutter, N. ]., and Seidenberg, M. S. (1994). Lexical 
nature of syntactic ambiguity resolution. Psychological Review, 101, 676-703.
Mani, K. and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982) The mental representation of spatial 
descriptions. Memory and Cognition, 10,181-187.
Marslen-Wilson, W., Tyler, L. K., and Koster, C. (1993). Integretative processes 
in utterance resolution. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 647-666.
May, R. (1985). Logical form. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
McCawley, J. D. (1981). Everything that linguists have ahuays wanted to know about 
logic. Basil Blackwell: Oxford.
238
McKoon, G., and Ratcliff, R. (1980). The comprehension processes and memory 
structures involved in anaphoric reference. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 19, 668-682.
McKoon, G., and Ratcliff, R. (1986). Inferences about predictable events.
Journal of Experimental Psycholog}/: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 12, 82-91.
McKoon, G., and Ratcliff, R. (1990). Dimensions of inference. In A. C. Graesser 
and G. H. Bower (Eds.), The psychology of learning arid motivation, 25, 313-328.
McKoon, G., and Ratcliff, R. (1991). Textual inferences: models and measures.
In D. A. Balota, G. B. Flores d'Arcais and K. Rayner (eds). Comprehension 
Processes in Reading, 403-421.
McKoon, G., and Ratcliff, R. (1992). Inferences during reading. Psychological 
Review, 99, 440-466.
Miller, G. A., Isard, S. D. (1963). Some perceptual consequences of linguistic 
rules. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2, 217-228.
Montague, R. (1970/1974) The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary 
English. In R. Thomason (Ed.), Formal philosophy: Selected papers of Richard 
Montague. Yale University Press: New Haven.
Mostowski, A. (1957). On a generalisation of quantifiers. Fundamental 
Mathematics, 44, 12-36.
Moxey, L. M., and Sanford, A; J. (1987). Quantifiers and focus. Journal of 
Semantics, 5 , 188-206.
Moxey, L. M., and Sanford, A. J. (1993a). Communicating Quantities: A  
psychological perspective. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Moxey, L. M., and Sanford, A. J. (1993b). Prior expectation and the 
interpretation of natural language quantifiers. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 5, 73-91.
Moxey, L. M., and Sanford, A. J., and Barton, S. B. (1990). Control of attentional 
focus by quantifiers. In K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie, and G.
Erdos (Eds.), Lines of thinking, vol 1, Wiley: Chichester.
239
Newstead, S. E. (1988). Quantifiers as fuzzy concepts. In T. Zetenyi (Ed.), 
Fuzzy sets in psychology. Elsevier-North Holland: Amsterdam.
Newstead, S. E. (1993). Do verbs act as implicit quantifiers? Paper 
presented at the International Conference on the Psychology of 
Language and Communication, University of Glasgow.
Newstead, S. E., and Collis, J. M. (1987). Context and the interpretation of 
quantifiers of frequency. Ergonomics, 3 0 ,1447-1462.
Nicol, J., and Swinney, D. (1989). The role of structure in coreference 
assignment during sentence comprehension. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 
18, 5-20.
O'Brien, E. J., Duffy, S. A., and Myers, J. L. (1986). Anaphoric inference during 
reading. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cogiution, 12, 
346-352.
O'Brien, E. J., Shank, D. M., Myers, J. L., and Rayner, K. (1988). Elaborative 
inferences during reading: Do they occur on-line? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 14, 410-420.
Oakhill, J., Garnham, A., and Vonk, W. (1989). The on-line construction of 
discourse models. Language and Cognitive Processes, 4, S263-S286.
Paris, S. G. and Lindauer, B. K. (1976) The role of inference in children's 
comprehension and memory for sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 8, 217-227.
Paterson, K. B., and Edden, R. (in preparation). Anaphoric reference and 
quantifier scope ambiguity. Paper submitted to Discourse Anaphora and 
Anaphor Resolution Colloquium, Lancaster University, 17-18th July, 1996
Pepper, S., and Prytulak, L. S. (1974). Sometimes frequently means seldom: 
Context effects in the interpretation of quantitative expressions. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 8, 95-101.
Perfetti, C. A. (1994). Why inferences might be restricted. Discourse Processes, 
1 6 ,181-192.
240
Pickering, M. J., and Traxler, M. J. (submitted). Plausibility and recovery from 
garden paths.
Potts, G. R., Keenan, J. M., and Golding, J. M. (1988). Assessing the occurance 
of elaborative inferences: Lexical decision versus naming. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 27, 399-415.
Rayner, K. (1979). Eye guidance in reading: Fixation locations within words. 
Perception, 8, 21-30.
Rayner, K., and Duffy, S. A. (1986). Lexical complexity and fixation times in 
reading: Effects of word frequency, verb complexity and lexical ambiguity, 
Memory and Cognition, 14 ,191-201.
Rayner, K., and Frazier, L. (1987). Parsing temporarily ambiguous 
complements. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 39A, 657-673.
Rayner, K., and McConkie, G. W. (1976). What guides a reader's eye 
movements? Vision Research, 16, 829-837.
Rayner, K., and Pollatsek, A. (1989). The psychology of reading. Prentice-Hall: 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Rayner, K., Well, A. D., Pollatsek, A., and Bertera, J. H. (1982). The availability 
of useful information to the right of fixation during reading. Perception and 
Psychophysics, 31, 537-550.
Rickheit, G., Schnotz, W., and Strohner, H. (1985). The concept of inference in 
discourse comprehension. In G. Rickheit and H. Strohner (Eds.), Inferences in 
text processing. Elsevier: North Holland.
Sag, I. A., and Hankamer, J. (1984). Toward a theory of anaphoric processing. 
Linguistics and Philosophy, 7, 325-345.
Sanford, A. J, and Moxey, L. M. (1995). Aspects of coherence in written 
language: A psychological perspective. In T. Givon and M. Gernsbacher (Eds.), 
Coherence in spontaneous text, J. Benjamins: Amsterdam.
241
Sanford, A. J. (1990). On the nature of text-driven inference. In D. A. Balota, G. 
B. Flores d'Arcais, and K. Rayner (Eds.), Comprehension processes in reading. 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, N.J..
Sanford, A. J., and Garrod S. C. (1981). Understanding written language: 
Explorations in comprehension beyond the sentence. John Wiley and sons: 
Chichester.
Sanford, A. J., and Garrod S. C. (1989). What, when and how?: Questions of 
immediacy in anaphoric reference resolution. Language and Cognitive Processes, 
4, 235-262.
Sanford, A. J., and Garrod S. C. (1991). Referential processes in reading. In D. 
A. Balota, G. B. Flores d'Arcais, and Rayner, K, Comprehension processes in 
reading. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ.
Sanford, A. J., and Lockhart, F. E. (1990). Description types and method of 
conjoining as factors influencing plural anaphora: A confirmation study of 
focus. Journal of Semantics, 7, 365-378.
Sanford, A. J., and Moxey, L. M. (1991) Notes on plural reference and the 
scenario mapping principle in comprehension. Research Paper HCRC/RP-23, 
Human Communication Research Centre, Edinburgh University.
Sanford, A. J., Moxey, L. M., and Paterson, K. B. (1996). Attentional focusing 
with quantifiers in production and comprehension. Memory and Cognition, 24, 
144-155.
Seigel, S., and Castellan, N. J. Jr. (1988). Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral 
sciences. McGraw-Hill: New York.
Shill cock, R. (1982). The on-line resolution of pronominal anaphora. Language 
and Speech, 25, 385-401.
Singer, M. (1979). Processes of inference in sentence encoding. Memory and 
Cognition, 7 ,192-200.
Singer, M. and Ferreira, F. (1983). Inferring consequences in story 
comprehension. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 437-448.
242
Speelman, C. P., and Kirsner, K. (1990). The representation of text-based and 
situation-based information in discourse comprehension. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 2 9 ,119-132.
Stevenson, R. J., and Vitkovich, M. (1986). The comprehension of anaphoric 
relations. Language and Speech, 29, 335-357.
Tanenhaus, M. K., Caroll, J. M., and Bever, T. G. (1976). Sentence-Picture 
verification models as theories of sentence comprehension: A critique of 
Carpenter and Just. Psychological Revieiv, 83, 310-317.
Trueswell, J. C., Tanenhaus, M. K., and Gamsey, S. M. (1994). Semantic 
influences on parsing: Use of thematic information in syntactic disambiguation, 
Journal of Memory and Language, 33, 285-318.
Turing, A. M. (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 433- 
460.
Tyler, L. K. and Marslen-Wilson, W. D. (1982). The resolution of discourse 
anaphora: Some on-line studies. Text, 2, 263-291.
van Bentham, J. (1983). Determiners and logic. Linguistics and Philosophy, 6, 
447-478.
van Bentham, J. (1986). Essays in logical semantics. D. Reidel: Dordecht.
van den Broek, P., Fletcher, C. R., and Risden, K. (1993). Investigations of 
inferential processes in reading. Discourse Processes, 16, 169-180.
van Eijk, J. (1986). Aspects of quanitifcation in natural language. Unpublished 
manuscript, Rijksunersiteit Groningen.
Vendler, Z. (1967) Linguistics in Philosophy. Cornell University Press: Ithaca,
NY.
Vonk, W. (1984). Eye movements during comprehension of pronouns. In A 
Gale and F Johnson (eds.), Theoretical and applied aspects of eye movement research. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
243
Vonk, W. (1985). The immediacy of inferences in understanding pronouns. In 
G. Rickheit and H. Strohner (Eds.), Inferences in text processing. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.
Vonk, W., and Noordman, L. (1991). On the control of inferences in text 
understanding. In D. A. Balota, G. B. Flores d'Arcais, and Rayner, K, 
Comprehension processes in reading. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ.
Westerstahl, D. (1984). Determiners and context sets. In J. van Bentham and A. 
ter Meulen (Eds.), Generalised quantifiers. Foris: Dordecht.
Westerstahl, D. (1989). Quantifiers in formal and natural languages. In D. 
Gabbay, and F. Guenthner (Eds.), Handbook of philosophical logic, 4 ,1-131.
Winer. B. J. (1971). Statistical principles in experimental design. McGraw-Hill: 
New York.
Yule, G. (1981). Interpreting anaphora without identifying reference. Journal of 
Semantics, 1, 315-322.
Zwaan, R. A., and Graesser, A. C. (1992). Reading goals and situation models. 
PSYCOLOQUY 3(64) reading-inference-.3
Zwarts, F. (to appear). Three types of polarity. In F. Hamm and E. Hinrichs 
(Eds.), Semantics.
244
Appendix 1: 
Experimental and filler materials for 
Experiments 1 to 4 
Experimental materials.
The following is a list of the experimental materials used in Experiments 1 to 4. 
The alternative forms for the quantifier and reference manipulations are listed 
in square brackets. These were quantified b y  a few  and few in Experiments 1 & 
3, and quantified by many and not many in Experiments 2 & 4. Experiments 2 & 
4 were eye tracking studies in which the experimental materials were divided 
into regions text prior to analysis. The regions divisions are indicated by 
slashes.
Writing an essay.
The literature students were set an essay on Samuel Beckett 
and modern literary theory. /  [A few | Few] of the students produced 
readable results. /Their [clarity | confusion]/dem onstra ted /how  well they 
understood the topic.
Was the essay on Harold Pinter?
On an identity parade.
Some soldiers from the local barracks were put on an identity 
parade alongside the accused man. /[A  few | Few] of the soldiers looked 
like the accused. /Their [similarities | differences] /w ere mentioned /b y  the 
victim.
At the funfair.
After having a ride on the big wheel a group of college students 
decided to try the coconut shy. /  [A few | Few] of the students managed to 
hit a coconut. /Their [accuracy | innacuracy] /earned /  them a commiseration 
prize.
In a hospital.
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The doctor needed permission from some of the patients before 
she tested a new drug on them. /[A  few | Few] of the patients agreed to 
act as guinea pigs. /Their [consent | refusal] /  was noted /b y  the hospital 
registrar.
Testing job applicants.
Prospective air traffic controllers had to fill in a personality 
questionnaire then sit a series of aptitude tests. /  [A few | Few] of the 
applicants passed. /Their [success | failure]/confirmed / the organiser's 
expectations.
A job offer.
Some accountancy trainees were offered a job with a major
international company. /[A  few | Few] of the accountants agreed to
work for the company. /Their [acceptance | rejection] /  was sent /b y  return of
post.
In the court.
Some local youths were arrested during a police raid at a party 
and accused of drug-dealing. /  [A few | Few] of the youths were found 
guilty of the crime. /Their [aquittal | conviction] /  was /a  relief to the whole 
neighbourhood/.
Coal mining.
The Coal Board wanted to increase productivity by making 
changes to working practices. /  [A few | Few] of the miners believed the 
promises of job safety. /Their [trust | distrust] /  was /  the result of a 
previous deal.
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A: tlhe gym.
Somie weight-lifters from the gym competed to see who could
lilt ai heavy dumb-bell. /  [A few | Few] of the weight-lifters managed to
lilt iit off the ground. /Their [strength | weakness] / surprised /  their friends.
Getting exam results.
The girls crowded round the notice-board to see the
examination results for chemistry and biology. /[A  few | Few] of the girls
did very well. /Their [joy | grief] /  was /uncontrollable.
Running a marathon.
Some boys decided to enter the marathon. /  [A few | Few] of the boys 
finished the race. /Their [fitness | unfitness]/su rp rised /th e ir friends.
In the train station.
Passengers often had difficulty finding the platform for the 
evening train to Birmingham. /[A few | Few] of the staff were willing to 
give directions. /Their [helpfulness | unhelpfulness]/w as repo rted /to  the 
manager.
At the theatre.
At the end of the performance the actors came to the front of 
the stage and took a bow. /  [A few | Few] of the audience expressed 
appreciation. /Their [applause | silence ] /w as /a  surprise to the theatre 
manager.
In the office.
The insurance office had a new computer system installed over
247
the Christmas holidays. /  [A few | Few] of the secretaries had previously 
used the system. /Their [experience | inexperience] /m ade /the  others feel 
more relaxed.
In the bar.
One of the barstaff liked to joke with female customers when
they asked for a drink. /  [A few | Few] of the woman appreciated his
sense of humour. /Their [pleasure | displeasure] /  was /obvious to everyone.
In a restaurant.
The office party went to an Italian restaurant for their 
Christmas dinner. /[A  few | Few] of the office staff treated the waiter 
with any respect. /Their [courtesy | rudeness] /  was reported / to the office 
manager.
Going to a party.
The girls asked their parents if they could go to an all-night 
party at a class-mate's house. /[A  few | Few] of the parents allowed their 
daughter to go. /Their [laxness | strictness] / reflected / their own up­
bringing.
A public meeting.
Local MP's were invited to take part in a public inquiry about 
proposals to build a nuclear power station. /  [A few | Few] of the MP's 
attended the meeting. /Their [presence | ab sen ce]/h e lp ed /th e  meeting run 
more smoothly.
At a boy-scout camp.
It was dark before the boy-scouts finished putting up the tents
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and collected wood for a camp-fire. /[A  few | Few] of the scouts went to 
bed immediately. /Their [wakefulness | sleepiness] /an n o y ed /th e  
scoutmaster.
In a classroom.
The trainee mathematics teacher was nervous about giving her 
first unsupervised lesson in such a rough school. /  [A few | Few] of the 
class misbehaved. /Their [quietness | no isiness]/w as rep o rted /to  the real 
teacher.
At the football match.
The stadium was packed to see Falkirk play East Stirling in the
final of the Stirlingshire Cup. /  [A few | Few] of the Falkirk fans expected
Falkirk to win. /Their [optimism | pessim ism ]/ was rew arded/ by an early
goal.
At a church meeting.
The evangelist told the audience that he would cure the sick 
and disabled among them. /  [A few | Few] of the audience thought that he 
could perform miracles. /Their [belief | disbelief] /w as shared /b y  the 
church authorities.
At the swimming pool.
A class of school children had been taking swimming lessons for 
the last couple of weeks. /  [A few | Few] of the children could manage 
the back-stroke. /Their [competence | incom petence]/surprised / the 
instructor.
Caught shop-lifting.
A group of boys were suspected of stealing magazines and
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sweets from the newsagents on the corner. /  [A few | Few] of the boys 
admitted to the crime. /Their [honesty | dishonesty] /  affected /  the 
punishment they received.
Filler materials for Experiment 1 & 3
The folowing materials were used as filler items in Experiment 1. Some of 
these were materials for another experiment. The alternative forms for that 
experimental manipulation are displayed in brackets.
In a taxi
A taxi-driver dropped a man and a woman off at the station.
On the way they had run into a traffic jam. The taxi-driver 
and the woman had been arguing but the man had remained 
calm. The taxi-driver told the woman that he had been 
arguing with that she wouldn't miss the train.
Studying for exams
A student had been working hard for her exams. On the way 
to the library she met two boys from her tutorial group. The 
student and one of the boys had been studying together but 
the other never seemed to work. The student told the boy 
that had been studying with her that his friend was a bad 
influence.
Crossing the channel.
A coach party was booked on the hovercraft from Dover to
Calais. On arriving at Dover the coach passengers were
annoyed to find that the hovercraft was cancelled due to
poor weather. After complaining to the hovercraft company
they took a ferry. The [ferry was | ferries were] three hours late to Calais
and they missed their connection.
Going to the opera.
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Alison and her friends were given free tickets for the opera
at Covent Garden. The girls were excited about going, but at
the same time worried that they would look scruffy
compared to the rest of the audience. Before the show they
hired an expensive dress. The [dress was | dresses were] made from pure
silk.
In a department store.
The department store employed a team of plain-clothes
security guards to protect the stock. The security guards
walked around the store and kept in contact with each other
using walkie-talkies. After only an hour on the job they
caught a shop-lifter. The [shop-lifter was | shop-lifters were] handed over to
the police.
At a school.
The headmaster had reached retirement age and the school 
needed to replace him. Most of the teachers at the school 
were keen to get the job since it meant a much larger salary.
As soon as the post was advertised they requested an
application form. The [application form was | application forms were ]
sent by return of post.
At the Post Office.
There was a crowd of people waiting for the Post Office to
open. When it was opened there was only one assistant
serving behind the counter. To get served quickly they
formed a queue. The [queue was | queues were] stretched to the door.
At the Booker Prize.
It was well-known that the authors short-listed for the
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Booker Prize hated each other. However the authors had 
avoided making public comments before the final decision 
had been reached. After the awards ceremony they allowed 
an interview. The [interview was | interviews were] highly 
critical of the competition.
In the hospital
After the surgeon examined the girl with the broken leg, he 
decided he would have to take immediate action. He he'd had a 
lot of experience with serious injuries and knew what to do 
next. He quickly injected the girl with a painkiller.
At the airport
A film star arrived at Heathrow and was surrounded by 
journalists. They noticed two women who seemed to be with him. 
The film star and one of the women had been travelling together 
but the other woman was a friend who had come to meet them.
The film star told the woman that he had been travelling with 
that the journalists were a real drag.
The union meeting.
The factory workers were furious when the management 
refused to give a wage rise. They organised a meeting to call 
for some form of action. After a short debate they passed a 
strike motion. The [motion was | motions were] to take effect from 
the next day.
Watching a tennis match.
The Wimbledon crowd were prepared for bad weather. The 
forecast was for heavy thunderstorms so they were dressed 
in waterproofs. As soon as it started to rain they put up an
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umbrella. The [umbrella was | umbrellas were] not enough to keep them dry. 
Robbing a bank.
The burglars had broken into the bank in the early hours of 
the morning. They smashed open the safe and stole several 
thousand pounds. Before leaving the bank they were 
recorded on a video. The [video was | video s were] produced as 
evidence in court.
Arresting terrorist suspects.
After the terrorist bombing the police rounded up a number 
of suspects. The suspects were taken to separate police 
stations and questioned for hours. After a while they made 
a confession. The [confession was | confessions were] later 
retracted in court.
In parliament.
The MP's were holding a debate on the state of the economy.
The evasiveness of the government spokepersons was 
annoying the MP's. Eventually it became too much and they 
heckled a speaker. The [speaker was | speakers were] forced to 
sit down.
Visiting grandparents.
Mr Smith always offered his grandchildren some fruit when 
they visited him. Today the grandchildren could choose 
between apples and pears. After looking the fruit over they 
took an apple. The [apple was | apples were] sour and made the 
children feel sick.
At the library
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John was being teased by two female friends for working too 
hard in the library. After a few really cutting remarks he got 
very angry. John hit the girl with a book.
In the street
A burglar looked over most of the houses in the street.
Several of them had lights on so he concentrated on the 
others. Eventually he picked his target and broke in by the 
rear window.
Collecting for charity.
An Oxfam supporter was collecting money for development 
work in Bangladesh. He stopped passing shoppers and asked 
them to make a donation. After giving some money they 
signed a petition. The [petition was | petitions were] calling for an 
increase in Third World aid.
At a Youth Hostel.
As the weather was very bad the boy-scouts had decided to
stay at a nearby Youth Hostel for the night. The boys were
shown to a large communal dormitory. Before unpacking
they chose a bed. The [bed was | beds were] hard and uncomfortable.
Glue-sniffing.
A group of glue-sniffers usually hung around the stairwell of
the block of flats. They annoyed the residents who reported
them to the police. The glue-sniffers decided to take
revenge. After piling newspapers in the stairwell, they
started a fire. The [fire was | fires were] put out by one of the residents.
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Caught by a policeman.
A policeman caught some boys writing graffiti on a wall. He
asked them for their names and addresses. After a pause
they gave a false name. The [name was | names were] not good enough to
fool the policeman and he arrested them.
At the cinema.
The girls agreed to go to the cinema but could not decide
which film to watch. One of them liked horror films, while
another preferred adventure films. After an argument they
decided on a comedy. The [comedy was | comedies were] showing at the
Odeon cinema.
At a party.
Everyone at the party had to provide some entertainment.
The more musical guests played guitar or sang. Some of the
boys were too embarrassed to sing. As an alternative they
told a joke. The [joke was | jokes were] appreciated by the other guests.
On a train
John was sitting next to an old woman in the train. After an 
hour the woman fell off her chair and lay on the ground 
moaning in pain. John panicked and pulled the emergency 
cord. The train came to a halt.
At the village hall
A woman was giving dancing lessons in the village hall. Among 
her pupils were two builders from the village. The woman and 
one of the builder danced together but the other just sat and
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watched. The woman told the builder that his footwork needed 
more practice.
After the concert.
After the concert the band packed their equipment into a
van. They found it easiest to pack the light instruments into
the van first. After packing the guitars into the van they
carried a piano. The [piano was | pianos were] the last instrument on
board.
At a funeral.
By coincidence all of John's uncles died in the same week.
They were given separate funerals in different parts of the 
country, and John attended them all. It turned out that they 
had left a will. The [will was | wills were] very generous to John.
On a building site.
The building contractors had hired some plasterers too early.
To cover up the mistake the bricklayers were persuaded to 
speed up their own work. Before the end of the shift they 
finished a house. The [house was | houses were] enough to keep the 
plasterers busy for a while.
In a school.
The new school principal was very strict and introduced a 
number of new rules. Girls were not allowed to wear make­
up or jewellery. No-one was happy with the new rules, and 
the sixth year girls were furious. As an act of rebellion they 
wore a necklace. The [necklace was | necklaces were] enough to have 
them suspended.
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A saxophone quartet.
The saxophone quartet had spent some time touring the 
United States. Their performances were acclaimed and they 
were tipped for the big-time. After a few months rest they 
recorded an album. The [album was | albums were] appreciated by 
the critics.
On a summer holiday.
During the summer Tom's friends travelled all over the 
world. One went to Australia, one went to Canada while 
others visited different parts of Europe. Before coming home 
they sent him a postcard. The [postcard was | postcards were] 
enough to make Tom feel envious.
Filler materials for Experiments 2 & 4
The following materials were used as filler items in Experiment 2. Some of 
these were materials for another experiment. The alternative forms for that 
experimental manipulation are displayed in brackets.
In a taxi.
A taxi-driver dropped a man and a woman off. at the station.
On the way they had run into a traffic jam. The taxi-driver 
and the woman had been arguing but the man had remained 
calm. The taxi-driver told the woman that he had been 
arguing with that she wouldn't miss the train.
Studying for exams.
A student had been working hard for her exams. On the way 
to the library she met two boys from her tutorial group. The 
student and one of the boys had been studying together but 
the other never seemed to work. The student told the boy 
that had been studying with her that his friend was a bad
influence.
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Crossing the channel.
A coach party was booked on the hovercraft from Dover to
Calais. On arriving at Dover the coach passengers were
annoyed to find that the hovercraft was cancelled due to poor
weather. After complaining to the hovercraft company, they
took a ferry. Their [ferry was | ferries were] the last one(s) to leave from
Dover that day.
Going to the opera.
Alison and her friends were given free tickets for the opera
at Covent Garden. The girls were excited about going, but at
the same time worried that they would look scruffy compared
to the rest of the audience. Before the show they hired an
expensive dress. The [dress was | dresses were] the prettiest one(s) that
the girls had ever worn in their lives.
In a department store.
The department store employed a team of plain-clothes
security guards to protect the stock. The security guards
walked around the store and kept in contact with each other
using walkie-talkies. After only an hour on the job, they
caught a shoplifter. Their [shop-lifter was | shop-lifters were] the only one(s)
that the department store caught that day.
At a school.
The headmaster had reached retirement age and the school 
needed to replace him. Most of the teachers at the school were 
keen to get the job since it meant a much larger salary. As 
soon as the post was advertised they requested an application 
form. Their [application form was | application forms were] the
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only one(s) that the committee considered for the post.
At the Post Office.
There was a crowd of people waiting for the Post Office to
open. When it was opened there was only one assistant
serving behind the counter. To get served quickly, they formed
a queue. Their [queue was | queues were] the slowest one(s) that the customers
had ever waited in.
The Booker Prize.
It was well-known that the authors short-listed for the 
Booker Prize hated each other. However the authors had 
avoided making public comments before the final decision 
had been reached. After the awards ceremony they gave an 
interview. The [interview was | interviews were] the only one(s) 
that the authors gave on the subject.
In the hospital.
After the surgeon examined the girl with the broken leg, he 
decided he would have to take immediate action. He'd had a 
lot of experience with serious injuries and knew what to do 
next. He quickly injected the girl with a painkiller.
At the airport.
A film star arrived at Heathrow and was surrounded by 
journalists. They noticed two women who seemed to be with him.
The film star and one of the women had been travelling together 
but the other woman was a friend who had come to meet them.
The film star told the woman that he had been travelling with 
that the journalists were a real drag.
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The union meeting.
A group of factory workers were furious when the management 
refused to give a wage rise. They organised a union meeting to 
call for some form of action. After a short debate, they passed 
a strike motion. The [strike motion was | strike motions were] the 
first one(s) that the union had passed in years.
Watching a tennis match.
The Wimbledon crowd were prepared for bad weather. The 
forecast was for heavy thunderstorms so they were dressed 
in waterproofs. As soon as it started to rain they put up an 
umbrella. The [umbrella was | umbrellas were] the biggest one(s) 
that the officials allowed into the court.
Robbing a bank.
The burglars had broken into the bank in the early hours of 
the morning. They smashed open the safe and stole several 
thousand pounds. Before leaving the bank, they were recorded 
on video. The [video recording was | video recording were} the 
best clue that the police had to their identity
Arresting terrorist suspects.
After the terrorist bombing the police rounded up a number 
of suspects. The suspects were taken to separate police 
stations and questioned for hours. After a while they gave a 
confession. Their [confession was | confessions were] the unlikeliest one(s) 
that the judge had heard in his career.
In parliament.
The MP's were holding a debate on the state of the economy.
The evasiveness of the government spokespersons was
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annoying the MP's. When it became too much they heckled 
a speaker. Their [target was | targets were] the dullest speakers 
in the debate that day.
Visiting grandparents.
Mr Smith always offered his grandchildren some fruit when 
they visited him. Today the grandchildren could choose between 
apples and pears. After looking the fruit over they took 
an apple. Their [apple was | apples were] the juiciest one(s) that the 
children had tasted in weeks.
At the library.
John was being teased by two female friends for working too 
hard in the library. After a few really cutting remarks he got 
very angry. John hit the girl with a book.
In the street.
A burglar looked over most of the houses in the street.
Several of them had lights on so he concentrated on the 
others. Eventually he picked his target and broke in by the 
rear window.
Collecting for charity.
Some Oxfam supporters were collecting money for development
work in Bangladesh. They stopped passing shoppers and asked
them to make a donation. After giving some money, they signed a
petition. The [petition was | petitions were] the largest one(s) that Oxfam had
organised for many years.
At a Youth Hostel.
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As the weather was very bad the boy-scouts had decided to 
stay at a nearby Youth Hostel for the night. The boys were 
shown to a large communal dormitory. Before unpacking they 
chose a bed. The [bed was | bed were] the hardest one(s) that the boys 
had ever slept on in their lives.
Glue-sniffing.
A group of glue-sniffers usually hung around the stairwell of 
the block of flats. They annoyed the residents who reported 
them to the police. The glue-sniffers decided to take 
revenge. After piling newspapers in the stairwell, they 
started a fire. The [fire was | fires were] the worst one(s) that the 
flats had suffered for many years.
Caught by a policeman.
A policeman caught some boys spraying graffiti on a wall.
He took out his notebook and asked the boys for their names
and addresses. After thinking for a moment they gave a
false name. The [false name was | false names were] the worst one(s)
that the policeman had heard in his career.
At the cinema.
The girls decided to go to the cinema but could not decide which 
film they wanted to watch. One of them liked science fiction and 
another preferred adventure films. After a heated argument they 
decided on a comedy. The [film was | films were] the best one(s) that the 
girls had seen in months.
At a party.
Everyone at the party had to provide some entertainment.
The more musical guests played guitar or sang. Some of the 
boys were too embarrassed to sing. As an alternative they
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told a joke. Their [joke was | jokes were] the worst one(s) that the other 
guests had heard in a long time.
On a train.
John was sitting next to an old woman in the train. After an 
hour the woman fell off her chair and lay on the ground 
moaning in pain. John panicked and pulled the emergency 
cord. The train came to a halt.
At the village hall.
A woman was giving dancing lessons in the village hall. Among 
her pupils were two builders from the village. The woman and 
one of the builder danced together but the other just sat and 
watched. The woman told the builder that his footwork needed 
more practice.
After the concert.
After the concert the musicians packed their equipment into 
a van. They found it easiest to pack the light instruments 
into the van first. After packing the guitars, they carried 
a piano. The [piano was | pianos were] the last instrument(s) that 
the musicians loaded into the van.
At a funeral.
By coincidence several of John's uncles died in the same week.
They were given separate funerals in different parts of the 
country, and John attended them all. It turned out that they 
had left a will. The [will was | wills were] the most generous one(s) 
that Tom had heard in his life.
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On a building site.
The building contractors had hired some plasterers too early.
To cover up the mistake the bricklayers were persuaded to speed 
up their own work. Before the end of the shift they finished 
a house. Their [house was | houses were] the first one(s) that the plasterers 
tackled that week.
In a school.
The new school principal was very strict and introduced a 
number of new rules. Girls were not allowed to wear make­
up or jewellery. No-one was happy with the new rules, and 
the sixth year girls were furious. As an act of rebellion they 
wore a necklace. Their [necklace was | necklace were] the first thing 
that the principal saw that morning.
A saxophone quartet.
The saxophone quartet had spent some time touring the United 
States. Their performances were acclaimed and they were tipped 
for the big-time. After a few months rest, they recorded an 
album. Their [album was | albums were] the best one(s) that the critics 
had heard for many years.
On a summer holiday.
During the summer Tom's friends travelled all over the world.
One went to Australia, one went to Canada while others visited 
different parts of Europe. Before coming home they sent a 
postcard. Their [postcard was | postcards were] the only one(s) that Tom 
received that summer.
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Appendix 2: 
Materials for Experiment 5 
Experimental materials
The following are the set of experimental materials used in Experiment 5, with 
their region of analysis divisions. The alternative quantifier and reference 
manipulations are highlighted, and the critical anaphoric region is italicised. 
The materials were double lined-spaced in the presentation.
At the boy-scout camp
It was late before the boy-scouts had finished setting-up
camp. /[A  few | Few] of the boys were [wide awake | very tired] after the
work, /so  /they slept /soundly /until /m orning /arrived.
In a retirement home
All of the residents were usually in the TV room during
Brookside. /  [A few | Few] of the residents were [excited | bored] with the
plot, /so  / they watched /intently /when /the  programme /began.
Was Coronation Street on the TV?
Caught shop-lifting
A group of school-boys were suspected of stealing from the
local shop. /  [A few | Few] of the boys were [innocent | guilty] of the
crime,/so / they confessed / immediately /  when / the police / arrived.
At the theatre
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The local theatre company put on a controversial work.
/[A few | Few] of the audience were [pleased by | disgusted] by the 
performance/, so / they applauded /appreciatively /w hen /  the play /finished.
At a conference
The conference delegates used the university cafeteria for
lunch. /  [A few | Few] of the delegates were [impressed | disappointed] with
the food/, so /they complained /bitterly / when /a  manager / arrived.
Did the delegates use the university cafeteria?
Keeping fit
The security guards were almost all unfit and overweight.
/[A few | Few] of the men were [enthusiastic | apathetic] about improving 
their health/, so /  they exercised /  vigorously /before /  the shift started.
In a hospital
Some medical students had the chance to participate in a drugs
trial. /[A  few | Few] of the students were [keen | reluctant] to take part,/
so / they refused / pointedly /  when /the  medical authorities / asked.
Going to a party
Some of the school-boys asked their parents for beer to take to
the party. /[A  few | Few] of the parents [allowed | forbade] underage
drinking,/ so /  they agreed /willingly /  when /the  boys /asked.
In the classroom
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The teacher lectured the entire class about behaving
properly. /  [A few | Few] of the children were [praised | scolded] by the
teacher, /so  /  they wept /tearfully /until /their parents /  arrived.
Visiting grandparents
The grandfather always told the children about his time in
the navy. /[A  few | Few] of the children were [interested in | tired of ] the
stories, /so  /  they listened /carefully /until /  their bedtime /came.
Was the grandfather in the navy?
Sitting exams
The students found that a hectic social life interfered with
their studies. /[A  few | Few] of the students [attended to | ignored] their
work, /so  /  they failed /  miserably /  when /  the exams /  were marked.
In the pub
Some men were playing on the fruit machine in the
pub. /[A  few | Few] of the men [won | lost] a lot of m oney,/
so /  they celebrated /extravagantly /until /  the bar /closed.
Catching a bus
As usual the bus was busy with commuters during rush
hour. /[A  few | Few] of the commuters [managed | failed] to get a seat,
so / they stood /awkwardly /until /  the journey /  was over.
Did the commuters travel by train?
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Catching flu.
The school was warned that a lot of children might fall prey to 
a flu epidemic. /[A  few | Few] of the children [caught | avoided] the 
virus,/so / they sneezed / constantly / until / the infection /h ad  passed.
At the protest march
The animal rights demonstrators were badly treated by the
police. /[A  few | Few] of the demonstrators [supported | condemned] the
police action, /so  / they protested / vociferously /un til /an  apology / was given.
After the accident
The police blamed dangerous drivers for a major motorway
pile-up. /  [A few | Few] of the drivers [admitted | denied] responsibility,
so /  they apologised /profusely /  when /the  police /arrived.
Catching a train
Commuters were always in a hurry to catch the London
train. /[A  few | Few] of the commuters were [early | late] for the train,/
so /  they sprinted /frantically /before /the  train /departed.
In the university
A number of university staff were offered early
retirement. /[A  few | Few] of the staff [accepted | rejected] the offer,/ 
so /  they retired / gracefully /  when /  the academic year / finished.
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At the school football match
Some boys from the local team were playing against a nearby
school. /[A  few | Few] of the boys were [friendly | hostile] to the other team,
/so  / they argued / incessantly /until /the  game /w as abandoned.
After a shipwreck
Most of the passengers dived overboard when the ship
sank. /  [A few | Few] of the passengers [managed | struggled] to stay afloat, 
/so  / they zuaited / calmly / until / the rescue services /  arrived.
Did most of the passengers dive overboard?
At the casino
A group of men won a lot of money on the roulette
wheel. /  [A few | Few] of the men were [careful | careless] with their
winnings, /so  /  they gambled / recklessly / until / the money /  was gone.
Were the men playing poker?
In parliament
MPs were scheduled to debate increased taxation for gas and 
electricity. /  [A few | Few] of the MPs were [present | absent] from the 
debate, / so /  they voted / unanimously /after / the motion /  was debated.
In the bar
One of the barstaff always made sexist remarks to female
customers. /  [A few | Few] of the women [appreciated | detested] his sense of
humour, /so  /  they objected / vocally /  when /  the manager / arrived.
After the election
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A crowd of people gathered to hear the election
result. /[A  few | Few] of the crowd felt [glad | sad] about the outcome,/ 
so I they clapped /enthusiastically /  when /th e  winner /spoke.
At playschool
The children all wanted to play with one of the toys at the
same time. /  [A few | Few] of the children were [passive | aggressive] by
nature, /so  /  they fought /violently /until /  the toy /broke.
After a hijacking
The hijackers were trapped in the aircraft and surrounded by
police. /[A  few | Few] of the hijackers wanted to [continue | end] the siege,
/so  / they surrendered /  unconditionally /before /the  police /attacked.
At the demonstration
The local council wanted to build a new road through the
city. /  [A few | Few] of the local residents [approved | opposed] the new
road, /so  /they demonstrated /noisily / when /the  workmen / arrived.
Did the local council want to build a road?
At the trial
Some Irishmen living in London were accused of terrorist
activities. /[A  few | Few] of the Irishmen were [aquitted | convicted] at the
trial, /so  /  they rejoiced / triumphantly /w hen /they  /w ere released.
Were the Irishmen living in Belfast?
A student house
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A group of students moved into a new house.
/[A few | Few] of students felt [warm | cold] in the house,/ 
so /  they shivered /  icily / until /  the heating / came on.
Begging in the street
A tramp was pestering shoppers to give him some
money. /[A  few | Few] of the shoppers [offered | refused] to help,/
so /  they donated I generously /  when /  the man /approached.
On holiday abroad
A group of tourists drank untreated tap water in the hotel.
/  [A few | Few] of the tourists [suffered | avoided] a bout of food poisoning, 
/so  / they vomited /copiously /until /the  doctor /arrived.
After a robbery
Local residents had suffered a spate of robberies.
/ [A few | Few] of the residents [agreed | declined] to join the neighbourhood 
watch, /so  /  they patrolled / regularly / until /  the thefts /stopped.
Filler materials
The following are the set of filler materials. Many of these were experimental 
materials for another study. Their alternative forms are listed in brackets.
The emergency crew asked [who would treat the accident victim. | where to 
treat the accident victim.] Skilfully the victim was treated by the [eager nurse | 
grass verge] immediately.
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The head gardener decided [who should plant the shrubs. | where to plant the 
shrubs.] In the end the shrubs were planted by the [apprentice | greenhouse] 
that morning.
The lawyer explained [who had found the lost document. | where to find the 
lost document.] It seemed that the file was found by the [personnel manager | 
shredding machine] last night.
The lecturer did not know [who would find his lost wallet. | where to find his 
lost wallet.] Luckily the wallet was discovered by the [student teachers | 
theatre entrance ] last night.
The general announced [who would carry out the ambush. | where to carry out 
the ambush.] As planned the convoy was ambushed by the [commando officers 
| deserted building} the next day.
The student knew [who had performed the burial of the man. | where the 
burial of the man took place.] Without doubt, the man was buried by the 
{bishop}/{chapel} twenty years ago.
The teacher decided [who should hide the prize. | where to hide the prize.
After some thought the prize was hidden by the [intelligent pupil | 
grandfather clock] that afternoon.
The girl heard [who had discovered the body. | where the discovery of the 
body occurred.] Sadly, the body was discovered by the [grieving cousin | 
isolated stable] that afternoon.
The manager decided [who should arrest the shoplifter. | where to arrest the 
shoplifter.] Discreetly the shoplifter was arrested by the [security guard | 
changing rooms] very promptly.
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The policeman wanted to know [who had carried out the stabbing | where the 
stabbing took place.] Apparently, the youngster was stabbed by the [convicts | 
tenement] last week.
The mafia had decided [who was to detonate the bomb. | where to detonate 
the bomb.] As intended, the bomb was detonated by the [nervous gangster | 
railway platform] during the night.
The driver asked [who would unload the delivery van. | where to unload the 
delivery van.] In fact, the van was unloaded by the [bored assistant | empty 
warehouse] very quickly.
The newscaster described [who had carried out the attacks. | where the attacks 
took place.] In fact the crimes were committed by the [sadistic mugger | 
desolate bridge] during the night.
The hotel staff wondered [who would find the lost girl. | where to find the lost 
girl.] In the end the child was discovered by the [manageress | escalator] 
during the evening.
The florist enquired [who had sold the last of the flowers. | where to sell the 
last of the flowers.] In fact, the flowers were sold by the [teenager | roadside] 
during the morning.
The producer announced [who would conduct the interview. | where to 
conduct the interview.] As usual, the athlete was interviewed by the [anxious 
youth | running track] after the final.
The farmer asked [who had pitched the big tent. | where to pitch the big tent.] 
Surprisingly, the tent was pitched by the [girl guide | deep river last month.
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The police identified [what had caused the accident. | where the accident 
happened.] It turned out that the cyclist was knocked down by the [juggernaut 
| roundabout] that morning.
The owner pointed out [who had trained the horse. | where to train the horse.] 
Unusually, the horse was trained by the [proud jockeys | m uddy paddock] last 
year.
The admiral decided [who should moor the ship. | where to moor the ship. As 
ordered, the ship was moored by the {captain}/{harbour} straight away.
The cop noted [who assaulted the foreman. | where the assault of the foreman 
occurred.] In fact, the foreman was assaulted by the [tattooed miner | colliery 
gates] that evening.
The police wondered [who would find the m urder victims. | where to find the 
m urder victims.] At last the bodies were dug up by the [gardeners | riverside] 
the next day.
The duke decided [who should set up the huge marquee. | where to set up the 
huge marquee.] As ordered, the marquee was set up by the [attendant | 
fountains] during the morning.
The supervisor asked [who would refuel the jumbo jet. | where to refuel the 
jumbo jet.] Finally the plane was refuelled by the [tired pilots | empty hangar] 
late on Friday.
The fact that the meat had gone down in price surprised the butcher 
who was struggling to make ends meet.
Singing aloud always embarrassed the man.
He would mime to hymns in church in future.
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The four weeks running up to Christmas are always hectic.
Jessica enjoyed a good bedtime story.
Within moments of her dad reading, she fell asleep.
The mechanic took a spanner from his toolbox.
It would be easy to fix the motorbike.
Every day the bus was about ten minutes late.
This made the passengers anxious and irritable.
The lion let out a huge roar to the hunter.
It was very protective of its young.
The loud music was not very appealing to the girl 
who hated parties.
Leaves on the track caused the angry businessman to be delayed 
for his important meeting.
The black Labrador enjoyed chasing after large wooden sticks 
which his owner often threw for him.
The baker took the loaf out of the oven.
He would enjoy eating it for his lunch.
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Appendix 3: 
Materials for Experiments 6 & 7
Materials for Experiment 6
The following are the set of materials used in Experiment 6. These were 
presented to subjects in one of four continuation conditions. Either the plural 
pronoun began a new sentence, or was conjoined to the quantified sentence by 
and, but or because. The materials were also presented in one of two forms, 
where the quantified sentence either matched or violated pragmatic norms. 
These alternative forms are highlighted.
In the mathematics tutorial class.
At the end of term, all of the post-graduate mathematics 
students tried to answer an 'O-grade' exam paper for some fun.
Only a few of the post-graduates were able to answer [more | less] than 
three questions. They /  and they /bu t they /  because t hey . . .
Working in a supermarket.
The supermarket desperately needed extra staff during 
the weeks before Christmas, so the manager hired some 
students. Only a few of the students were [on time | late] 
each morning. They / and they /bu t they /  because they . . .
Getting exam results.
The girls crowded around the notice-board to see the exam 
results for chemistry and biology. Only a few of the girls 
scored more than [ninety | five] percent. They /an d  they /bu t they /  
because t hey . . .
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At the graduation ceremony.
The University's graduation ceremony was always an 
extremely expensive affair. Only a few of the students 
could afford to hire [graduation robes at seven pounds 
a day | a Rolls-Royce at one hundred pounds 
a day]. They /an d  they /bu t they /  because they . . .
In a restaurant.
The office party went to an up-market Italian restaurant for 
their Christmas dinner. Only a few of the office staff [offered 
to buy the waiter a drink | ate with their m ouths closed]. 
They /an d  they /bu t they /  because they . . .
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Materials for Experiment 7
Experimental materials
The following are the set of experimental materials used in Experiment 7. The 
alternative quantifier and reference manipulations are highlighted. The 
materials were double lined-spaced in the presentation.
At the gym.
Some expert weight-lifters from the gym held a weight-lifting
competition. Only a few of the weight-lifters managed to lift
the [heaviest | lightest] dumbbell. Their [strength | weakness] was a surprise
to their friends.
Was the competition held in a gym?
In the mathematics tutorial class.
At the end of term, all of the post-graduate mathematics 
students tried to answer an 'O-grade' exam paper for some fun.
Only a few of the post-graduates were able to answer [more | less] than 
three questions. Their [competence | incompetence] was a surprise to 
the rest of the class.
Working in a supermarket.
The supermarket desperately needed extra staff during
the weeks before Christmas, so the manager hired some
students. Only a few of the students were [on time | late]
each morning. Their [enthusiasm | laziness] was noted by the manager.
At the funfair.
After having a ride on the big wheel a group of college students
decided to try the coconut shy. Only a few of the students
managed to [hit all three coconuts | could throw in the right direction]. Their
[accuracy | inaccuracy] was a surprise to their friends.
Had the students been on the rollercoaster?
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At the train station.
Clapham Junction was busy all day with commuters waiting for
connecting trains into London. Only a few of the trains arrived
[ahead of schedule | on time]. Their [early | late] arrival annoyed the station
master.
At a party.
Graeme hired the local club for his stag-night party. He invited all of his rugby 
club friends, and felt sure that it would be a wild night. Only a few of the 
guests [were still standing by the end of the night | insisted on drinking 
orange juice all night]. Their [sobriety | drunkeness] disappointed Graeme. 
Was it Graeme's stag night party?
Comparing heights.
All the women in the office decided to compare height using 
a tape measure. Only a few of the women were over [four | six] 
feet tall. Their [tallness | shortness] amused the others.
A health inspection.
The [athletic club | cancer ward] carried out a routine health inspection of 
its patients. Only a few of the [patients | members] were declared fit 
and well. Their [good | poor] health surprised the health inspector.
In the office.
The insurance office had a computer system installed over the 
Christmas break. Only a few of the secretaries had [previously 
used this particular system | seen a computer]. Their [experience | 
inexperience] was noted by the office manager.
Were the computers installed over Easter?
Running a marathon.
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Some boys from a local college decided to enter the London 
marathon. Only a few of the boys finished the race with 
[a reasonable time | record-breaking time]. Their [fitness | unfitness] 
was a surprise to their friends.
At the theatre.
At the end of the performance the actors came to the front of 
the stage and took a bow. Only a few of the audience [showed 
their appreciation | gave a long standing ovation]. Their [applause | 
silence] was noted by the theatre critics.
Caught by a policeman.
A policeman shouted to some boys to stop spraying graffiti
on a wall. Only a few of the boys [paid attention to him  and
stopped | called him sir and apologised]. Their [respect | disrespect] amused
the policeman.
Buying CD's.
The boys went to John Menzies to buy some compact 
discs. Only a few of the CD's cost less than [three | thirty] 
pounds. Their [expensiveness | cheapness] surprised the boys.
Did the boys go to HMV?
In the train station.
Passengers often had difficulty finding the correct
platform for the evening train to Birmingham. Only a few
of the staff [were willing to listen to passengers | would escort the passengers
to the platform] questions. Their [helpfulness | unhelpfulness] was reported
to their manager.
Did the passenger want the Birmingham train?
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At the swimming pool.
A class of school children had been taking swimming lessons for 
the last three years. Only a few of the children could manage [a 
breadth of the pool | thirty lengths of the pool]. Their [aptitude | 
inaptitude] surprised the instructor.
At the circus.
The teacher took her primary school class to see the lions and
acrobats at the circus. Only a few of the children were
[terrified by the performance | stayed awake through the performance].
Their [excitement | boredom] surprised the teacher.
Did the class see any acrobats?
Applying for a job.
It was very easy to get manual jobs in the area, so a group 
of school-leavers decided to apply for jobs as [astronauts | labourers].
Only a few of the school-leavers were successful in their 
application. Their [success | failure] surprised their friends.
At the boxing match.
Before the heavy weight bout, all of the boxers were weighed 
by a doctor. Only a few of the boxers were under [fifteen | seven] 
stone. Their [heaviness | lightness] surprised the doctor.
Getting exam results.
The girls crowded around the notice-board to see the exam
results for chemistry and biology. Only a few of the girls
scored more than [ninety | five] percent. Their [joy | grief] was obvious to
everyone.
Were the results for a physics exam?
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In the bar.
One of the barstaff liked to have lewd jokes with the female 
customers when they ordered a drink. Only a few of the women 
[enjoyed his jokes | returned to the bar]. Their [pleasure | displeasure] was 
obvious to everyone.
At the graduation ceremony.
The University's graduation ceremony was always an 
extremely expensive affair. Only a few of the students 
could afford to hire [graduation robes at seven pounds 
a day | a Rolls-Royce at one hundred pounds 
a day]. Their [wealth | poverty] shocked the Principal.
Going to a party.
The girls, who were all under fourteen, asked their parents 
if they could go to a birthday party at a classmate's house. Only a few 
of the parents allowed their daughter to [take alcohol with them | go to the 
party]. Their [strictness | laxness] reflected their own up-bringing.
Were the girls under fourteen?
In a restaurant.
The office party went to an up-market Italian restaurant for 
their Christmas dinner. Only a few of the office staff [offered 
to buy the waiter a drink | ate with their m ouths closed].
Their [courtesy | rudeness] was a surprise to the waiter.
Did the office party go to an Italian restaurant?
At a boy-scout camp.
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It was dark before the boy-scouts finished putting up the
tents, collected wood for the camp-fire, and sat around
the fire to have a meal. Only a few of the boy-scouts went
to bed [early | that night]. Their [wakefulness | sleepiness] annoyed
the scoutmaster.
Did the boys build a camp-fire?
Filler materials for Experiment 7
The following are the filler materials for Experiment 7. Some of the items were 
materials for another experiment. I have listed only those which appeared in 
one of the presentation blocks.
In a taxi.
A taxi-driver dropped a man and a woman off at the station.
On the way they had run into a traffic jam. The taxi driver 
and the woman had been arguing but the man had remained 
calm. The taxi-driver told the woman that he had been 
arguing with that she wouldn't miss the train.
The artist sent the flowers to the teacher
and the joiner brought the whisky for the workmate.
Although the very long film is
frightening the young child the mother enjoys the plot
and although the rather tall man is
singing the theme tune the chorus annoys the crowd.
The major sent the order back to the headquarters.
The model found the jacket changed in the studio.
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Although the popular story was
charming the cheerful cast the director was uncertain.
Although the elegant lady was
knitting the turquoise socks were unfinished.
Were the socks finished ?
The programmer posted the software hugged the librarian. 
The grandparent knitted the jumper for the adolescent.
Since the very famous case was 
intriguing the clever sergeant noted the facts.
Since the rather worried nurse was
bandaging the bleeding patient the consultant waited in fear.
The actor reserved the ticket took the taxi
and the lawyer despatched the report left the airport.
Because the exceedingly long route was 
tiring the injured walker stopped for a break 
and because the surprisingly keen boy was 
ironing the yellow jacket hung on a chair.
The executive sent the blackmail letter to the chairperson 
and the ambassador faxed the crucial visa to the traveller.
As the unhelpful reports were
discouraging the surly conscripts the sergeant was annoyed 
and as the annoying lawyers were
photocopying the crucial papers the statement was mislaid.
The disc jockey played the song praised the guitarist 
and the pop singer sold the car fired the manager.
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While the African safari was 
exciting the naive tourist flipped through books 
and while the Portuguese musician was 
composing the splendid opera played for days.
The barrister whispered the verdict coaxed the defendant. 
The producer assigned the programme to the cameraman.
As the deafening thunder was
menacing the desperate yachtsman returned quickly.
As the careful rider was
polishing the embossed buckle the harness glinted brightly.
The banker saved the seat next to the client.
The farmer built the house hated the town.
Although the important document was 
convincing the stupid boss the youth was not taken in. 
Although the aggressive magistrate was 
entering the noisy court did not settle down.
In the street.
A burglar looked over most of the houses in the street. 
Several of them had lights on so he concentrated on the 
others. Eventually he picked his target and broke in by 
the rear window.
Were the houses on the same street?
The waiter handed the glass glimpsed the charming hostess 
and the chemist rented the flat feared the shady landlord.
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While the recently produced video was 
boring the old experts watched with great interest 
and while the extremely famous scientist was 
choosing the best samples cooled in the compartment.
The woman painted the portrait near the house 
and the client repaid the money to the bank.
Since the rather formal complaint was
worrying the apprehensive singer the composer tried to help 
and since the very anxious doctor was 
assisting the incompetent surgeon the inspector asked to go. 
Did the composer try to help ?
The psychologist lent the book to the nurse.
The mathematician bought the wine kissed the guest.
Because the additional subject was
confusing the history student the teacher asked a question. 
Because the apprehensive toddler was 
visiting the generous uncle made a jelly.
Did the student ask a question ?
The climber tossed the rope yelled to the injured mountaineer. 
The builder passed the paint up to the spotty apprentice.
Although the particularly loud noise was 
distracting the little groups were very good.
Although the unusually smart boy was
explaining the complex rules the game seemed rather hard.
Did the game seem simple ?
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The publisher read the manuscript met the editor
and the consultant passed the stethoscope called the researcher.
While the further new evidence was 
dismaying the young defendant was looking nervous 
and while the rather bold architect was 
surveying the whole property was being levelled.
The baby fed the apple to the dappled pony.
The umpire tossed the jumper stopped the cricket player.
Because the extensive landscapes were
enchanting the fat duke the chauffeur was very cheerful.
Because the expanding grocers were 
opening the main shop was rather crowded.
The prince served the meal heard the princess.
The witch brought the frog to the wizard.
Since the American patrol was
threatening the cowardly terrorist fled speedily.
Since the Canadian expert was
directing the wonderful musical the performance went perfectly.
The singer returned the records to the confused composer 
and the agent offered the booking to the famous magician.
As the lengthy and pretentious review was
insulting the friendly producer the actor contacted friends
and as the eager but unhappy student was
programming the ancient computer the keyboard emitted sparks.
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Appendix 4: 
Resullts for the off-line post-test 
conducted following Experiment 7
Subjects made a forced choice between continuations which described a 
property of either the refset or compset of the previously quantified NP. The 
table illustrates the number of refset continuations selected when the quantified 
sentence matched pragmatic norms, and the number of compset continuations 
which were selected when the quantified sentence violated pragmatic norms. 
Those items marked with an asterisk were entered into the re-analysis of the 
Experiment 7 results.___________________________________________________
Norm -m atching N orm -violating
Titles Refset C ontinuation C om pset C ontinuation
At the Gym 5 10
* In the maths class 6 10
Working in a supermarket 5 10
* At the funfair 6 10
* At the train station 6 11
* Caught by a policeman 8 7
Buying compact discs 4 12
In the train station 5 11
At the sw im m ing pool 5 11
At the circus 4 9
Applying for a job omitted from analysis omitted from analysis
Going to a party 10 5
* Comparing heights 10 8
A health inspection 1 9
In the office 2 9
* Running a marathon 11 6
* At the theatre 9 10
* At the boxing match 9 8
* Getting exam results 10 11
* In a bar 9 8
* At the graduation ceremony 6 10
At a parly 5 7
* In a restaurant 8 10
At a boyscoul camp 5 10
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